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IV – Expansion – “Go West, young man”



Frank Bellew - 1876

Andrei Gromyko, a former Soviet foreign minister, once complained that Americans had “too many doctrines and concepts proclaimed at different times” and were therefore unable to pursue “a solid, coherent, and consistent policy¹.” And, indeed, American foreign policy has been labeled as isolationist, expansionist, neutral, imperialist, unilateral, multilateral, etc. This is why Walter Russell Mead has characterized American foreign policy

¹ Walter A. McDougall, “Back to Bedrock – The Eight Traditions of American Statecraft”, *Foreign Affairs*, Volume 76, N°2, March/April 1997, p. 134.

as a “kaleidoscope².” Still, Mead argues that there are four key traditions which can help define the foreign policy of the United States. Each of those traditions was shaped by a specific American leader: (1) Alexander Hamilton believed that the first task of America’s foreign policy was to integrate the United States into the global economy; (2) Thomas Jefferson emphasized the preservation of American democracy; (3) Andrew Jackson thought that the most important foreign policy goal was the physical security and the economic well-being of the American people; (4) Finally, Woodrow Wilson believed that the United States had both a moral obligation and an important national interest in spreading American democratic and social values throughout the world.

Like Mead, Walter McDougall also judges that it is necessary to leave aside simplistic perspectives when describing American foreign policy and he therefore offers his own framework. He identifies eight guiding principles. Four were designed “to deny the outside world the chance to shape America’s future³.” They are: (1) Liberty, or Exceptionalism; (2) Unilateralism, or Isolationism; (3) The American System, or Monroe Doctrine; (4) Expansionism, or Manifest Destiny. The other four rested on “the belief that America has a responsibility to nurture democracy and economic growth around the world⁴.” They are: (5) Progressive Imperialism; (6) Wilsonianism, or Liberal Internationalism; (7) Containment; (8) Global Meliorism.

Some of these traditions were meant to protect the country from foreign aggression, and the other ones reflected a will to project the political, economic, and cultural influence of the country onto other countries. As a result, using Frédéric Charillon’s terminology⁵, American foreign policy is both a “politique étrangère de protection” and a “politique étrangère de projection.” This twofold aspect of America’s foreign policy may explain why it often had, and still has, a rather ambiguous character. However baffling they are, the ambiguities of America’s foreign policy should be taken into account so as to avoid a Manichean perspective.

These ambiguities were already present in the early years of the American Republic but what prevailed throughout the nineteenth century and beyond was the westward expansion of the national domain. Already, in 1787, when he published his *Notes on the State of Virginia*, Thomas Jefferson expressed his conviction that the West would be the key to defining the character of the new nation. In 1831, Alexis de Tocqueville was dumbfounded by the expansionist mood of the American pioneers:

Nation de conquérants qui se soumet à mener la vie sauvage sans se jamais laisser entraîner par ses douceurs, qui n’aime de la civilisation et des lumières que ce qu’elles ont d’utile au bien-être et qui s’enfoncent dans les solitudes de l’Amérique avec une hache et des journaux; [...] C’est ce peuple nomade que les fleuves et les lacs n’arrêtent point, devant qui les forêts tombent et les prairies se couvrent d’ombrages; et qui, après avoir touché l’océan Pacifique, reviendra sur ses pas pour troubler et détruire la société qu’il aura formée derrière lui⁶.

The urge to go West was popularized in the 1860s by the newspaper editor Horace Greeley with the famous phrase “Go West, young man, go West and grow up with the country.”

² Walter Russell Mead, *Special Providence – American Foreign Policy and How it Changed the World*, New York, Alfred A. Knopf, 2001, p. 30.

³ Walter McDougall, *Promised Land, Crusader State – The American Encounter with the World Since 1776*, Boston, Mariner Books, 1997, p. 4.

⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 5.

⁵ Frédéric Charillon, “Fin ou renouveau des politiques étrangères?”, in F. Charillon (ed.), *Les Politiques étrangères – Ruptures et continuités*, Paris, La Documentation Française, 2001, pp. 13–33.

⁶ Alexis de Tocqueville, *Quinze jours dans le désert américain*, Paris, Éditions Mille et Une Nuits, [1860] 1998, p. 27.

1. Isolation

In September 1796, in his Farewell Address, President **George Washington (1)** made a plea for isolation when he declared: “The great rule of conduct for us in regard to foreign nations is, in extending our commercial relations to have with them as little political connection as possible⁷.” George Washington’s formula was not totally new and in point of fact one might say that he spelled out what had been a current practice for many years. Still, in so doing, he also showed the way for future generations of Americans and their political leaders.

Already, in the seventeenth century, the Pilgrim Fathers had come to America to seek isolation, to escape Europe and its corrupt ways. Far from Europe, they would be less exposed to the political and religious infightings of the day. In America, where some of them wanted to build a new Jerusalem, they meant, in the words of the Reverend Increase Mather, to “shake off the dust of Babylon⁸” and start anew. The Puritans had a rather strong feeling of self-righteousness which nourished their propensity for isolation. They were convinced that America enjoyed God’s special favor and therefore felt that it was vital to remain isolated so as to preserve their special relationship with God.

If religion played a decisive part, mostly within the Puritan community, geography and politics, on the other hand, affected all the colonies and contributed to their isolation. The geographical position of America made isolation feasible. Isolation was also strengthened because the colonists were given a good deal of political leeway. Although the source of whatever authority their government possessed was ultimately in England, they nonetheless had a significant amount of freedom in the running of their current affairs. This political autonomy was reinforced during the 1640s because of the Civil War in England, the British being too busy at home to keep a close eye on the colonists. The success of the American Revolution probably intensified the Americans’ isolationist tendency.

When the American colonists eventually declared their independence in 1776, they made it clear that “all political connection between them and the state of Great Britain is, and ought to be, totally dissolved.” This act of political severance reinforced the prevailing mood of isolation which had existed since the first settlements in America at the beginning of the seventeenth century. Once the colonists had chosen independence, it became vital to cut off all the remaining links with Great Britain and to make sure that the country would not get entangled with another foreign nation.

Therefore, when the revolutionaries sought an alliance with France against England, they did their best not to get involved in European affairs. In his diary, John Adams, one of the Founding Fathers, emphasized the need for the young republic to stay away from Europe’s affairs. He wrote:

That our Negotiations with France ought however, to be conducted with great caution and with all the foresight We could possibly obtain. That We ought not to enter into any Alliance with her, which should entangle Us in any future Wars in Europe, that We ought to lay it down as a first principle and a Maxim never to be forgotten, to maintain an entire Neutrality in all future European Wars⁹.

It was necessary for the young republic not to get involved in European affairs so as to keep its pristine character and stay away from the corrupting international politics of monarchies. French military aid was essential for the success of the American Revolution but this alliance had to remain strictly limited.

⁷ George Washington, “Farewell Address”, September 1796, in Thomas G. Paterson & Dennis Merrill (ed.), *Major Problems in American Foreign Relations*, Volume I: *To 1920*, *op. cit.*, p. 77.

⁸ Increase Mather in Max Savelle, “Early Diplomatic Principles”, in *ibid.*, p. 45.

⁹ John Adams in Thomas G. Paterson & Dennis Merrill (ed.), *ibid.*, pp. 30–31.

In the same manner, Americans sympathized with the French revolutionary process but did their best to stay clear of any possible involvement. In April 1793, following France's declaration of war against Great Britain, Spain, and Holland, George Washington issued a neutrality proclamation. The American administration pledged to "pursue a conduct friendly and impartial towards the belligerent powers." Again, in the first decade of the nineteenth century, America's response to the revolutionary movement in Santo Domingo was tepid at best. In February 1806, the United States decided to cut off its trade relations with Santo Domingo, which had declared its independence in 1804 after the black general Jean-Jacques Dessalines had put to rout the French army. The United States found it difficult to recognize a "Negro Republic," which was the direct product of the slave rebellion led by Toussaint l'Ouverture in the 1790s. A slave revolt which had resulted in the birth of a new nation was not something to celebrate in a country where slavery still existed. Isolation came in handy to avoid further contact with a nation which had set such an unfortunate example¹⁰. Haiti was not officially recognized by the United States before 1862.

Isolation was also adopted by the United States with respect to the revolutionary movement in South America. James Monroe, together with his Secretary of State, John Quincy Adams, adopted a policy of "impartial neutrality" and therefore refused to give the new South American nations official diplomatic recognition. They acted in this manner so as not to undermine their ongoing negotiations with Spain with regard to the possible annexation of Florida, "an object of earnest desire to this country"¹¹. As in the case of Haiti, the United States adopted a policy of isolation and neutrality because it suited its interests not to get involved. Diplomatic recognition of the new South American republics eventually came in 1822, that is to say, once the United States had finally secured the acquisition of Florida from Spain.

The failure of the United States to immediately recognize Haiti and the South American nations also reflected a genuine desire to avoid foreign entanglements. Before leaving the presidency, George Washington repeated, in his valedictory speech of 1796, his neutrality proclamation. He sincerely believed that "foreign influence [was] one of the most baneful foes of republican government," and urged his fellow-citizens "to steer clear of permanent alliances with any portion of the foreign world." However, by 1796, neutrality and therefore isolation were more and more difficult to sustain because they ran counter to America's other foreign policy objectives, notably territorial expansion.

2. Expansion

At the end of the eighteenth century, territorial expansion was already deeply rooted in the American psyche. The process of expansion had started before the original thirteen colonies became the United States of America. Somehow, the expansionist urge of the United States had been initiated by that of the British Empire, whose effort to acquire new territories in America culminated with the outcome of the Seven Years' War (1756-1763). The Treaty of Paris of 1763 provided that France would yield Canada and all its possessions east of the Mississippi River to England. The British also received Florida from Spain in exchange for the return of Cuba and the Philippines which had been conquered in 1761. Finally, by way of compensation for the loss of Florida, Spain was given Louisiana by France. In the end, France only retained in America the islands of Martinique, Saint Lucia, and Saint-Pierre and Miquelon. The territorial acquisition made by the British as a result of that conflict set an example for the Americans. Their interest in the western territories was reinforced after the

¹⁰ See Marie-Jeanne Rossignol, *Le ferment nationaliste – Aux origines de la politique extérieure des États-Unis, 1789–1812*, Paris, Belin, 1994, pp. 207–239.

¹¹ John Quincy Adams in Robert H. Ferrell (ed.), *Foundations of American Diplomacy, 1775-1872*, New York, Harper Torchbooks, 1968, p. 135.

Seven Years' War, all the more so as they had directly participated in the fighting. The children of empire had grown up and now had their own agenda: to go West.

The urge to go West, which was facilitated by the discovery in 1750 of the Cumberland Gap, a pass through the Appalachian Mountains, may partially be explained by economic and demographic factors. The availability of land was diminishing, and this reduction was all the more critical as the population of the colonies kept increasing, going from 630,000 in 1730 to 1,300,000 in 1754 to 1,850,000 in 1765. Another element accounts for this expansionist movement: the search for security. The Americans wanted to enlarge their territory so as to remove any potentially dangerous neighbors. The end of the War of Independence in 1783 allowed the Americans to achieve that aim since, with the Treaty of Paris, they gained an empire which extended well beyond the current areas of settlement and included the territory which lay between the Appalachians and the Mississippi River.

The integration of this vast area into the young republic was implemented by a series of land ordinances, the main one being the *Northwest Ordinance* of 1787. It provided that when a specific territory had 60,000 inhabitants, it could qualify for statehood. In 1792, Kentucky joined the Union and was soon followed by Tennessee in 1796. The Mississippi River provided a vital outlet for the people who settled in those new states but their right to navigate freely was challenged in 1802 when the Spanish Intendant at New Orleans decided to close the river to American commerce. On May 1, 1800, Napoleon had concluded with Spain the secret treaty of San Ildefonso, which provided for the retrocession of Louisiana to France. Now, Louisiana belonged to France but Spain continued to administer the territory. To secure navigation on the Mississippi, the Jefferson administration initiated negotiations with the French, who eventually sold Louisiana to the United States in April 1803. The acquisition was a bargain since 828,000 square miles were bought for only 15 million dollars, that is to say less than 3 cents an acre. In the process, the United States had doubled its size.

Following the acquisition of Louisiana, the Americans were much more confident and their urge to expand became stronger. In 1804, Jefferson organized a major expedition to collect information about the newly acquired territory and to find the mythical Northwest Passage. The expedition, which had been contemplated by **Thomas Jefferson (2)** even before the acquisition of Louisiana, was conducted by Meriwether Lewis and William Clark. Already, on January 18, 1803, in a "Confidential letter to Congress", he wrote:

An intelligent officer, with ten or twelve chosen men, fit for the enterprise, and willing to undertake it, taken from our posts, where they may be spared without inconvenience, might explore the whole line, even to the Western ocean, have conferences with the natives on the subject of commercial intercourse, get admission among them for our traders, as others are admitted, agree on convenient deposits for an interchange of articles, and return with the information acquired, in the course of two summers¹².

The Lewis and Clark expedition, also called the Corps of Discovery Expedition, lasted two years and the explorers went beyond the Rocky Mountains and reached the Pacific coast. This expedition was a scientific one but it also certainly paved the way for future landed expansion. In the meantime, the Americans also had their eyes on Florida, which now belonged to Spain.

The British, who had acquired Florida after the Seven Years' War, decided in 1783 to cede it to Spain. In 1810, settlers in West Florida, with the unofficial strategic help of the Americans, staged a rebellion, declared their independence and requested annexation by the United States, something the American government was ready to grant them. From 1817 to 1819, Secretary of State John Quincy Adams applied a combination of diplomatic skill and

¹² Thomas Jefferson, "Confidential letter to Congress", January 18, 1803, in Donald Jackson (ed.), *Letters of the Lewis & Clark Expedition with Related Documents, 1783-1854*, Volume I, Urbana, University of Illinois, 1978, pp. 12-13.

military pressure on Spain to acquire Florida and create an “American global empire¹³.” After the War of 1812, also called the Second War of Independence, such an agenda was possible because the Americans regained their pride, were no longer viewed as an inferior nation and could then focus on expansion.

In August 1814, the British had attacked Washington, D. C. and looted the White House and most public buildings but in September 1814, at the Battle of Baltimore, the Americans beat back the British. The successful defense of Baltimore inspired the poet Francis Scott Key, who wrote “The Star-Spangled Banner” to celebrate the American victory. In the concluding lines of the last stanza, he predicted: “And the star-spangled banner in triumph shall wave / O’er the land of the free, and the home of the brave¹⁴.” The poem was later adapted as a song and became the national anthem in 1916. It is also during the War of 1812 that the national personification of the United States, Uncle Sam, was born. Samuel Wilson, a meat-packer from New York State, supplied beef to the Army using boxes which were branded with the initials “U.S.” The soldiers, jokingly, said that they referred to “Uncle Sam.”

In 1818, General Andrew Jackson, on the pretense that the Seminole Indians were responsible for recurrent troubles on the northern border of Florida, entered Florida to chastise the Seminoles. He felt justified in doing so because the Spanish authorities failed to do it. Meanwhile, John Quincy Adams kept negotiating with his Spanish counterpart, Don Luis de Onís.

Adams’s diplomatic enterprise eventually paid off, and in February 1819, with the Transcontinental Treaty, Spain accepted the cession of East and West Florida to the United States. This treaty concluded successfully the first phase of the continental expansion of the United States in the nineteenth century and confirmed America’s territorial appetite, something that was aptly captured by Don Luis de Onís himself in his *Memoria sobre las negociaciones entre Espana y los Estados Unidos de America*: “The Americans believe themselves superior to all the nations of Europe, and see their destiny to extend their dominion to the isthmus of Panama, and in the future to all of the New World¹⁵.” With the Adams-Onís Treaty, the expansionist mood of the Americans was temporarily satisfied but it did not put a definitive end to their lust for land.

3. The Monroe Doctrine

Don Luis de Onís was quite perceptive when he wrote that the Americans were eager to extend their dominion to the Western Hemisphere. At the beginning of the nineteenth century, the United States did not have the power yet to impose its will on the entire American continent. Still, the Americans were paying a good deal of attention to the political developments in South America.

In the early 1820s, the Americans were favorable to the South American rebels who were breaking the chains of Spanish imperial rule. But at first they refused to recognize the new nations so as not to antagonize Spain for fear it would not respect the Adams–Onís Treaty and take back Florida. In 1822, the United States eventually recognized the states of Argentina, Chile, Colombia, Peru, and Mexico. However, the Americans feared that the Holy Alliance might plan to help Spain recover its South American Empire. In 1815, the rulers of Russia, Austria, and Prussia, had signed a common document in which they pledged to uphold monarchy in the name of Christian principles and, in 1820, the Holy Alliance crushed uprisings in Italy and Spain. In addition to South America, the Americans were also worried

¹³ See William Earl Weeks, *John Quincy Adams and American Global Empire*, Lexington, Ky., The University Press of Kentucky, 1992.

¹⁴ Francis Scott Key, “The Star-Spangled Banner”, in Geoffrey Moore (ed.), *op. cit.*, p. 68

¹⁵ Don Luis de Onís in William Earl Weeks, *op.cit.*, p. 72.

by the Russian maneuvers on the Pacific coast. In 1821, a Russian edict had extended the boundary of Alaska southward into Oregon and the Americans feared that Russia intended to colonize the area. The Monroe administration felt that these external dangers demanded a response.

In December 1823, in his annual message to Congress, President James Monroe formulated a series of principles as far as the foreign policy of the United States was concerned. He announced first that the Western Hemisphere was no longer open to colonization, then declared that the European powers should not intervene in the Americas, and, finally, he promised that the United States of America would not get entangled in European affairs:

[T]he American continents, by the free and independent condition which they have assumed and maintain, are henceforth not to be considered as subjects for future colonization by any European powers. [...] We owe it, therefore, to candor and to the amicable relations existing between the United States and those powers to declare that we should consider any attempt on their part to extend their system to any portion of this hemisphere as dangerous to our peace and safety. [...] Our policy in regard to Europe, which was adopted at an early stage of the wars which have so long agitated that quarter of the globe, nevertheless remains the same, which is, not to interfere in the internal concerns of any of its powers¹⁶.

Afterwards, those principles of noncolonization, nonintervention and isolation came to be known collectively as the **Monroe Doctrine (4)** although they were largely defined by his Secretary of State, **John Quincy Adams (3)**. So, the Monroe Doctrine was a form of warning to the monarchies of Europe against intervening in Latin America. It was also meant to answer the Russian threat. Despite these apparently clear objectives the Monroe Doctrine has been and still is a matter of debate.

First of all, because it claimed that the United States would not get entangled in European affairs, one may say that the Monroe Doctrine was nothing but the continuation of America's isolationist policy. Although the Monroe Doctrine put forward the same isolationist position, it cannot be restricted to an isolationist declaration. Like his predecessors, President Monroe considered that it was vital to remain aloof from Europe by refusing entangling alliances. But, he also argued that it was necessary to make sure that Europe did not get involved in American affairs. Not only did Monroe pledge that the United States would not go to Europe, but he also promised that the United States would see to it that European powers did not come over to the Americas. The Monroe Doctrine was then an active defense of America's ideals, security, and commerce. It was an affirmation of the national interest, which came at a time when the United States had secured a rather large safety zone. Somehow, the Monroe Doctrine put an end to America's first phase of expansion by claiming that it only meant to protect its interests. However, it has been argued that the Monroe Doctrine was not exclusively a defensive measure.

Some historians have claimed that, far from putting an end to America's first period of expansion, the Monroe Doctrine was a formula for further expansion. According to William Appleman Williams: "[T]he men who formulated it [...] viewed it as a positive, expansionist statement of American supremacy in the hemisphere¹⁷." Still, those men were not merely expansionist, as it can be deduced from John Quincy Adams' declaration about America in July 1821:

Wherever the standard of freedom and independence has been or shall be unfurled, there will her heart, her benedictions and her prayers be. But she goes not abroad in search of monsters

¹⁶ "The Monroe Doctrine", in Robert H. Ferrell (ed.), *Foundations of American Diplomacy*, *op. cit.*, pp. 149-150.

¹⁷ William Appleman Williams, "Manifesto of the U.S. Empire", in Thomas G. Paterson & Denis Merrill (ed.), *Major Problems in American Foreign Relations*, Volume I: *To 1920*, *op. cit.* p. 190.

to destroy. She is the well-wisher to the freedom and independence of all. She is the champion and vindicator only of her own¹⁸.

In addition to this, one should not overlook the fact that it was only a doctrine and that for most of the nineteenth century, the United States did not have the power to enforce it. So, for example, when Great Britain decided to annex the Falkland Islands in 1833, the United States could not react. Similarly, European interventions, for example those by France in Mexico and Argentina in 1838, were viewed without alarm. Again, until the 1850s, the United States did not oppose British presence in Central America.

Whether the Monroe Doctrine reinforced America's isolationism or, on the contrary, its expansionist urge, is a matter of historical debate. Some will keep arguing that the Monroe Doctrine was primarily an isolationist statement whereas others will say that it was a formula for further expansion. What is undeniable, however, is the fact that the Monroe Doctrine emphasized America's exceptionalism. In the concluding paragraph of his doctrine, James Monroe wrote:

If we compare the present conditions of our Union with its actual state at the close of our Revolution, the history of the world furnishes no example of a progress in improvement in all the important circumstances which constitute the happiness of a nation which bears any resemblance to it¹⁹.

Two centuries after John Winthrop formulated his celebrated Covenant, the United States had become a "city upon a hill" whose ambitions kept growing and soon became a source of worry for its neighbors. Simón Bolívar, the Venezuelan revolutionary leader, once observed that the United States "seemed destined by Providence to plague America with torments in the name of freedom²⁰."

4. Manifest Destiny

The purchase of Louisiana and the annexation of Florida marked a significant territorial expansion for the United States and gave the Americans greater confidence. The Monroe Doctrine was, so to speak, a declaration of diplomatic independence. In the future, it could serve as the rationale for a more active foreign policy. In the meantime, however, the Americans had enough on their hands.

The first priority was the settlement of the newly acquired territories. Settlement was the continuation of expansion by other means even though no new territory was acquired in the process. It kept the expansionist mood alive. As a result, once it was achieved, it was no surprise that the Americans should look elsewhere for further expansion. Settlement had not quenched the Americans' appetite for national growth. The acquisition of Texas in 1845 may be described as the apex of a steady expansionist movement. It marked the beginning of the second expansionist period which was characterized by military conquest and was legitimized by a mighty ideological movement known as "Manifest Destiny."

In March 1836, a few days before the Alamo mission fell, the Texans declared their independence, established a republic and requested admission into the American Union. Their request was rejected by President Andrew Jackson because it would have meant adding a slave state to the Union. In 1844, James Polk, a staunch expansionist was elected president and the annexation of Texas was part of his political agenda, as he made it clear on March 4, 1845, in his inaugural address: "I shall [...] endeavor by all constitutional, honorable, and

¹⁸ John Quincy Adams, "Speech on Independence Day", United States House of Representatives, July 4, 1821. Available at <http://teachingamericanhistory.org/library/index.asp?document=2336>

¹⁹ "The Monroe Doctrine", in Robert H. Ferrell (ed.), *Foundations of American Diplomacy*, *op. cit.*, p. 151.

²⁰ Simón Bolívar in George C. Herring, *From Colony to Superpower – U.S. Foreign Relations since 1776*, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2008, p. 161.

appropriate means to consummate the expressed will of the people and Government of the United States by the reannexation of Texas to our Union at the earliest practicable period²¹.” In December 1845, Texas became the twenty-eighth state of the Union. On May 13, 1846, the killing of eleven American soldiers on the Texan border gave Polk the pretext he had been waiting for to go to war against Mexico. In 1847, the U.S. Army captured Mexico City and the Mexicans surrendered. With the Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo, which was signed on February 2, 1848, Mexico accepted the annexation of Texas by the United States. The treaty also provided for the transfer of California to the United States. The acquisition of California completed the expansionist process on the Pacific coast which had started earlier in 1846 when England had ceded the Oregon territory to the United States. All in all, with the annexation of Texas and the acquisition of both California and Oregon, the United States had achieved the largest territorial extension of its history. The size of the country had increased to more than three million square miles.

In 1853, one final strip of land was acquired from Mexico by James Gadsden, an agent of the American administration. This final acquisition, which was meant to be used for a future transcontinental railroad, put an end to the contiguous expansion of the United States. The continental United States now made up a compact geographic entity. This growth of the national domain partially resulted from military conquest, which was sustained by the powerful ideological underpinnings of “Manifest Destiny.”

The phrase “Manifest Destiny” was coined by **John O’Sullivan (5)**, a journalist who in 1837 had founded a journal, the *Democratic Review*, to give the Jacksonian movement a greater intellectual and political presence. In 1839, he published in his *Democratic Review* a text, “The Great Nation of Futurity,” in which he claimed that America was destined to great achievements. He became more specific following Polk’s election to the presidency in 1844. In July 1845, that is to say at a time when Congress was about to vote in favor of the annexation of Texas, John O’Sullivan in his *Democratic Review* claimed that “[t]he manifest destiny [of the United States] was to overspread the continent allotted by Providence for the free development of our yearly multiplying millions²².” Again, in December 1845, in the *New York Morning News*, he wrote that Oregon belonged to the United States “[b]y the right of our manifest destiny to overspread and to possess the whole of the continent which Providence has given us for the development of the great experiment of liberty and federated self-government entrusted to us²³.” O’Sullivan had coined the phrase which was going to epitomize the spirit of expansionism which prevailed in that period.

The idea of a “destiny” for the United States to expand was based on at least five elements: natural right, geographical predestination, the destined use of the soil, the extension of the area of freedom and political regeneration:

- (1) Natural right was the notion that a right is given prior to or independently of political society. For instance, it was argued that the settlers had a natural right to navigate the Mississippi River.
- (2) This element was reinforced by the notion of geographical predestination. As far the Mississippi River was concerned, it was also claimed that the Americans had the right to navigate on it simply because of its geographical location. In a similar way, Florida was seen as a natural appendage of the United States and therefore, geographically, meant to be part of the United States. Contiguity or propinquity justified its acquisition.

²¹ James Polk, “Inaugural Address”, March 4, 1845, in Thomas G. Paterson & Dennis Merrill (ed.), *Major Problems in American Foreign Relations*, Volume I: *To 1920*, *op. cit.* p. 251.

²² John O’Sullivan in Albert Weinberg, *Manifest Destiny – A Study of Nationalist Expansionism in American History*, Baltimore, The John Hopkins Press, 1935, p. 112.

²³ *Ibid.* pp. 144–145.

- (3) The third element, the destined use of the soil, meant that civil states were entitled to the uncultivated lands of those in a natural state. In other words, the industrious American farmers could take away the lands of the Indians who were hunters and gatherers.
- (4) The idea of extending the area of freedom emerged at the time of the Louisiana Purchase. Thomas Jefferson justified the acquisition of this territory by the need to preserve and promote American democracy.
- (5) This notion was completed with that of political regeneration, that is to say the assumption that the American experience was successful, that it was universally valid, and that Americans had a duty to help other nations to emulate it.

These elements, which were identified by the American historian Albert Weinberg in 1935 in his seminal book, *Manifest Destiny – A Study of Nationalist Expansionism in American History*, were put forward by the expansionists in order to justify the annexation of Texas and the acquisition of Oregon. If this ideology of expansionism seduced a vast majority of American people, a few begged to differ. Henry David Thoreau, for example, refused to pay a poll tax on the ground that the money would be used to support the Mexican-American War and therefore the extension of slavery. Thoreau explained his resistance in his *Civil Disobedience*, which was published in 1849.

In spite of Thoreau's stance, by the end of the 1840s, the United States spread across the American continent from the Atlantic coast to the Pacific Rim, and, as the frontier kept moving west, the urge of the Americans to look outward grew.

5. Looking Outward

In 1854, the Franklin Pierce administration drafted the so-called Ostend Manifesto, a secret document which stated the desire of the United States government to acquire Cuba. Because of a strong opposition to the plan, the acquisition of Cuba by the United States never materialized. In point of fact, in spite of what Albert Weinberg called the "grasping spirit" of the 1850s, there was no new territorial acquisition during that decade except for the Gadsden Purchase of 1853. What's more, the outbreak of the Civil War in 1861 cut short the urge to enlarge the national domain. The Americans were too busy fighting on their soil to contemplate any new territorial extension. Still, the Civil War facilitated the settlement of the territories which had been acquired during the 1840s. In 1862, the *Homestead Act* and the *Pacific Railroad Act* made westward expansion easier. In addition to settling the West, some American foreign policy officials were also trying to develop foreign trade.

Daniel Webster (6), who served as Secretary of State from 1841 to 1843 and again from 1850 to 1852, considered that it was vital for the United States to develop American commerce with Asia. In 1843, he urged Caleb Cushing, America's special envoy to China, to do so:

A leading object of the Mission in which you are now to be engaged, is to secure the entry of American ships and cargoes into these ports, on terms as favorable as those which are enjoyed by English merchants. [...] cultivating, to the greatest extent practicable, friendly commercial intercourse with China, in all its accessible ports, is a matter of moment to the commercial and manufacturing, as well as the agricultural and mining, interests of the United States²⁴.

As a result of Cushing's diplomatic efforts, the Treaty of Wangxia was signed with China in 1844. A decade later, a similar commercial agreement, the Treaty of Kanagawa, was signed

²⁴ Daniel Webster in Thomas G. Paterson & Dennis Merrill (ed.), *Major Problems in American Relations*, Volume I, *op. cit.*, p. 304.

with Japan. In order to secure the commercial interests of the United States, Webster also endeavored to reinforce its presence in the Pacific Ocean. For example, judging that Hawaii could be used as a way station in the China trade, he did his best to keep the European powers away from this island. The annexation of New Zealand in 1840 by the British and the acquisition of the Marquesas by the French in 1842 had worried the Americans and led the United States government to extend the noncolonization and nonintervention principles of the Monroe Doctrine to Hawaii.

William Seward (7), Lincoln's Secretary of State, shared similar concerns and was eager to promote America's commercial interests. Because of the Civil War, Seward was unable to advance his commercial goals during the first half of his mandate but afterward he did all he could possibly do to carry out his commercial program. In the course of his mandate, he also extended the national domain when, in March 1867, he signed a treaty with the Russians by which the Americans accepted to pay 7 million dollars for the purchase of Alaska. Although political opponents derided the acquisition of Alaska as "Seward's folly", it was consistent with Seward's commercial strategy. It would help contain British ambitions by squeezing British Columbia between two parts of the United States. Still, the acquisition was as much the result of a well-planned American initiative as of pure luck. The fact is that the Russians were eager to sell this huge piece of land. Besides, it was not the most significant element of Seward's commercial agenda.

His agenda was at least threefold. First of all, Seward deemed it vital for the United States to acquire naval bases both in the Caribbean area and in the Pacific Ocean so as to reinforce the strategic position of the country in the commercial war which was bound to take place over the Asian trade. However, because of the opposition of the Senate, the only success he had was the acquisition of Brooks Island, which was renamed Midway Island in 1903. The second key element in Seward's agenda was to secure canal rights in Central America. The creation and control of a canal on the Isthmus of Panama was fundamental for the commercial interests of the United States. In 1869, Seward signed a treaty with Colombia which gave the United States the right to build a canal through Panama but the Senate refused to ratify it. When it came to the third aspect of his commercial strategy, that is to say the opening of the Chinese market, Seward was more successful. In 1868, he negotiated the Burlingame Treaty, which stipulated that American goods could enter the Chinese market on the same basis as goods from European powers. So, despite various setbacks, Seward's commercial policy made progress. In any case, it pointed in the direction of the future expansion of the country. However, the insular or maritime expansion of the United States could not take place before this project was widely supported.

By 1893, because of the serious economic crisis which affected the country, there was now a rather large consensus with regard to the need for the United States to seek new markets. In 1890, **Alfred T. Mahan (10)**, a navy officer who had been appointed president of the Naval War College in 1886, published a very influential book, *The Influence of Sea Power upon History, 1600-1783*. In this book he analyzed the rise and decline of great maritime powers and argued that sea power was indispensable to maintain greatness. He also advocated the development of overseas trade as a means to solve America's overproduction crisis:

Whether they will or no, Americans must now begin to look outward. The growing production of the country demands it. An increasing volume of public sentiment demands it. The position of the United States, between the two Old Worlds and the two great oceans, makes the same claim, which will soon be strengthened by the creation of the new link joining the Atlantic and Pacific²⁵.

²⁵ Alfred T. Mahan, "The United States Looking Outward", *Atlantic Monthly*, December 1890. Available at <http://www.samuelbrenner.com/URIHIS142/Documents/mahan1890art.htm>

Mahan argued that the development of overseas trade demanded both building up a great battleship fleet and the acquisition of naval bases. Mahan's strategic thinking was indirectly supported by that of **Frederick Jackson Turner (11)**, a well-known historian.

In 1893, in a book entitled *The Frontier in American History*, Turner argued that the closing of the frontier, that is to say the completion of western settlement, demanded further expansion because "this perennial rebirth, this fluidity of American life, this expansion westward with its new opportunities, its continuous touch with the simplicity of primitive society, furnish the forces dominating American character²⁶." With the disappearance of the frontier, the Americans had lost a central factor in their dynamic of progress and it was necessary to replace it. He claimed that the solution lay in overseas commercial expansion. So, even before the economic crisis of 1893, the current strategic thinking, which was represented by both Mahan and Turner, emphasized the need for the United States to go on with its commercial expansion. In a similar way, some ideologues were also advocating a revival of Manifest Destiny.

6. The Imperialist Temptation

The concept of Manifest Destiny was revived when, in March 1885, *Harper's New Monthly Magazine* published an article entitled "Manifest Destiny." It had been written by the historian and philosopher **John Fiske (8)**, who claimed that the Anglo-Saxon race had managed to civilize the New World against barbaric societies and that it still had a mission to educate the rest of the world. **Josiah Strong (9)**, a Congregational pastor and a member of the Home Missionary Society, was also a prophet of Manifest Destiny. In 1885, he became famous with the publication of a book entitled *Our Country – Its Possible Future and Its Present Crisis*. Strong believed that the future of America meant expansion because the Anglo-Saxon had "an instinct or genius for colonizing":

His unequaled energy, his indomitable perseverance, and his personal independence, made him a pioneer. He excels all others in pushing his way into new countries. It was those in whom this tendency was strongest that came to America, and this inherited tendency has been further developed by the westward sweep of successive generations across the continent. So noticeable has this characteristic become that English visitors remark it. Charles Dickens once said that the typical American would hesitate to enter heaven unless assured that he could go farther west²⁷.

Like Fiske, Strong provided American expansionism in the 1890s with a solid ideological framework.

When he entered the presidency in 1897, William McKinley was confronted with the critical political situation in Cuba. In February 1895, a revolution had erupted in Cuba and the rebels were demanding the independence of the island. Spain refused to grant the Cubans independence and put down the rebellion in a ruthless manner. At first, the American administration tried not to get involved and in June 1895 Grover Cleveland issued a neutrality proclamation even though, the following month, Secretary of State Richard Olney revived the Monroe Doctrine when he declared that "today the United States is practically sovereign on this continent, and its fiat is law upon the subjects to which it confines its interposition²⁸." The situation changed with the arrival of McKinley.

Following riots in Cuba in January 1898, McKinley dispatched the armored cruiser the *Maine* so as to protect American citizens and property. In February, the *Maine* exploded in

²⁶ Frederick Jackson Turner in Thomas G. Paterson & Dennis Merrill (ed.), *Major Problems in American Relations*, Volume I, *op. cit.*, p. 355.

²⁷ Josiah Strong in Bernard Vincent, *La destinée manifeste des États-Unis au dix-neuvième siècle*, *op.cit.*, p. 116.

²⁸ Richard Olney, July 1895, in Thomas G. Paterson & Dennis Merrill (ed.), *Major Problems in American Relations*, Volume I, *op. cit.*, p. 357.

Havana harbor. It was an accident but at the time it was claimed that it was the result of a conspiracy. In March, Senator **Redfield Proctor (12)** delivered an emotional speech to the Senate in which he reported on his recent trip to Cuba and described the human suffering on the island: “I could not believe that out of a population of one million six hundred thousand, 200,000 had died within these Spanish forts, practically prison walls, within a few months past, from actual starvation and disease caused by insufficient and improper food²⁹.” The McKinley administration, which was also urged to act by the “yellow press”, eventually sent an ultimatum to Spain asking for the assurance that Cuba would become independent. Spain would not hear of independence for the Cubans.

In April, **William McKinley (13)** signed a declaration of war and partially justified it on humanitarian grounds:

In the cause of humanity and to put an end to the barbarities, bloodshed, starvation, and horrible miseries now existing there, and which the parties to the conflict are either unable or unwilling to stop or mitigate. It is no answer to say this is all in another country, belonging to another nation, and is therefore none of our business. It is specially our duty, for it is right at our door³⁰.

A few weeks later, arguing that Hawaii could serve as a military base en route to the Philippines, McKinley asked Congress to annex the island: “We need Hawaii just as much and a good deal more than we did California. It is manifest destiny³¹.” In May 1898, Congress complied and the island was annexed.

After a “splendid little war”, the Treaty of Paris was signed in December 1898. It provided for the cession to the United States of the Philippines, Puerto Rico and Guam, territories which had previously belonged to the Spanish Empire. U.S. forces withdrew from Cuba in 1901, after the signing of the Platt Amendment which transformed the island into a virtual American protectorate and, according to Juan Gualberto Gómez, the Afro-Cuban revolutionary leader and a delegate to the Cuban Constitutional Convention, turned the Cubans into “a vassal people³².” The Cuban government promised to provide the United States with naval stations, one of which has been under American jurisdiction ever since: Guantánamo Bay. Because of these acquisitions, America’s mission appeared to be not only to help oppressed people but also to conquer new territories. Like the European powers, the United States seemed to have an imperialist agenda.

The Filipinos were not prepared to accept the replacement of the Spanish domination by that of the Americans and they were ready to defend their rights. Hardly had the peace treaty been signed when, in February 1899, the Filipinos, led by **Emilio Aguinaldo (14)**, staged a rebellion against the American authorities. As the United States was not inclined to leave the Philippines, McKinley decided to put down the rebellion. This proved quite difficult and the rebellion lasted more than three years. About 4,000 American soldiers and some 16,000 Filipino soldiers were killed in the course of the conflict. Some 200,000 Filipino civilians also died because of the war. In the process, the United States resorted to the brutal methods the Spanish had practiced in Cuba and which the Americans had denounced. Meanwhile, in the United States, opposition to the acquisition of the Philippines, and therefore to the building up of an empire, kept growing.

²⁹ Senator Redfield Proctor, March 17, 1898, in Robert H. Ferrell (ed.), *America as a World Power, 1872-1945*, New York, Harper & Row, 1971, p. 57.

³⁰ William McKinley, April 11, 1898, in *ibid.*, p. 63.

³¹ William McKinley in Walter LaFeber, *The American Search for Opportunity, 1865-1913*, The Cambridge History of American Foreign Relations, Volume II, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1993, p. 148.

³² Juan Gualberto Gómez in Jonathan M. Hansen, “Give Guantánamo back to Cuba”, *The International Herald Tribune*, January 12, 2012.

In November 1898, in Boston, the Anti-Imperialist League was founded in order to organize the resistance to the ratification of the Paris Treaty. Anti-imperialists such as Mark Twain, the vice president of the Anti-Imperialist league from 1901 to 1910, were opposed to the acquisition of the Philippines and they offered a wide range of objections to account for their position. One of the most fundamental arguments put forward by the members of the League was the idea that the acquisition of the Philippines would betray the principle of self-determination. Their argument was that men should not be governed without their consent, even if they were Filipinos. They also claimed that the Constitution did not give the federal government the right to annex faraway places such as the Philippines. What's more, historically speaking, America was identified with the ideal of liberty and not imperialism. To acquire distant colonies would mark a departure from traditional American practice. It would also lead the United States to become entangled in international affairs and would therefore negate the isolationist principle laid down by the Founding Fathers. Besides, American involvement in international politics would automatically endanger American security and, as a result, the country would have to protect itself and launch a costly militarization process at the expense of domestic affairs. In spite of these objections, the Paris Treaty was ratified by the Senate on February 6, 1899.

This very month, the English poet Rudyard Kipling published his famous poem "The White Man's Burden", with the subtitle "The United States and the Philippines Islands." Its first lines seemed to support American colonization of the Philippines: "Take up the White Man's burden / Send forth the best ye breed." On October 17, 1899, the American statesman **Carl Schurz (15)** delivered a speech in Chicago in which he chastised those who might use Kipling's poem to justify the annexation of the Philippines:

Here are our "burden" men, who piously turn up their eyes and tell us, with a melancholy sigh, that all this conquest business may be very irksome, but that a mysterious Providence has put it as a "burden" upon us, which, however sorrowfully, we must bear; that this burden consists in our duty to take care of the poor people of the Philippines; and that in order to take proper care of them we must exercise sovereignty over them; and that if they refuse to accept our sovereignty, we must alas! alas! kill them, which makes the burden very solemn and sad³³.

Schurz and the Anti-Imperialist League did not prevent the acquisition of the Philippines but their fight awoke the American people to the fact that imperialism was not the right course to follow because it profoundly contradicted America's ideals. As a result, by 1900, the idea of building a colonial empire was no longer on the agenda. However, the United States was still determined to retain its strategic and economic position on the international scene. For example, in September 1899, Secretary of State John Hay formulated his "open door" policy towards China. This policy meant to protect American commercial interests in China against possible challenges from the European powers.

President McKinley, who was fatally shot at the Pan-American Exposition in Buffalo on September 6, 1901, was replaced by his Vice-President, **Theodore Roosevelt (16)**, a staunch expansionist, who, the year before, had declared: "Is America a weakling, to shrink from the work of the great world powers? No. the young giant of the West stands on a continent and clasps the crest of an ocean in either hand³⁴." If need be, Roosevelt was prepared to use force to promote his objectives as he had adopted the adage: "Speak softly and carry a big stick, you will go far." He did resort to military action to defend American interests in Central America. In 1904, to justify American intervention in Santo Domingo, Roosevelt announced a corollary to the Monroe Doctrine. This corollary declared U.S.

³³ Carl Schurz, "Address at the Anti-Imperialist Conference", Chicago, October 17, 1899. Available at <http://www.trip.net/~bobwb/schurz/speech/imperialism2.html>

³⁴ Theodore Roosevelt in Martin Walker, *America Reborn*, *op. cit.* pp. 3-4.

hegemony in the Western Hemisphere and stated that the United States was prepared to act as a policeman if necessary.

McKinley and Roosevelt fulfilled William Seward's agenda since, in the course of their mandates, naval bases were acquired, canal rights were secured, and new markets were opened. By the end of the nineteenth century, the United States had become a great military power and the greatest economic power in the world. However, the Spanish-American War made American policymakers realize that foreign involvement could be very costly. From then on, the United States would try to remain as neutral as possible.

7. Neutrality

Largely because of the difficult aftermath of the Spanish-American War in the Philippines, the United States at the beginning of the twentieth century was no longer interested in grabbing new lands. However, it was keen on protecting its assets, at the point of a gun if necessary, as it did in Honduras (1907), Mexico (1911), Cuba, and Nicaragua (1912). Still, provided foreign powers did not threaten America's interests and did not intervene in the Western Hemisphere, the United States meant to remain aloof from European and Asian affairs. The Americans and their leaders intended to keep away from the chaos of the world, which materialized in colonial rivalries, military alliances and arms build-ups. Neutrality seemed to be the wisest policy to adopt.

In August 1914, that is to say only a couple of weeks after World War I had broken out, Woodrow Wilson issued a neutrality declaration in which he said that "the United States must be neutral in fact, as well as in name, during these days that are to try men's souls. We must be impartial in thought, as well as action, must put a curb upon our sentiments, as well as upon every transaction that might be construed as a preference of one party to the struggle before another³⁵." Wilson had grown up in the South in the years following the Civil War and knew a lot about the horrors of war. As a result, he developed a very strong pacifist attitude and his proclamation of neutrality was not surprising as it reflected his personal inclination. Neutrality was also in keeping with America's isolationist tradition and the corresponding fear of foreign entanglements. What's more, Wilson's neutrality proclamation reflected the general mood of the American public, who felt no vital interest of the United States was directly threatened by the war in Europe. Wilson also issued this proclamation to stave off possible ethnic divisions within the country. Finally, Wilson clung to neutrality because he wanted the United States to remain above the fray. In so doing, he would have the required moral authority to participate in the diplomatic process after WWI and set the terms that would guarantee a lasting peace.

The United States remained neutral for almost three years while Wilson secretly endeavored to forge a negotiated peace settlement with the belligerents. Both in 1915 and 1916, Colonel House, Wilson's adviser, had gone to Europe to act as a mediator but to no avail. In February 1917, because of German submarine warfare and the so-called Zimmermann Telegram, a German message which proposed to Mexico an alliance against the United States, the American government eventually broke off its diplomatic relations with Germany. However, Wilson's decision to declare war on Germany was an agonizing experience for him. On April 1, 1917, that is to say on the eve of his war message to Congress, he showed the greatest reluctance to lead his people into war because "they'll forget there ever was such a thing as tolerance. To fight you must be brutal and ruthless, and the spirit of ruthless brutality will enter into the very fibre of our national life, infecting

³⁵ Woodrow Wilson, "Message on Neutrality", August 20, 1914. Available at <http://millercenter.org/president/speeches/detail/3791>

Congress, the courts, the policeman on the beat, the man in the street³⁶.” Still, **Woodrow Wilson (17)** knew that neutrality was “no longer feasible or desirable” and felt that the United States, because of its high moral stance, could act as a mediator. The following day, when he delivered his **war message**, he proved convincing enough and a formal declaration of war was passed by Congress a couple of days later.

When he came back from Europe, where he had participated in the peace conference in Versailles, Wilson was faced with rather strong opposition as the Republicans had won the November 1918 congressional elections. In the Senate, the opposition was led by Henry Cabot Lodge, the chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. Lodge argued that some of the articles of the peace treaty, especially Article X, undermined American sovereignty because the United States would be involved in a collective security organization, something that broke with its foreign policy tradition. Therefore he demanded that it be amended. Wilson refused to compromise and the fight went on. He eventually lost it when, in March 1920, the Senators decided not to ratify the Versailles Treaty. This rejection reflected the prevailing isolationist mood in the Senate but also that of the American public. The war had been a traumatic experience and the Versailles conference a disillusioning one. The Americans felt that European powers had gone back to normal power politics and were behaving in a self-seeking way, not trying to build a more stable and peaceful world order. Some Americans began wondering whether it had been worthwhile going to war and were putting pressure on the administration not to meddle in external affairs anymore. They deemed that Europe was untrustworthy and that therefore it was fundamental to stay clear from her. This resurgence of isolationism lasted for almost two decades.

In the 1920s, the United States showed a limited interest in the affairs of Asia and Europe. This isolationist trend was reinforced in the 1930s because of the Great Depression. The Americans had no choice but to focus on the internal affairs of their country. So, when the Japanese army intervened in Manchuria in September 1931, the American administration responded with the Stimson Doctrine. It declared that the United States would recognize no changes in the Far East which were brought by force. The Stimson Doctrine did not deter Japan from occupying Manchuria. The United States also remained aloof from European developments. It neither intervened in the Spanish Civil War nor reacted to Italian and German maneuvers. Franklin Delano Roosevelt, who considered that the American people were unwilling to risk “the slightest chance of becoming involved in a quarrel in Europe which had all the possibilities of developing into a general European conflict³⁷,” signed a series of *Neutrality Acts* (1935–37). In spite of the growing tension in both Europe and Asia, neutrality remained very deeply ingrained in American minds. In September 1938, a Gallup poll showed that only 34 % of American citizens were favorable to the selling of arms to England and France in case of a war with the Axis. In 1940, following the fall of France, 82% of Americans still opposed military intervention in Europe.

The Senate rejection of the Versailles Treaty had not marked a return to total isolation but rather the beginning of a period of cautious and limited American involvement in world affairs. The United States did try to maintain a stable and peaceful environment but this effort was flawed because it relied exclusively on economic power when the international situation demanded political and military commitments. In the words of President Franklin Delano Roosevelt, the United States remained committed to pursuing a “policy of peace” but the pressure of outside events, notably the rise of fascism in Italy, Germany, and Japan, was becoming stronger and stronger and the position of the Americans was getting less and less tenable. They would soon have no choice but to get involved in external affairs.

³⁶ Woodrow Wilson in Richard Hofstadter, *The American Political Tradition and the Men Who Made It*, New York, Vintage, [1948] 1989, p. 350.

³⁷ Franklin Delano Roosevelt in *ibid.*, p. 446.

8. Meliorism

In October 1937, following Japan's invasion of China, **Franklin Delano Roosevelt (20)** declared that aggressors ought to be "quarantined":

It seems to be unfortunately true that the epidemic of world lawlessness is spreading.

When an epidemic of physical disease starts to spread, the community approves and joins in a quarantine of the patients in order to protect the health of the community against the spread of the disease³⁸.

Although Roosevelt did not offer concrete policies, his speech marked the beginning of America's return to world affairs. Having recovered from the economic depression, it could now focus again on the international situation. Following the Japanese surprise attack against the naval base of Pearl Harbor in Hawaii on December 7, 1941, the country immediately abandoned its neutral position. Overnight, the Americans put an end to two decades of isolation. The attack, which FDR characterized as "a date which will live in infamy," demanded a strong reaction. The United States was now prepared to play an international part commensurate with its power. In the 1920s and the 1930s, the United States had remained on the sidelines, politically as well as militarily. However, despite its political and military neutrality, the country knew it could not shrink from its responsibilities and therefore had endeavored to stay involved in world affairs, at the economic, diplomatic, and cultural levels. Like Wilson, Roosevelt was inspired by a genuine desire to ameliorate the global world order. Both leaders felt that the United States had a duty, if not a mission, to improve the rest of the world's behavior.

In the first three years of World War I, Wilson had advocated neutrality but, in spite of this commitment, he sided with the Allies. Wilson rapidly broke his pledge of neutrality because he was keen to protect America's interests and also because he had a loftier purpose. To him, helping the Allies meant defending democratic values which were represented by Great Britain and France but certainly not by Germany. Wilson perceived Imperial Germany as an autocratic and militaristic state. Early in 1915, when some Cabinet members urged him to embargo exports to England, he made the following comment: "Gentlemen, the Allies are standing with their backs to the wall fighting wild beasts. I will permit nothing to be done by our country to hinder or embarrass them in the prosecution of the war unless admitted rights are grossly violated³⁹." To him, World War I was a fight between democracy and autocracy. A German victory would disrupt the global balance of power and threaten the United States directly. In case of a German victory, the United States would have to protect itself and, in the process, become militaristic in its turn, something that Wilson could not tolerate. Germany's resumption of unrestricted submarine warfare in 1917 seemed to confirm the barbarity of the German regime as several merchant ships were torpedoed, in violation of traditional maritime laws. In his war message, on April 2, he declared that "the present German submarine warfare against commerce is a warfare against mankind." He also indicated that "the world must be made safe for democracy⁴⁰." Obviously, he retained this ambition after World War I.

Wilson (18) had a grand vision for the world after the war and he announced it even before it was over. On January 8, 1918, he issued his famous **Fourteen Points**, which aimed at promoting democracy and preventing war. Eight of the fourteen points dealt with specific territorial questions. Five laid down the general principles of international behavior: open

³⁸ Franklin Delano Roosevelt, "Quarantine Address," Chicago, October 5, 1937, in John Grafton (ed.), *Great Speeches – Franklin Delano Roosevelt*, Mineola, N.Y., Dover Publications, 1999, p. 67.

³⁹ Woodrow Wilson in Richard Hofstadter, *op. cit.*, p. 339.

⁴⁰ Woodrow Wilson, "War Message", April 2, 1917, in Thomas G. Paterson & Dennis Merrill (ed.), *Major Problems in American Foreign Relations*, Volume II: *Since 1914*, Lexington, Mass., D.C. Heath and Company, [1989] 1995, p. 35.

diplomacy, freedom of the seas, equality of economic opportunity, armaments reduction, and equality of rights for small nations. Last but not least, the fourteenth point called for the creation of a League of Nations to keep the peace: “A general association of nations must be formed under specific covenants for the purpose of affording mutual guarantees of political independence and territorial integrity to great and small states alike⁴¹.” The general purpose of Wilson’s diplomacy was to get rid of traditional power politics, which he held responsible for the triggering of World War I, and replace it with a collective security mechanism. This mechanism would help soften national rivalries as it rested on new diplomatic principles and the existence of an international organization specifically set up to preserve a stable world order. In January 1919, Wilson went to Versailles to defend his project and promote the covenant he had formulated for the League of Nations.

Wilson’s project to improve the global world order was not well received by the Republicans. One of the most outspoken critics was **William E. Borah (19)**, a Senator from Idaho whose isolationist views were well known. Borah argued that in joining an international organization such as the projected League of Nations, the United States would alienate its national sovereignty and would inevitably get entangled in foreign affairs:

If the league includes the affairs of the world, does it not include the affairs of all the world? Is there any limitation of the jurisdiction of the council or of the assembly upon the question of peace and war? Does it not have now, under the reservations, the same as it had before, the power to deal with all matters of peace or war throughout the entire world? How shall you keep from meddling in the affairs of Europe or keep Europe from meddling in the affairs of America⁴²?

As a result, the Versailles Treaty was rejected by the American Senate and the United States never participated in the League of Nations. In Paris, during the peace conference, some thought that Wilson’s plan was naïve because traditional power politics was not about to disappear. The French Prime minister Georges Clemenceau is supposed to have said: “God gave us His Ten Commandments and we broke them. Wilson gave us his Fourteen Points – We shall see!” Still, Wilson relentlessly warned against the dangers of war: “I can predict with absolute certainty that within another generation there will be another world war if the nations of the world do no concert the method by which to prevent it⁴³.” Despite the lack of support for his plan to ameliorate the world order, Wilson left a very strong legacy and, after Pearl Harbor, Franklin Delano Roosevelt resurrected and expanded his vision.

Like Wilson, Roosevelt began providing help to the Allies even before the United States was actually at war. If, following the invasion of Poland in September 1939, FDR had proclaimed U.S. neutrality, he nonetheless secured a “cash-and-carry” agreement, which allowed the United States to provide covert aid to Britain. In December 1940, in one of his fireside chats, he pledged to turn the United States into what he called the “great arsenal of democracy” and explained why in the following manner:

Never before since Jamestown and Plymouth Rock has our American civilization been in such danger as now. [...] If Great Britain goes down, the Axis powers will control the continents of Europe, Asia, Africa, Australia, and the high seas – and they will be in a position to bring enormous military and naval resources against this hemisphere. It is no exaggeration to say that all of us, in all the Americas, would be living at the point of a gun⁴⁴.

⁴¹ Woodrow Wilson, “The Fourteen Points”, January 8, 1918, in *ibid.*, p. 39.

⁴² William E. Borah, “The League of Nations”, November 19, 1919, U.S. Senate. Available at http://www.senate.gov/artandhistory/history/common/generic/Speeches_Borah_League.htm

⁴³ Woodrow Wilson in Bernard M. Baruch, *The Public Years*, New York, Holt, Rinehart, & Winston, 1960, p. 137.

⁴⁴ Franklin Delano Roosevelt, “Fireside Chat”, December 29, 1940, in John Grafton (ed.), *op. cit.*, pp. 83-84.

The following week, FDR reiterated his pledge to support the world's democracies when, in his State of the Union speech, he promised to help build "a world founded on four essential freedoms": freedom of speech, freedom of worship, freedom from want, and freedom from fear. Roosevelt's pledge materialized in March 1941 with the passage of the *Lend-Lease Act* which allowed the United States to lend or lease military equipment and other war-related goods to nations whose security was declared essential to United States interests by the President. In addition to protecting the United States and preserving democracy, Roosevelt decided to help the Allies because he considered that the global world order was seriously at risk. The preservation and possibly the betterment of the international order was one of Roosevelt's key objectives during World War II.

In August 1941 Roosevelt met Winston Churchill off the coast of Newfoundland, where they formulated the famous Atlantic Charter in which they voiced their attachment to the following principles: self-determination, equal access to trade and raw materials, international economic cooperation, freedom of the seas, and disarmament. These principles were the ones which had been defined by Wilson in 1918 and, somehow, Roosevelt's purpose was to finish what had been left pending after World War I. To do so, Roosevelt intended to expand the role of the United States in world affairs so as to make sure that the nation would not retreat again into isolation. To ensure America's permanent involvement in world affairs, he supported the participation of the United States into a new international organization committed to the prevention of war.

The setting up of this organization was discussed at Dumbarton Oaks in September 1944 and the charter of the United Nations was signed in April 1945 at the San Francisco Conference. In addition to promoting collective security, Roosevelt also endeavored to create a safe economic environment to alleviate international tensions. In July 1944, at the Bretton Woods Conference, an International Monetary Fund (IMF) and a World Bank were created for that purpose. The political and economic international framework was completed in November 1946 with the creation of the United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization (UNESCO). Wilson's agenda was now complete.

Meliorism, which was promoted by both Wilson and Roosevelt, was in keeping with America's missionary tradition to make the world a better place. This effort cannot but be praised because it aimed at establishing a stable and peaceful global world order. However, meliorism rested on the dangerous assumption that the American model is universally valid and that it should be enforced everywhere. In the second half of the twentieth century, this led the United States to sometimes overreach itself and to get involved in a tangled web of commitments around the world.

America's foreign policy is a complex phenomenon because it reflects a fundamental contradiction in the American attitude towards the world. American diplomacy from 1787 to 1945 lacked coherence since the Americans were haunted by a dual and contradictory attitude when it came to world affairs. Their desire to stay aloof from the international scene was regularly counterbalanced by their will to participate in foreign affairs. As a result, one might say that America's foreign policy was characterized alternately by periods of isolation and bouts of intervention. This pattern was described by Frank L. Klingberg in an article which was originally published in *World Policy* in January 1952 and which was recently translated into French. In this article, Klingberg claims that America's foreign policy is characterized by phases of "introversion" and "extroversion":

Ces cycles [...] semblent refléter le cheminement psychologique des Américains au cours de l'évolution des États-Unis qui, après avoir été une petite nation du littoral atlantique, sont devenus une puissance mondiale active. Les phases d'extraversion ont été marquées par

l'expansion et l'extension de l'influence ; celles d'introversio n ont été des années de consolidation et de préparation⁴⁵.

Although it would be hasty to restrict America's foreign policy to both these traditions, they do provide a useful general framework to understand the foreign policy of the United States. In the course of this period, American diplomacy constantly wavered between isolation and intervention.

However, in that period, America's intervention was primarily an effort to expand westward. Once the expansionist agenda had been fulfilled, the United States would withdraw from world affairs and turn inward. By 1941, however, the pressure of external events was too strong for America to remain isolated. The United States had to react to the Japanese attack against Pearl Harbor. In the same manner, after World War II, it was obvious that isolation was ruled out if the United States meant to prevent a similar attack. Once the Axis powers had been defeated, the United States had no choice but to act so as to prevent the recurrence of fascism. The best way to do so was to protect the values of the Western World and to defend democracy. Because of a profound ideological antagonism, it proved impossible to do so with the cooperation of America's former ally, that is to say the Soviet Union. As a matter of fact, the two superpowers were soon at odds with each other and by 1947 the so-called Cold War was in full swing. This ideological confrontation reinforced America's commitment to the defense and promotion of democracy. In the process, America's foreign policy became radically interventionist.

⁴⁵ Frank L. Klingberg, « Les changements historiques d'humeur dans la politique étrangère américaine », in *Politique Étrangère*, printemps 2000, p. 227.

EXPANSION

1. George Washington, "Farewell Address," September 17, 1796.
2. Thomas Jefferson, "Confidential Letter to Congress," January 18, 1803.
3. John Quincy Adams to Hugh Nelson, the U.S. Minister at Madrid, April 28, 1823.
4. The Monroe Doctrine, December 2, 1823.
5. John O'Sullivan, "The Great Nation of Futurity," 1839.
6. Daniel Webster, "Instructions to Caleb Cushing," 1843.
7. William Seward, "Commerce in the Pacific Ocean," July 29, 1852.
8. John Fiske at the Royal Institute of Great Britain, May 1880.
9. Josiah Strong, "The Anglo-Saxons and the World's Future," 1885.
10. Alfred T. Mahan, "The United States Looking Outward," *Atlantic Monthly*, December 1890.
11. Frederick Jackson Turner, "The Frontier in American History," 1893.
12. Senator Redfield Proctor, March 17, 1898.
13. William McKinley, "War Message," April 11, 1898.
14. Emilio Aguinaldo, "The True Version of the Philippine Revolution," September 23, 1899.
15. Carl Schurz, "Address at the Anti-Imperialistic Conference," Chicago, October 17, 1899.
16. Theodore Roosevelt, "Annual Message to Congress," December 6, 1904 .
17. Woodrow Wilson, "War Message to Congress," April 2, 1917.
18. Woodrow Wilson, Joint Session of Congress, January 8, 1918.
19. William E. Borah, U. S. Congress, Senate, November 19, 1919.
20. Franklin Delano Roosevelt, "Quarantine Speech," October 5, 1937.

1 - George Washington, "Farewell Address" - September 17, 1796

Against the insidious wiles of foreign influence (I conjure you to believe me, fellow-citizens) the jealousy of a free people ought to be constantly awake, since history and experience prove that foreign influence is one of the most baneful foes of republican government. But that jealousy to be useful must be impartial; else it becomes the instrument of the very influence to be avoided, instead of a defense against it. Excessive partiality for one foreign nation and excessive dislike of another cause those whom they actuate to see danger only on one side, and serve to veil and even second the arts of influence on the other. Real patriots who may resist the intrigues of the favorite are liable to become suspected and odious, while its tools and dupes usurp the applause and confidence of the people, to surrender their interests.

The great rule of conduct for us in regard to foreign nations is in extending our commercial relations, to have with them as little political connection as possible. So far as we have already formed engagements, let them be fulfilled with perfect good faith. Here let us stop.

Europe has a set of primary interests which to us have none; or a very remote relation. Hence she must be engaged in frequent controversies, the causes of which are essentially foreign to our concerns. Hence, therefore, it must be unwise in us to implicate ourselves by artificial ties in the ordinary vicissitudes of her politics, or the ordinary combinations and collisions of her friendships or enmities.

Our detached and distant situation invites and enables us to pursue a different course. If we remain one people, under an efficient government, the period is not far off when we may defy material injury from external annoyance; when we may take such an attitude as will cause the neutrality we may at any time resolve upon to be scrupulously respected; when belligerent nations, under the impossibility of making acquisitions upon us, will not lightly hazard the giving us provocation; when we may choose peace or war, as our interest, guided by justice, shall counsel.

Why forego the advantages of so peculiar a situation? Why quit our own to stand upon foreign ground? Why, by interweaving our destiny with that of any part of Europe, entangle our peace and prosperity in the toils of European ambition, rivalry, interest, humor or caprice?

It is our true policy to steer clear of permanent alliances with any portion of the foreign world; so far, I mean, as we are now at liberty to do it; for let me not be understood as capable of patronizing infidelity to existing engagements. I hold the maxim no less applicable to public than to private affairs, that honesty is always the best policy. I repeat it, therefore, let those engagements be observed in their genuine sense. But, in my opinion, it is unnecessary and would be unwise to extend them.

Taking care always to keep ourselves by suitable establishments on a respectable defensive posture, we may safely trust to temporary alliances for extraordinary emergencies.

Harmony, liberal intercourse with all nations are recommended by policy, humanity, and interest. But even our commercial policy should hold an equal and impartial hand; neither seeking nor granting exclusive favors or preferences; consulting the natural course of things; diffusing and diversifying by gentle means the streams of commerce, but forcing nothing; establishing (with powers so disposed, in order to give trade a stable course, to define the rights of our merchants, and to enable the government to support them) conventional rules of intercourse, the best that present circumstances and mutual opinion will permit, but temporary, and liable to be from time to time abandoned or varied, as experience and

circumstances shall dictate; constantly keeping in view that it is folly in one nation to look for disinterested favors from another; that it must pay with a portion of its independence for whatever it may accept under that character; that, by such acceptance, it may place itself in the condition of having given equivalents for nominal favors, and yet of being reproached with ingratitude for not giving more. There can be no greater error than to expect or calculate upon real favors from nation to nation. It is an illusion, which experience must cure, which a just pride ought to discard.

In offering to you, my countrymen, these counsels of an old and affectionate friend, I dare not hope they will make the strong and lasting impression I could wish; that they will control the usual current of the passions, or prevent our nation from running the course which has hitherto marked the destiny of nations. But, if I may even flatter myself that they may be productive of some partial benefit, some occasional good; that they may now and then recur to moderate the fury of party spirit, to warn against the mischiefs of foreign intrigue, to guard against the impostures of pretended patriotism; this hope will be a full recompense for the solicitude for your welfare, by which they have been dictated.

How far in the discharge of my official duties I have been guided by the principles which have been delineated, the public records and other evidences of my conduct must witness to you and to the world. To myself, the assurance of my own conscience is, that I have at least believed myself to be guided by them.

In relation to the still subsisting war in Europe, my proclamation of the twenty-second of April, 1793, is the index of my plan. Sanctioned by your approving voice, and by that of your representatives in both houses of Congress, the spirit of that measure has continually governed me, uninfluenced by any attempts to deter or divert me from it.

2 - Thomas Jefferson, "Confidential letter to Congress" - January 18, 1803

Gentlemen of the Senate, and of the House of Representatives:

As the continuance of the act for establishing trading houses with the Indian tribes will be under the consideration of the Legislature at its present session, I think it my duty to communicate the views which have guided me in the execution of that act, in order that you may decide on the policy of continuing it, in the present or any other forms, or discontinue it altogether, if that shall, on the whole, seem most for the public good.

The Indian tribes residing within the limits of the United States, have, for considerable time, been growing more and more uneasy at the constant diminution of the territory they occupy, although effected by their own voluntary sales: and the policy has long been gaining strength with them, of refusing absolutely all further sale, on any conditions; insomuch that, at this time, it hazards their friendship, and excites dangerous jealousies and perturbations in their minds to make any overture for the purchase of the smallest portions of their land. A very few tribes only are not yet obstinately in these dispositions. In order peaceably to counteract this policy of theirs, and to provide an extension of territory which the rapid increase of our numbers will call for, two measures are deemed expedient. First: to encourage them to abandon hunting, to apply to the raising stock, to agriculture and domestic manufacture, and thereby to prove to themselves that less land and labor will maintain them in this, better than in their former mode of living. The extensive forests necessary in the hunting life, will then become useless, and they will see advantage in exchanging them for the means of improving their farms, and of increasing their domestic comforts. Secondly: to multiply trading houses among them, and place within their reach those things which will contribute more to their domestic comfort, than the possession of extensive, but uncultivated wilds. Experience and reflection will develop to them the wisdom of exchanging what they can spare and we want, for what we can spare and they want. In leading them to agriculture, to manufactures, and civilization; in bringing together their and our settlements, and in preparing them ultimately to participate in the benefits of our governments, I trust and believe we are acting for their greatest good. At these trading houses we have pursued the principles of the act of Congress, which directs that the commerce shall be carried on liberally, and requires only that the capital stock shall not be diminished. We consequently undersell private traders, foreign and domestic, drive them from the competition; and thus, with the good will of the Indians, rid ourselves of a description of men who are constantly endeavoring to excite in the Indian mind suspicions, fears, and irritations towards us. A letter now enclosed, shows the effect of our competition on the operations of the traders, while the Indians, perceiving the advantage of purchasing from us, are soliciting generally, our establishment of trading houses among them. In one quarter this is particularly interesting. The Legislature, reflecting on the late occurrences on the Mississippi, must be sensible how desirable it is to possess a respectable breadth of country on that river, from our southern limit to the Illinois at least; so that we may present as firm a front as on our Eastern border. We possess what is below the Yazoo and can probably acquire a certain breadth from the Illinois and Wabash to the Ohio; but between the Ohio and Yazoo, the country all belongs to the Chickasaws, friendly tribe within our limits, but the most decided against the alienation of lands. The portion of their country most important for us is exactly that which they do not inhabit. Their settlements are not on the Mississippi, but in the interior country. They have lately shown a desire to become agricultural; and this leads to the desire of buying implements and comforts. In the strengthening and gratifying of these wants, I see the only prospect of planting the Mississippi

itself, the means of its own safety. Duty has required me to submit these views to the judgment of the Legislature; but as their disclosure might embarrass and defeat their effect, they are committed to the special confidence of the two Houses.

While the extension of the public commerce among the Indian tribes, may deprive of that source of profit such of our citizens as are engaged in it, it might be worthy the attention of Congress, in their care of individual as well as of the general interest, to point, in another direction, the enterprise of these citizens, as profitably for themselves, and more usefully for the public. The river Missouri, and the Indians inhabiting it, are not as well known as is rendered desirable by their connexion with the Mississippi, and consequently with us. It is, however, understood, that the country on that river is inhabited by numerous tribes, who furnish great supplies of furs and peltry to the trade of another nation, carried on in a high latitude, through an infinite number of portages and lakes, shut up by ice through a long season. The commerce on that line could bear no competition with that of the Missouri, traversing a moderate climate, offering according to the best accounts, a continued navigation from its source, and possibly with a single portage, from the Western Ocean, and finding to the Atlantic a choice of channels through the Illinois or Wabash, the lakes and Hudson, through the Ohio and Susquehanna, or Potomac or James rivers, and through the Tennessee and Savannah, rivers. An intelligent officer, with ten or twelve chosen men, fit for the enterprise, and willing to undertake it, taken from our posts, where they may be spared without inconvenience, might explore the whole line, even to the Western ocean, have conferences with the natives on the subject of commercial intercourse, get admission among them for our traders, as others are admitted, agree on convenient deposits for an interchange of articles, and return with the information acquired, in the course of two summers. Their arms and accoutrements, some instruments of observation, and light and cheap present for the Indians, would be all the apparatus they could carry, and with an expectation of a soldier's portion of land on their return, would constitute the whole expense. Their pay would be going on, whether here or there. While other civilized nations have encountered great expense to enlarge the boundaries of knowledge by undertaking these voyages of discovery, and for other literary purposes, in various parts and directions, our nation seems to owe to the same object, as well as to its own interests, to explore this, the only line of easy communication across the continent, and so directly traversing our own part of it. The interests of commerce place the principal object within the constitutional powers and care of Congress, and that it should incidentally advance the geographical knowledge of our own continent, cannot but be an additional gratification. The nation claiming the territory, regarding this as a literary pursuit, which is in the habit of permitting, within its dominions, would not be disposed to view it with jealousy, even if the expiring state of its interests there did not render it a matter of indifference. The appropriation of two thousand five hundred dollars, "for the purpose of extending the external commerce of the United States," while understood and considered by the Executive as giving the legislative sanction, would cover the undertaking from notice, and prevent the obstructions which interested individuals might otherwise previously prepare in its way.

3 - John Quincy Adams to Hugh Nelson, the United States Minister at Madrid - April 28, 1823.

It has been a maxim in the policy of these United States, from the time when their independence was achieved, to keep themselves aloof from the political systems and contentions of Europe. To this principle it is yet the purpose of the President to adhere: and in the war about to commence, the attitude to be assumed and maintained by the United States will be that of neutrality.

But the experience of our national history has already shown that, however sincerely this policy was adopted, and however earnestly and perseveringly it was maintained, it yielded ultimately to a course of events by which the violence and injustice of European powers involved the immediate interests and brought in conflict the essential rights of our own country.

Two of the principal causes of the wars between the nations of Europe since that of our own Revolution, have been indeed, the same as those in which that originated – civil liberty and national independence. To these principles, and to the cause of those who contend for them, the people of the United States can never be indifferent. A feeling of sympathy and of partiality for every nation struggling to secure or to defend these great interests, has been and will be manifested by this Union; and it is among the most difficult and delicate duties of the general government, in all its branches, to indulge this feeling so far as it may be compatible with the duties of neutrality, and to withhold and restrain from encroaching upon them. So far as it is indulged, its tendency is to involve us in foreign wars, while the first and paramount duty of the government is to maintain *peace* amidst all the convulsions of foreign wars, and to enter the lists as parties to no cause, other than our own.

In the *maritime* wars of Europe, we have, indeed, a direct and important interest of our own; as they are waged upon an element which is the common property of all; and as our participation in the possession of that property is perhaps greater than that of any other nation. The existence of maritime war, itself, enlarges and deepens the importance of this interest; and it introduces a state of things in which the conflict of neutral and belligerent rights becomes itself a continual and formidable instigation to war. To all maritime wars Great Britain can scarcely fail of becoming a party; and from that moment arises a collision between her and these states, peculiar to the situation, interests and rights of the two countries, and which can scarcely form a subject of discussion between any other nation and either of them.

This cause then is peculiarly our own; and we have already been once compelled to vindicate our rights implicated in it by war. It has been too among the dispensations of Providence, that the issue of that war should have left that question unsettled for the future; and that the attempts which on the part of the United States have been repeatedly made since the peace for adjusting it by amicable negotiation, have in like manner proved ineffectual. There is therefore great reason to apprehend, that if Great Britain should engage in the war, now just kindled in Europe, the United States will again be called to support by all their energies, not excepting war, the rights of their national independence, enjoyed in the persons of their seamen. But in the war between France and Spain now commencing, other interests, peculiarly ours, will in all probability be deeply involved.

Whatever may be the issue of this war, as between those two European powers, it may be taken for granted that the dominion of Spain upon the American continents, North and South, is irrecoverably gone. But the islands of Cuba and of Porto Rico still remain nominally and so far really dependent upon her, that she yet possesses the power of transferring her own dominion over them, together with the possession of them, to others. These islands, from their

local position, are natural appendages to the North American continent; and one of them, Cuba, almost, in sight of our shores, from a multitude of considerations has become an object of transcendent importance to the political and commercial interests of our Union. Its commanding position with reference to the Gulf of Mexico and the West Indian seas ; the character of its population ; its situation midway between our southern coast and the island of Santo Domingo ; its safe and capacious harbor of the Havana, fronting a long line of our shores destitute of the same advantage ; the nature of its productions and of its wants, furnishing the supplies and needing the returns of a commerce immensely profitable and mutually beneficial ; give it an importance in the sum of our national interests, with which that of no other foreign territory can be compared, and little inferior to that which binds the different members of this Union together.

Such indeed are, between the interests of that island and of this country, the geographical, commercial, moral, and political relations, formed by nature, gathering in the process of time, and even now verging to maturity, that in looking forward to the probable course of events for the short period of half a century, it is scarcely possible to resist the conviction that the annexation of Cuba to our federal republic will be indispensable to the continuance and integrity of the Union itself. It is obvious however that for this event we are not yet prepared. Numerous and formidable objections to the extension of our territorial dominions beyond the sea present themselves to the first contemplation of the subject. Obstacles to the system of policy by which it alone can be compassed and maintained are to be foreseen and surmounted, both from at home and abroad. But there are laws of political as well as of physical gravitation; and if an apple severed by the tempest from its native tree cannot choose but fall to the ground, Cuba, forcibly disjoined from its own unnatural connection with Spain, and incapable of self-support, can gravitate only towards the North American Union, which by the same law of nature cannot cast her off from its bosom.

4. The Monroe Doctrine - December 2, 1823

At the proposal of the Russian Imperial Government, made through the minister of the Emperor residing here, a full power and instructions have been transmitted to the minister of the United States at St. Petersburg to arrange by amicable negotiation the respective rights and interests of the two nations on the northwest coast of this continent. A similar proposal has been made by His Imperial Majesty to the Government of Great Britain, which has likewise been acceded to. The Government of the United States has been desirous by this friendly proceeding of manifesting the great value which they have invariably attached to the friendship of the Emperor and their solicitude to cultivate the best understanding with his Government. In the discussions to which this interest has given rise and in the arrangements by which they may terminate the occasion has been judged proper for asserting, as a principle in which the rights and interests of the United States are involved, that the American continents, by the free and independent condition which they have assumed and maintain, are henceforth not to be considered as subjects for future colonization by any European powers.

It was stated at the commencement of the last session that a great effort was then making in Spain and Portugal to improve the condition of the people of those countries, and that it appeared to be conducted with extraordinary moderation. It need scarcely be remarked that the results have been so far very different from what was then anticipated. Of events in that quarter of the globe, with which we have so much intercourse and from which we derive our origin, we have always been anxious and interested spectators. The citizens of the United States cherish sentiments the most friendly in favor of the liberty and happiness of their fellow-men on that side of the Atlantic. In the wars of the European powers in matters relating to themselves we have never taken any part, nor does it comport with our policy to do so. It is only when our rights are invaded or seriously menaced that we resent injuries or make preparation for our defense. With the movements in this hemisphere we are of necessity more immediately connected, and by causes which must be obvious to all enlightened and impartial observers. The political system of the allied powers is essentially different in this respect from that of America. This difference proceeds from that which exists in their respective Governments; and to the defense of our own, which has been achieved by the loss of so much blood and treasure, and matured by the wisdom of their most enlightened citizens, and under which we have enjoyed unexampled felicity, this whole nation is devoted. We owe it, therefore, to candor and to the amicable relations existing between the United States and those powers to declare that we should consider any attempt on their part to extend their system to any portion of this hemisphere as dangerous to our peace and safety. With the existing colonies or dependencies of any European power we have not interfered and shall not interfere. But with the Governments who have declared their independence and maintain it, and whose independence we have, on great consideration and on just principles, acknowledged, we could not view any interposition for the purpose of oppressing them, or controlling in any other manner their destiny, by any European power in any other light than as the manifestation of an unfriendly disposition toward the United States. In the war between those new Governments and Spain we declared our neutrality at the time of their recognition, and to this we have adhered, and shall continue to adhere, provided no change shall occur which, in the judgment of the competent authorities of this Government, shall make a corresponding change on the part of the United States indispensable to their security.

The late events in Spain and Portugal shew that Europe is still unsettled. Of this important fact no stronger proof can be adduced than that the allied powers should have thought it proper, on any principle satisfactory to themselves, to have interposed by force in

the internal concerns of Spain. To what extent such interposition may be carried, on the same principle, is a question in which all independent powers whose governments differ from theirs are interested, even those most remote, and surely none of them more so than the United States. Our policy in regard to Europe, which was adopted at an early stage of the wars which have so long agitated that quarter of the globe, nevertheless remains the same, which is, not to interfere in the internal concerns of any of its powers; to consider the government *de facto* as the legitimate government for us; to cultivate friendly relations with it, and to preserve those relations by a frank, firm, and manly policy, meeting in all instances the just claims of every power, submitting to injuries from none. But in regard to those continents circumstances are eminently and conspicuously different.

It is impossible that the allied powers should extend their political system to any portion of either continent without endangering our peace and happiness; nor can anyone believe that our southern brethren, if left to themselves, would adopt it of their own accord. It is equally impossible, therefore, that we should behold such interposition in any form with indifference. If we look to the comparative strength and resources of Spain and those new Governments, and their distance from each other, it must be obvious that she can never subdue them. It is still the true policy of the United States to leave the parties to themselves, in hope that other powers will pursue the same course.

5. John O'Sullivan, "The Great Nation of Futurity" - 1839

The American people having derived their origin from many other nations, and the Declaration of National Independence being entirely based on the great principle of human equality, these facts demonstrate at once our disconnected position as regards any other nation; that we have, in reality, but little connection with the past history of any of them, and still less with all antiquity, its glories, or its crimes. On the contrary, our national birth was the beginning of a new history, the formation and progress of an untried political system, which separates us from the past and connects us with the future only; and so far as regards the entire development of the natural rights of man, in moral, political, and national life, we may confidently assume that our country is destined to be the great nation of futurity.

It is so destined, because the principle upon which a nation is organized fixes its destiny, and that of equality is perfect, is universal. It presides in all the operations of the physical world, and it is also the conscious law of the soul - the self-evident dictates of morality, which accurately defines the duty of man to man, and consequently man's rights as man. Besides, the truthful annals of any nation furnish abundant evidence, that its happiness, its greatness, its duration, were always proportionate to the democratic equality in its system of government.

What friend of human liberty, civilization, and refinement, can cast his view over the past history of the monarchies and aristocracies of antiquity, and not deplore that they ever existed? What philanthropist can contemplate the oppressions, the cruelties, and injustice inflicted by them on the masses of mankind, and not turn with moral horror from the retrospect?

America is destined for better deeds. It is our unparalleled glory that we have no reminiscences of battle fields, but in defence of humanity, of the oppressed of all nations, of the rights of conscience, the rights of personal enfranchisement. Our annals describe no scenes of horrid carnage, where men were led on by hundreds of thousands to slay one another, dupes and victims to emperors, kings, nobles, demons in the human form called heroes. We have had patriots to defend our homes, our liberties, but no aspirants to crowns or thrones; nor have the American people ever suffered themselves to be led on by wicked ambition to depopulate the land, to spread desolation far and wide, that a human being might be placed on a seat of supremacy.

We have no interest in the scenes of antiquity, only as lessons of avoidance of nearly all their examples. The expansive future is our arena, and for our history. We are entering on its untrodden space, with the truths of God in our minds, beneficent objects in our hearts, and with a clear conscience unsullied by the past. We are the nation of human progress, and who will, what can, set limits to our onward march? Providence is with us, and no earthly power can. We point to the everlasting truth on the first page of our national declaration, and we proclaim to the millions of other lands, that "the gates of hell" - the powers of aristocracy and monarchy - "shall not prevail against it."

The far-reaching, the boundless future will be the era of American greatness. In its magnificent domain of space and time, the nation of many nations is destined to manifest to mankind the excellence of divine principles; to establish on earth the noblest temple ever dedicated to the worship of the Most High - the Sacred and the True. Its floor shall be a hemisphere - its roof the firmament of the star-studded heavens, and its congregation an Union of many Republics, comprising hundreds of happy millions, calling, owning no man master, but governed by God's natural and moral law of equality, the law of brotherhood - of "peace and good will amongst men."

Yes, we are the nation of progress, of individual freedom, of universal enfranchisement. Equality of rights is the cynosure of our union of States, the grand exemplar of the correlative equality of individuals; and while truth sheds its effulgence, we cannot retrograde, without dissolving the one and subverting the other. We must onward to the fulfilment of our mission - to the entire development of the principle of our organization - freedom of conscience, freedom of person, freedom of trade and business pursuits, universality of freedom and equality. This is our high destiny, and in nature's eternal, inevitable decree of cause and effect we must accomplish it. All this will be our future history, to establish on earth the moral dignity and salvation of man - the immutable truth and beneficence of God. For this blessed mission to the nations of the world, which are shut out from the life-giving light of truth, has America been chosen; and her high example shall smite unto death the tyranny of kings, hierarchs, and oligarchs, and carry the glad tidings of peace and good will where myriads now endure an existence scarcely more enviable than that of beasts of the field. Who, then, can doubt that our country is destined to be the great nation of futurity?

6. Secretary of State Daniel Webster, "Instructions to Caleb Cushing, United States Ambassador to China" - 1843

Occurrences happening in China within the last two years have resulted in events which are likely to be of much importance as well to the United States as to the rest of the civilized world. Of their still more important consequences to China herself, it is not necessary here to speak. The hostilities which have been carried on between that Empire and England, have resulted, among other consequences, in opening four important ports to English commerce, viz: Amoy, Ning-po, Shanghai, and Fow-chow-fow.

These ports belong to some of the richest, most productive and most populous provinces of the Empire; and are likely to become very important marts of commerce. A leading object of the Mission in which you are now to be engaged, is to secure the entry of American ships and cargoes into these ports, on terms as favorable as those which are enjoyed by English merchants. It is not necessary to dwell here, on the great and well known amount of imports of the productions of China into the United States. These imports, especially in the great article of tea, are not likely to be diminished. Heretofore they have been paid for in the precious metals, or, more recently, by bills drawn on London. At one time, indeed, American paper, of certain descriptions was found to be an available remittance. Latterly a considerable trade has sprung up in the export of certain American manufactures to China. To augment these exports, by obtaining the most favorable commercial facilities, and cultivating, to the greatest extent practicable, friendly commercial intercourse with China, in all its accessible ports, is a matter of moment to the commercial and manufacturing, as well as the agricultural and mining, interests of the United States. It cannot be foreseen how rapidly, or how slowly, a people of such peculiar habits as the Chinese, and apparently so tenaciously attached to their habits, may adopt the sentiments, ideas, and customs of other nations. But if prejudiced and strongly wedded to their own usages, the Chinese are still understood to be ingenious, acute, and inquisitive.

As your Mission has in view only friendly and commercial objects, it is supposed, equally useful to both countries, the natural jealousy of the Chinese, and their repulsive feeling towards foreigners, it is hoped may be in some degree removed or mitigated by prudence and address on your part. Your constant aim must be to produce a full conviction on the minds of the Government and the people that your Mission is entirely pacific; that you come with no purposes of hostility or annoyance; that you are a messenger of peace, sent from the greatest Power in America to greatest Empire in Asia, to offer respect and good will, and to establish the means of friendly intercourse.

In regard to the mode of managing this matter [the kowtow], much must be left to your discretion, as circumstances may occur. All pains should be taken to avoid the giving of offence, or the wounding of the national pride; but, at the same time, you will be careful to do nothing which may seem, even to the Chinese themselves, to imply any inferiority on the part of your Government, or any thing less than perfect independence of all Nations. You will say that the Government of the United States is always controlled by a sense of religion and honor; that Nations differ in their religious opinions and observances; that you cannot do any thing which the religion in your own country, or its sentiments of honor, forbid; that you have the most profound respect for His Majesty the Emperor; that you are ready to make to him all manifestations of homage which are consistent with your own sense; and that you are sure His Majesty is too just to desire you to violate your own duty; that you should deem yourself quite unworthy to appear before His Majesty as peace bearer from a great and powerful Nation, if you should do any thing against religion or against honor, as understood by the Government

and people in the country you come from. Taking care thus in no way to allow the Government or people of China to consider you as tribute bearer from your Government, or as acknowledging its inferiority, in any respect, to that of China, or any other Nation, you will bear in mind, at the same time, what is due to your own personal dignity and the character which you bear. You will represent to the Chinese authorities, nevertheless, that you are directed to pay to His Majesty the Emperor the same marks of respect and homage as are paid by your Government to His Majesty the Emperor of Russia, or any of the great Powers of the world.

It will be no part of your duty to enter into controversies which may exist between China and any European State; nor will you, in your communications, fail to abstain altogether from any sentiment, or any expression, which might give to other Government just cause of offence. It will be quite proper, however, that you should, in a proper manner, always keep before the eyes of the Chinese the high character, importance, and power of the United States.

7 - William Seward, "Commerce in the Pacific Ocean" - U. S. Senate, July 29, 1852

Commerce is the great agent of this movement. Whatever nation shall put that commerce into full employment, and shall conduct it steadily with adequate expansion, will become necessarily the greatest of existing States; greater than any that has ever existed.

Sir, you will claim that responsibility and that high destiny for our own country. Are you so sure that by assuming the one she will gain the other. They imply nothing less than universal commerce and the supremacy of the seas.

We are second to England, indeed, but, nevertheless, how far are we not behind her in commerce and in extent of Empire! I pray to know where you will go that you will not meet the flag of England, fixed, planted, rooted into the very earth? If you go northward, it waves over half of this Continent of North America, which we call our own. If you go southward, it greets you on the Bermudas, the Bahamas, and the Caribbean Islands. On the Falkland Islands it guards the Straits of Magellan; on the South Shetland Island it watches the passage round the Horn; and at Adelaide Island it warns you that you have reached the Antarctic Circle. When you ascend along the southwestern coast, of America, it is seen at Galapagos, overlooking the Isthmus of Panama; and having saluted it there, and at Vancouver, you only take leave of it in the far Northwest, when you are entering the Arctic Ocean. If you visit Africa, you find the same victorious cross guarding the coast of Gambia and Sierra Leone and St. Helena. It watches you at Cape Town as you pass into the Indian Ocean; while on the northern passage to that vast sea it demands your recognition from Gibraltar, as you enter the Mediterranean; from Malta, when you pass through the Sicilian Straits; on the Ionian Islands it waves in protection of Turkey; and at Aden it guards the passage from the Red Sea into the Indian Ocean. Wherever Western commerce has gained an entrance to the Continent of Asia, there that flag is seen waving over subjugated millions at Bombay, at Ceylon, at Singapore, at Calcutta, at Lahore, and at Hong Kong; while Australia and nearly all the Islands of Polynesia acknowledge its protection.

Sir, I need not tell you that wherever that flag waves, it is supported and cheered by the martial airs of England. But I care not for that. The sword is not the most winning messenger that can be sent abroad; and commerce, like power, upheld by armies and navies, may in time be found to cost too much. But what is to be regarded with more concern is that England employs the steam engine even more vigorously and more universally than her military force. Steam engines, punctually departing and arriving between every one of her various possessions and her island seat of power, bring in the raw material for every manufacture and supplies for every want. The steam engine plies incessantly there, day and night, converting these materials into fabrics of every variety, for the use of man. And again the steam engine forever and without rest moves over the face of the deep, not only distributing these fabrics to every part of the globe, but disseminating also the thoughts, the principles, the language and religion of England.

Sir, we are bold indeed to dare competition with such a Power. Nevertheless, the resources for it are adequate. We have coal and iron no less than she, while corn, timber, cattle, hemp, wool, cotton, silk, oil, sugar, and the grape, quicksilver, lead, copper, silver, and gold, are all found, within our own broad domain in inexhaustible profusion. What energies we have already expended prove that we have in reserve all that are needful. What inventions we have made prove our equality to any exigency. Our capital increases, while labor scarcely knows the burthen of taxation. Our Panama route to China has a decided advantage over that

of the Isthmus of Suez, and at the same time vessels leaving that country and coming round the Horn, will reach New York always at least five days sooner than vessels of equal speed can double the Cape of Good Hope and make the port of Liverpool.

Mr. President, we now see how conspicuous a part in the great movement of the age, California and Oregon are to sustain, and that, as yet, they are separated from us and isolated. They will adhere to us only so long as our Government over them shall be conducted, not for our benefit, but for their own. Their loyalty is great, but it cannot exceed that of the thirteen ancient American colonies to Great Britain; and yet the neglect and oppression of their commerce undermined that loyalty, and resulted in their independence. I hear often of dangers to the Union and see lines of threatened separation drawn by passionate men or alarmists, on parallels of latitude; but, in my judgment, there is only One danger of severance and that is involved in the possibility of criminal neglect of the new communities on the Pacific coast, while the summits of the Rocky Mountains, or of the Snowy Mountains, mark the only possible line of dismemberment. Against that danger I would guard as against the worst calamity that could befall, not only my country, at her most auspicious stage of progress, but mankind also, in the hour of their brightest hopes. I would guard against it by practicing impartial justice toward the new and remote States and Territories, whose political power is small, while their wants are great, and by pursuing at the same time, with liberality and constancy, the lofty course which they indicate, of an aspiring yet generous and humane national ambition.

8 - John Fiske at the Royal Institute of Great Britain - May 1880

In the United States of America a century hence we shall therefore doubtless have a political aggregation immeasurably surpassing in power and in dimensions any empire that has as yet existed. But we must now consider for a moment the probable future career of the English race in other parts of the world. The colonization of North America by Englishmen had its direct effects upon the eastern as well as upon the western side of the Atlantic. The immense growth of the commercial and naval strength of England between the time of Cromwell and the time of the elder Pitt was intimately connected with the colonization of North America and the establishment of plantations in the West Indies. These circumstances reacted powerfully upon the material development of England, multiplying manifold the dimensions of her foreign trade, increasing proportionately her commercial marine, and giving her in the eighteenth century the dominion over the seas. Endowed with this maritime supremacy, she has with an unerring instinct proceeded to seize upon the keys of empire in all parts of the world, - Gibraltar, Malta, the isthmus of Suez, Aden, Ceylon, the coasts of Australia, island after island in the Pacific - every station, in short, that commands the pathways of maritime commerce, or guards the approaches to the barbarous countries which she is beginning to regard as in some way her natural heritage. Any well-filled album of postage-stamps is an eloquent commentary on this maritime supremacy of England. It is enough to turn one's head to look over her colonial blue-books. The natural outcome of all this overflowing vitality it is not difficult to foresee. No one can carefully watch what is going on in Africa to-day without recognizing it as the same sort of thing which was going on in North America in the seventeenth century; and it cannot fail to bring forth similar results in course of time. Here is a vast country, rich in beautiful scenery and in resources of timber and minerals, with a salubrious climate and fertile soil, with great navigable rivers and inland lakes, which will not much longer be left in control of tawny lions and long-eared elephants and negro fetish-worshippers. Already five flourishing English states have been established in the south, besides the settlements on the Gold Coast and those at Aden commanding the Red Sea. English explorers work their way, with infinite hardship, through its untravelled wilds, and track the courses of the Congo and the Nile as their forefathers tracked the Potomac and the Hudson. The work of La Salle and Smith is finding its counterpart in the labors of Baker and Livingstone. Who can doubt that within two or three centuries the African continent will be occupied by a mighty nation of English descent, and covered with populous cities and flourishing farms, with railroads and telegraphs and other devices of civilization as yet undreamed of?

If we look next to Australia, we find a country of more than two-thirds the area of the United States, with a temperate climate and immense resources, agricultural and mineral, a country sparsely peopled by a race of irredeemable savages hardly above the level of brutes. Here England within the present century has planted six greatly thriving states, concerning which I have not time to say much, but one fact will serve as a specimen. When in America we wish to illustrate in one word the wonderful growth of our so-called north-western states, we refer to Chicago, a city of half-a-million inhabitants standing on a spot which fifty years ago was an uninhabited marsh. In Australia the city of Melbourne was founded in 1837, the year when the present queen of England began to reign, and the state of which it is the capital was hence called Victoria. This city, now just forty-three years old, has a population half as great as that of Chicago, has a public library of 200,000 volumes, and has a university with at least one professor of world-wide renown. When we see, by the way, within a period of five years and at such remote points upon the earth's surface, such erudite and ponderous works in the English language issuing from the press as those of Professor Hearn of Melbourne, of

Bishop Colenso of Natal, and of Mr. Hubert Bancroft of San Francisco, even such a little commonplace fact as this is fraught with wonderful significance when we think of all that it implies. Then there is New Zealand, with its climate of perpetual spring, where the English race is now multiplying faster than anywhere else in the world unless it be in Texas and Minnesota. And there are in the Pacific Ocean many rich and fertile spots where we shall very soon see the same things going on.

It is not necessary to dwell upon such considerations as these. It is enough to point to the general conclusion, that the work which the English race began when it colonized North America is destined to go on until every land on the earth's surface that is not already the seat of an old civilization shall become English in its language, in its political habits and traditions, and to a predominant extent in the blood of its people. The day is at hand when, four-fifths of the human race will trace its pedigree to English forefathers, as four-fifths of the white people in the United States trace their pedigree today. The race thus spread over both hemispheres, and from the rising to the setting sun, will not fail to keep that sovereignty of the sea and that commercial supremacy which it began to acquire when England first stretched its arm across the Atlantic to the shores of Virginia and Massachusetts.

9 - Josiah Strong, "The Anglo-Saxons and the World's Future" - 1885

There is abundant reason to believe that the Anglo-Saxon race is to be, is, indeed, already becoming more effective here than in the mother country. The marked superiority of this race is due, in large measure, to its highly mixed origin. Says Rawlinson: "It is a general rule, now almost universally admitted by ethnologists, that the mixed races of mankind are superior to the pure ones"; and adds: "Even the Jews, who are so often cited as an example of a race at once pure and strong, may, with more reason, be adduced on the opposite side of the argument." The ancient Egyptians, the Greeks, and the Romans, were all mixed races. Among modern races, the most conspicuous example is afforded by the Anglo-Saxons. Mr. Green's studies show that Mr. Tennyson's poetic line, "Saxon and Norman and Dane are we," must be supplemented with Celt and Gaul, Welshman and Irishman, Frisian and Flamand, French Huguenot and German Palatine. What took place a thousand years ago and more in England again transpires to-day in the United States. "History repeats itself"; but, as the wheels of history are the chariot wheels of the Almighty, there is, with every revolution, an onward movement toward the goal of His eternal purposes. There is here a new commingling of races; and, while the largest injections of foreign blood are substantially the same elements that constituted the original Anglo-Saxon admixture, so that we may infer the general type will be preserved, there are strains of other bloods being added, which, if Mr. Emerson's remark is true, that "the best nations are those most widely related," may be expected to improve the stock, and aid it to a higher destiny. If the dangers of immigration, which have been pointed out, can be successfully met for the next few years, until it has passed its climax, it may be expected to add value to the amalgam which will constitute the new Anglo-Saxon race of the New World. Concerning our future, Herbert Spencer says: "One great result is, I think, tolerably clear. From biological truths it is to be inferred that the eventual mixture of the allied varieties of the Aryan race, forming the population, will produce a more powerful type of man than has hitherto existed, and a type of man more plastic, more adaptable, more capable of undergoing the modifications needful for complete social life. I think, whatever difficulties they may have to surmount, and whatever tribulations they may have to pass through, the Americans may reasonably look forward to a time when they will have produced a civilization grander than any the world has known."

It may be easily shown, and is of no small significance, that the two great ideas of which the Anglo-Saxon is the exponent are having a fuller development in the United States than in Great Britain. There the union of Church and State tends strongly to paralyze some of the members of the body of Christ. Here there is no such influence to destroy spiritual life and power. Here, also, has been evolved the form of government consistent with the largest possible civil liberty. Furthermore, it is significant that the marked characteristics of this race are being here emphasized most. Among the most striking features of the Anglo-Saxon is his money-making power - a power of increasing importance in the widening commerce of the world's future. We have seen, in a preceding chapter, that, although England is by far the richest nation of Europe, we have already outstripped her in the race after wealth, and we have only begun the development of our vast resources.

Again, another marked characteristic of the Anglo-Saxon is what may be called an instinct or genius for colonizing. His unequalled energy, his indomitable perseverance, and his personal independence, made him a pioneer. He excels all others in pushing his way into new countries. It was those in whom this tendency was strongest that came to America, and this inherited tendency has been further developed by the westward sweep of successive generations across the continent. So noticeable has this characteristic become that English

visitors remark it. Charles Dickens once said that the typical American would hesitate to enter heaven unless assured that he could go farther west.

Again, nothing more manifestly distinguishes the Anglo-Saxon than his intense and persistent energy, and he is developing in the United States an energy which, in eager activity and effectiveness, is peculiarly American. This is due partly to the fact that Americans are much better fed than Europeans, and partly to the undeveloped resources of a new country, but more largely to our climate, which acts as a constant stimulus. Ten years after the landing of the Pilgrims, the Rev. Francis Higginson, a good observer, wrote: "A sup of New England air is better than a whole flagon of English ale." Thus early had the stimulating effect of our climate been noted. Moreover, our social institutions are stimulating. In Europe the various ranks of society are, like the strata of the earth, fixed and fossilized. There can be no great change without a terrible upheaval, a social earthquake. Here society is like the waters of the sea, mobile; as General Garfield said, and so signally illustrated in his own experience, that which is at the bottom to-day may one day flash on the crest of the highest wave. Every one is free to become whatever he can make of himself; free to transform himself from a rail-splitter or a tanner or a canal-boy, into the nation's President. Our aristocracy, unlike that of Europe, is open to all comers. Wealth, position, influence, are prizes offered for energy; and every farmer's boy, every apprentice and clerk, every friendless and penniless immigrant, is free to enter the list. Thus many causes co-operate to produce here the most forceful and tremendous energy in the world.

10 - Alfred T. Mahan, "The United States Looking Outward" – *Atlantic Monthly*, December 1890

Whether they will or no, Americans must now begin to look outward. The growing production of the country demands it. An increasing volume of public sentiment demands it. The position of the United States, between the two Old Worlds and the two great oceans, makes the same claim, which will soon be strengthened by the creation of the new link joining the Atlantic and Pacific. The tendency will be maintained and increased by the growth of the European colonies in the Pacific, by the advancing civilization of Japan, and by the rapid peopling of our Pacific States with men who have all the aggressive spirit of the advanced line of national progress. Nowhere does a vigorous foreign policy find more favor than among the people west of the Rocky Mountains.

It has been said that, in our present state of unpreparedness, a trans-isthmian canal will be a military disaster to the United States, and especially to the Pacific coast. When the canal is finished the Atlantic seaboard will be neither more nor less exposed than it now is; it will merely share with the country at *large the* increased danger of foreign complications with inadequate means to meet them. The danger of the Pacific coast will be greater by so much as the way between it and Europe is shortened through a passage which the stronger maritime power can control. The danger lies not merely in the greater facility for dispatching a hostile squadron from Europe, but also in the fact that a more powerful fleet than formerly can be maintained on that coast by a European power, because it can be so much more promptly called home in case of need. The greatest weakness of the Pacific ports, however, if wisely met by our government, will go far to insure our naval superiority there. The two chief centres, San Francisco and Puget Sound, owing to the width and the great depth of the entrances, cannot be effectively protected by torpedoes; and consequently, as fleets can always pass batteries through an unobstructed channel, they cannot obtain perfect security by means of fortifications only. Valuable as such works will be to them, they must be further garrisoned by coast-defense ships, whose part in repelling an enemy will be coordinated with that of the batteries. The sphere of action of such ships should not be permitted to extend far beyond the port to which they are allotted, and of whose defense they form an essential part; but within that sweep they will always be a powerful reinforcement to the seagoing navy, when the strategic conditions of a war cause hostilities to centre around their port. By sacrificing power to go long distances, the coast-defense ships gains proportionate weight of armor and guns; that is, of defensive and offensive strength. It therefore adds an element of unique value to the fleet with which it for a time acts. No foreign states, except Great Britain, have ports so near our Pacific coast as to bring it within the radius of action of their coast-defense ships; and it is very doubtful whether even Great Britain will put such ships at Vancouver Island, the chief value of which will be lost to her when the Canadian Pacific is severed—a blow always in the power of this country. It is upon our Atlantic seaboard that the mistress of Halifax, of Bermuda, and of Jamaica will now defend Vancouver and the Canadian Pacific. In the present state of our seaboard defense she can do so absolutely. What is all Canada compared with our exposed great cities? Even were the coast fortified, she could still do so, if our navy be no stronger than is as yet designed. What harm can we do Canada proportionate to the injury we should suffer by the interruption of our coasting trade, and by a blockade of Boston, New York, the Delaware, and the Chesapeake? Such a blockade Great Britain certainly could make technically efficient, under the somewhat loose definitions of international law. Neutrals would accept it as such.

The military needs of the Pacific States, as well as their supreme importance to the whole country, are yet a matter of the future, but of a future so near that provision should immediately begin. To weigh their importance, consider what influence in the Pacific would

be attributed to a nation comprising only the States of Washington, Oregon, and California, when filled with such men as now people them and are still pouring in, and controlling such maritime centres as San Francisco, Puget Sound, and the Columbia River. Can it be counted less because they are bound by the ties of blood and close political union to the great communities of the East? But such influence, to work without jar and friction, requires underlying military readiness, like the proverbial iron hand under the velvet glove. To provide this, three things are needful: First, protection of the chief harbors by fortifications and coast-defense ships, which gives defensive strength, provides security to the community within, and supplies the bases necessary to all military operations. Secondly, naval force, the arm of offensive power, which alone enables a country to extend its influence outward. Thirdly, it should be an inviolable resolution of our national policy that no European state should henceforth acquire a coaling position within three thousand miles of San Francisco—a distance which includes the Sandwich and Galapagos islands and the coast of Central America. For fuel is the life of modern naval war; it is the food of the ship; without it the modern monsters of the deep die of inanition. Around it, therefore, cluster some of the most important considerations of naval strategy. In the Caribbean and the Atlantic we are confronted with many a foreign coal depot, and perhaps it is not an unmitigated misfortune that we, like Rome, find Carthage at our gates bidding us stand to our arms; but let us not acquiesce in an addition to our dangers, a further diversion of our strength, by being forestalled in the North Pacific.

In conclusion, while Great Britain is undoubtedly the most formidable of our possible enemies, both by her great navy and the strong positions she holds near our coasts, it must be added that a cordial understanding with that country is one of the first of our external interests. Both nations, doubtless, and properly, seek their own advantage; but both, also, are controlled by a sense of law and justice drawn from the same sources, and deep-rooted in their instincts. Whatever temporary aberration may occur, a return to mutual standards of right will certainly follow. Formal alliance between the two is out of the question, but a cordial recognition of the similarity of character and ideas will give birth to sympathy, which in turn will facilitate a cooperation beneficial to both; for, if sentimentality is weak, sentiment is strong.

11 - Frederick Jackson Turner, "The Frontier in American History" - 1893

In a recent bulletin of the Superintendent of the Census for 1890 appear these significant words: "Up to and including 1880 the country had a frontier of settlement, but at present the unsettled area has been so broken into by isolated bodies of settlement that there can hardly be said to be a frontier line. In the discussion of its extent, its westward movement, etc., it can not, therefore, any longer have a place in the census reports." This brief official statement marks the closing of a great historic movement. Up to our own day American history has been in a large degree the history of the colonization of the Great West. The existence of an area of free land, its continuous recession, and the advance of American settlement westward, explain American development.

Behind institutions, behind constitutional forms and modifications, lie the vital forces that call these organs into life and shape them to meet changing conditions. The peculiarity of American institutions is the fact that they have been compelled to adapt themselves to the changes of an expanding people - to the changes involved in crossing a continent, in winning a wilderness, and in developing at each area of this progress out of the primitive economic and political conditions of the frontier into the complexity of city life. Said Calhoun in 1817, "We are great, and rapidly - I was about to say fearfully - growing!" So saying, he touched the distinguishing feature of American life. All peoples show development; the germ theory of politics has been sufficiently emphasized. In the case of most nations, however, the development has occurred in a limited area; and if the nation has expanded, it has met other growing peoples whom it has conquered. But in the case of the United States we have a different phenomenon. Limiting our attention to the Atlantic coast, we have the familiar phenomenon of the evolution of institutions in a limited area, such as the rise of representative government; into complex organs; the progress from primitive industrial society, without division of labor, up to manufacturing civilization. But we have in addition to this a recurrence of the process of evolution in each western area reached in the process of expansion. Thus American development has exhibited not merely advance along a single line, but a return to primitive conditions on a continually advancing frontier line, and a new development for that area. American social development has been continually beginning over again on the frontier. This perennial rebirth, this fluidity of American life, this expansion westward with its new opportunities, its continuous touch with the simplicity of primitive society, furnish the forces dominating American character. The true point of view in the history of this nation is not the Atlantic coast, it is the Great West. Even the slavery struggle, which is made so exclusive an object of attention by writers like Professor von Holst, occupies its important place in American history because of its relation to westward expansion.

In this advance, the frontier is the outer edge of the wave - the meeting point between savagery and civilization. Much has been written about the frontier from the point of view of border warfare and the chase, but as a field for the serious study of the economist and the historian it has been neglected.

The American frontier is sharply distinguished from the European frontier - a fortified boundary line running through dense populations. The most significant thing about the American frontier is that it lies at the hither edge of free land. In the census reports it is treated as the margin of that settlement which has a density of two or more to the square mile. The term is an elastic one, and for our purposes does not need sharp definition. We shall consider the whole frontier belt including the Indian country and the outer margin of the "settled area"

of the census reports. This paper will make no attempt to treat the subject exhaustively; its aim is simply to call attention to the frontier as a fertile field for investigation, and to suggest some of the problems which arise in connection with it.

In the settlement of America we have to observe how European life entered the continent, and how America modified and developed that life and reacted on Europe. Our early history is the study of European germs developing in an American environment. Too exclusive attention has been paid by institutional students to the Germanic origins, too little to the American factors. The frontier is the line of most rapid and effective Americanization. The wilderness masters the colonist. It finds him a European in dress, industries, tools, modes of travel, and thought. It takes him from the railroad car and puts him in the birch canoe. It strips off the garments of civilization and arrays him in the hunting shirt and the moccasin. It puts him in the log cabin of the Cherokee and Iroquois and runs an Indian palisade around him. Before long he has gone to planting Indian corn and plowing with a sharp stick, he shouts the war cry and takes the scalp in orthodox Indian fashion. In short, at the frontier the environment is at first too strong for the man. He must accept the conditions which it furnishes, or perish, and so he fits himself into the Indian clearings and follows the Indian trails. Little by little he transforms the wilderness, but the outcome is not the old Europe, not simply the development of Germanic germs, any more than the first phenomenon was a case of reversion to the Germanic mark. The fact is that here is a new product that is American. At first, the frontier was the Atlantic coast. It was the frontier of Europe in a very real sense. Moving westward, the frontier became more and more American. As successive terminal moraines result from successive glaciations, so each frontier leaves its traces behind it, and when it becomes a settled area the region still partakes of the frontier characteristics. Thus the advance of the frontier has meant a steady movement away from the influence of Europe, a steady growth of independence on American lines. And to study this advance, the men who grew up under these conditions, and the political, economic, and social results of it, is to study the really American part of our history.

12 - Senator Redfield Proctor - March 17, 1898

The first clause of Weyler's order reads as follows: "I order and command:

First - All the inhabitants of the country now outside of the line of fortifications of the towns shall within the period of eight days concentrate themselves in the town so occupied by the troops. Any individual who after the expiration of this period is found in the uninhabited parts will be considered a rebel and tried as such."

The other three sections forbid the transportation of provisions from one town to another without permission of the military authority, direct the owners of cattle to bring them into the towns, prescribe that the eight days shall be counted from the publication of the proclamation to the head town of the municipal districts, and state that if news is furnished of the enemy which can be made use of it will serve as a "recommendation."

Many doubtless did not learn of this order. Others failed to grasp its terrible meaning. Its execution was left largely to the guerillas to drive in all that had not obeyed, and I was informed that in many cases a torch was applied to their homes with no notice, and the inmates fled with such clothing as they might have on, their stock and their belongings being appropriated by the guerillas.

When they reached the town they were allowed to build huts of palm leaves in the suburbs and vacant places within the trochas, and were left to live if they could. Their huts are about ten by fifteen feet in size; and for want of space are usually crowded together very closely. They have no floor but the ground, and no furniture, and after a year's wear but little clothing, except such stray substitutes as they can extemporize.

With large families or with more than one in this little space, the commonest sanitary provisions are impossible. Conditions are unmentionable in this respect. Torn from their homes, with foul earth, foul air, foul water and foul food, or none, what wonder that one-half have died and that one-quarter of the living are so diseased that they cannot be saved. A form of dropsy is a common disorder resulting from these conditions. Little children are still walking about with arms and chests terribly emaciated, eyes swollen and abdomen bloated to three times the natural size. The physicians say these cases are hopeless.

Deaths in the streets have not been uncommon. I was told by one of our consuls that people have been found dead about the markets in the morning where they had crawled hoping to get some stray bits of food from the early hucksters, and that there had been cases where they had dropped dead inside the market, surrounded by food.

These people were independent and self-supporting before Weyler's order. They are not beggars even now. There are plenty of professional beggars in every town among the regular residents, but these country people, the reconcentrados, have not learned the art. Rarely is a hand held out to you for alms when going among their huts, but the sight of them makes an appeal stronger than words. The hospitals, of these I need not speak; others have described their condition far better than I can.

It is not within the narrow limits of my vocabulary to portray it. I went to Cuba with a strong conviction that the picture had been overdrawn; that a few cases of starvation and suffering had inspired and stimulated the press correspondents, and that they had given free play to a strong, natural and highly cultivated imagination.

I could not believe that out of a population of one million six hundred thousand, 200,000 had died within these Spanish forts, practically prison walls, within a few months past, from actual starvation and disease caused by insufficient and improper food.

My inquiries were entirely outside of sensational sources. They were made by our medical officers, of our consuls, of city alcaldes (mayors), of relief committees, of leading

merchants and bankers, physicians and lawyers. Several of my informants were Spanish born, but every time came the answer that the case had not been overstated.

What I saw I cannot tell so that others can see it. It must be seen with one's own eyes to be realized.

13 - William McKinley, "War Message" - April 11, 1898

The grounds for such intervention may be briefly summarized as follows:

First. In the cause of humanity and to put an end to the barbarities, bloodshed, starvation, and horrible miseries now existing there, and which the parties to the conflict are either unable or unwilling to stop or mitigate. It is no answer to say this is all in another country, belonging to another nation, and is therefore none of our business. It is specially our duty, for it is right at our door.

Second. We owe it to our citizens in Cuba to afford them that protection and indemnity for life and property which no government there can or will afford, and to that end to terminate the conditions that deprive them of legal protection.

Third. The right to intervene may be justified by the very serious injury to the commerce, trade, and business of our people and by the wanton destruction of property and devastation of the island.

Fourth, and which is of the utmost importance. The present condition of affairs in Cuba is a constant menace to our peace and entails upon this Government an enormous expense. With such a conflict waged for years in an island so near us and with which our people have such trade and business relations; when the lives and liberty of our citizens are in constant danger and their property destroyed and themselves ruined; where our trading vessels are liable to seizure and are seized at our very door by war ships of a foreign nation; the expedition of filibustering that we are powerless to prevent altogether, and the irritating questions and entanglements thus arising – all these and others that I need not mention, with the resulting strained relations, are a constant menace to our peace and compel us to keep on a semi war footing with a nation with which we are at peace.

These elements of danger and disorder already pointed out have been strikingly illustrated by a tragic event which had deeply and justly moved the American people. I have already transmitted to Congress the report of the Naval Court of Inquiry on the destruction of the battleship Maine in the harbor of Havana during the night of the 15th of February. The destruction of that noble vessel has filled the national heart with inexpressible horror. Two hundred and fifty-eight brave sailors and marines and two officers of our Navy, reposing in the fanciest security of a friendly harbor, have been hurled to death, grief and want brought to their homes, and sorrow to the nation.

The Naval Court of Inquiry, which, it is needless to say, command the unqualified confidence of the government, was unanimous in its conclusion that the destruction of the Maine was caused by an exterior explosion, that of a submarine mine. It did not assume to place the responsibility. That remains to be fixed.

In any event, the destruction of the Maine, by whatever exterior cause, is a patent and impressive proof of a state of things in Cuba that is intolerable. That condition is thus shown to be such that the Spanish government cannot assure safety and security to a vessel of the American Navy in the harbor of Havana on a mission of peace, and rightfully there.

The long trial has proved that the object for which Spain has waged war cannot be attained. The fire of insurrection may flame or may smolder with varying seasons, but it has not been, and it is plain that it cannot be, extinguished by present methods. The only hope of relief and repose from a condition which can no longer be endured is the enforced pacification of Cuba. In the name of humanity, in the name of civilization, in behalf of endangered American interests which give us the right and the duty to speak and to act, the war in Cuba must stop.

In view of these facts and of these responsibilities I ask Congress to authorize and empower the President to take measures to secure a full and final termination of hostilities between the Government of Spain and the people of Cuba, and to secure in the island the establishment of a stable government, capable of maintaining order and observing its international obligations, insuring peace and tranquility and the security of its citizens as well as our own, and the use the military and naval forces of the United States as may be necessary for these purposes.

And in the interest of humanity and to aid in preserving the lives of the starving people of the island I recommend that the distribution of food and supplies be continued and that an appropriation be made out of the public Treasury to supplement the charity of our citizens.

The issue is now with the Congress. It is a solemn responsibility. I have exhausted every effort to relieve the intolerable condition of affairs which is at our doors. Prepared to execute every obligation imposed upon me by the Constitution and the law, I await your action.

Yesterday, and since the preparation of the foregoing message, official information was received by me that the latest decree of the Queen Regent of Spain directs General Blanco, in order to prepare and facilitate peace, to proclaim a suspension of hostilities, the duration and details of which have not yet been communicated to me.

This fact, with every other pertinent consideration, will, I am sure, have your just and careful attention in the solemn deliberations upon which you are about to enter. If this measure attains a successful result, then our aspirations as a Christian, peace-loving people will be realized. If it fails, it will be only another justification for our contemplated action.

14 - Emilio Aguinaldo, "The True Version of the Philippine Revolution" - 23rd September, 1899

Oh, dear Philippines! Blame your wealth, your beauty for the stupendous disgrace that rests upon your faithful sons.

You have aroused the ambition of the Imperialists and Expansionists of North America and both have placed their sharp claws upon your entrails!

Loved mother, sweet mother, we are here to defend your liberty and independence to the death! We do not want war; on the contrary, we wish for peace; but honorable peace, which does not make you blush nor stain your forehead with shame and confusion. And we swear to you and promise that while America with all her power and wealth could possibly vanquish us; killing all of us; but enslave us, never!!!

No; this humiliation is not the compact I celebrated in Singapore with the American Consul Pratt. This was not the agreement stipulated for with Mr. Wildman, American Consul in Hong Kong. Finally, it was not the subjection of my beloved country to a new alien yoke that Admiral Dewey promised me.

It is certain that these three have abandoned me, forgetting that I was sought for and taken from my exile and deportation; forgetting, also, that neither of these three solicited my services in behalf of American Sovereignty, they paying the expense of the Philippine Revolution for which, manifestly, they sought me and brought me back to your beloved bosom!

If there is, as I believe, one God, the root and fountain of all justice and only eternal judge of international disputes, it will not take long, dear mother, to save you from the hands, of your unjust enemies. So I trust in the honor of Admiral Dewey: So I trust in the rectitude of the great people of the United States of America, where, if there are ambitious Imperialists, there are defenders of the humane doctrines of the immortal Monroe, Franklin, and Washington; unless the race of noble citizens, glorious founders of the present greatness of the North American Republic, have so degenerated that their benevolent influence has become subservient to the grasping ambition of the Expansionists, in which latter unfortunate circumstance would not death be preferable to bondage?

Oh, sensible American people! Deep is the admiration of all the Philippine people and of their untrained Army of the courage displayed by your Commanders and soldiers. We are weak in comparison with such Titanic instruments of your Government's ambitious Caesarian policy and find it difficult to effectively resist their courageous onslaught. Limited are our warlike resources, but we will continue this unjust, bloody, and unequal struggle, not for the love of war - which we abhor - but to defend our incontrovertible rights of Liberty and Independence (so dearly won in war with Spain) and our territory which is threatened by the ambitions of a party that is trying to subjugate us.

Distressing, indeed, is war! Its ravages cause us horror. Luckless Filipinos succumb in the confusion of combat, leaving behind them mothers, widows and children. America could put up with all the misfortunes she brings on us without discomfort; but what the North American people are not agreeable to is that she should continue sacrificing her sons, causing distress and anguish to mothers, widows and daughters to satisfy the whim of maintaining a war in contravention of their honorable traditions as enunciated by Washington and Jefferson.

Go back, therefore, North American people, to your old-time liberty. Put your hand on your heart and tell me: Would it be pleasant for you if, in the course of time, North America should find herself in the pitiful plight, of a weak and oppressed people and the Philippines, a free and powerful nation, then at war with your oppressors, asked for your aid promising to

deliver you from such a weighty yoke, and after defeating her enemy with your aid she set about subjugating you, refusing the promised liberation?

Civilized nations! Honorable inhabitants of the United States, to whose high and estimable consideration I submit this unpretentious work, herein you have the providential facts which led to the unjust attack upon the existence of the Philippine Republic and the existence of those for whom, though unworthy, God made me the principal guardian.

The veracity of these facts rests upon my word as President of this Republic and on the honor of the whole population of eight million souls, who, for more than three hundred years have been sacrificing the lives and wealth of their brave sons to obtain due recognition of the natural rights of mankind — liberty and independence.

If you will do me the honor to receive and read this work and then pass judgment impartially solemnly declaring on which side right and justice rests, your respectful servant will be eternally grateful.

15 - Carl Schurz, "Address at the Anti-Imperialistic Conference" - Chicago, October 17, 1899

Here are our "manifest destiny" men who tell us that, whether it be right or not, we must take and keep the Philippines because "destiny" so wills it. We have heard this cry of manifest destiny before, especially when, a half century ago, the slave-power demanded the annexation of Cuba and Central America to strengthen the slave-power. The cry of destiny is most vociferously put forward by those who want to do a wicked thing and to shift the responsibility. The destiny of a free people lies in its intelligent will and its moral strength. When it pleads destiny, it pleads "the baby act." Nay, worse; the cry of destiny is apt to be the refuge of evil intent and of moral cowardice.

Here are our "burden" men, who piously turn up their eyes and tell us, with a melancholy sigh, that all this conquest business may be very irksome, but that a mysterious Providence has put it as a "burden" upon us, which, however sorrowfully, we must bear; that this burden consists in our duty to take care of the poor people of the Philippines; and that in order to take proper care of them we must exercise sovereignty over them; and that if they refuse to accept our sovereignty, we must alas! alas! kill them, which makes the burden very solemn and sad.

But cheer up, brethren! We may avoid that mournful way of taking care of them by killing them, if we simply recognize their right to take care of themselves, and gently aid them in doing so. Besides, you may be as much mistaken about the decrees of Providence as before our civil war the Southern Methodist bishops were who solemnly insisted that Providence willed the negroes to remain in slavery.

Next there are our "flag" men, who insist that we must kill the Filipinos fighting for their independence to protect the honor of the stars and stripes. I agree that the honor of our flag sorely needs protection. We have to protect it against desecration by those who are making it an emblem of that hypocrisy which seeks to cover a war of conquest and subjugation with a cloak of humanity and religion; an emblem of that greed which would treat a matter involving our National honor, the integrity of our institutions and the peace and character of the Republic as a mere question of dollars and cents; an emblem of that vulgar lust of war and conquest which recklessly tramples upon right and justice and all our higher ideals; an emblem of the imperialistic ambitions which mock the noblest part of our history and stamp the greatest National heroes of our past as hypocrites or fools. These are the dangers threatening the honor of our flag, against which it needs protection, and that protection we are striving to give it.

Now, a last word to those of our fellow-citizens who feel and recognize as we do that the Philippine war of subjugation is wrong and cruel, and that we ought to recognize the independence of those people, but who insist that, having begun that war, we must continue it until the submission of the Filipinos is complete. I detest, but I can understand, the Jingo whose moral sense is obscured by intoxicating dreams of wild adventure and conquest, and to whom bloodshed and devastation have become a reckless sport. I detest even more, but still I can understand, the cruel logic of those to whom everything is a matter of dollars and cents and whose greed of gain will walk coolly over slaughtered populations. But I must confess I cannot understand the reasoning of those who have moral sense enough to recognize that this war is criminal aggression - who must say to themselves that every drop of blood shed in it by friend or foe is blood wantonly and wickedly shed, and that every act of devastation is barbarous cruelty inflicted upon an innocent people - but who still maintain that we must go on killing, and devastating, and driving our brave soldiers into a fight which they themselves

are cursing, because we have once begun it. This I cannot understand. Do they not consider that in such a war, which they themselves condemn as wanton and iniquitous, the more complete our success, the greater will be our disgrace?

What do they fear for the Republic if, before having fully consummated this criminal aggression, we stop to give a people struggling for their freedom what is due them? Will this Republic be less powerful? It will be as strong as ever, nay, stronger, for it will have saved the resources of its power from useless squandering and transformed vindictive enemies into friends. Will it be less respected? Nay, more, for it will have demonstrated its honesty at the sacrifice of false pride. Is this the first time that a powerful nation desisted from the subjugation of a weaker adversary? Have we not the example of England before us, who, after a seven-year war against the American colonists, recognized their independence? Indeed, the example of England teaches us a double lesson. England did not, by recognizing American independence, lose her position in the world and her chances of future greatness; on the contrary, she grew in strength. And secondly, England would have retained, or won anew, the friendship of the Americans, if she had recognized American independence more promptly, before appearing to have been forced to do so by humiliating defeats. Will our friends who are for Philippine independence, but also for continuing to kill those who fight for it, take these two lessons to heart?

16 - Theodore Roosevelt, "Annual Message to Congress" - December 6, 1904

It is not true that the United States feels any land hunger or entertains any projects as regards the other nations of the Western Hemisphere save such as are for their welfare. All that this country desires is to see the neighboring countries stable, orderly, and prosperous. Any country whose people conduct themselves well can count upon our hearty friendship. If a nation shows that it knows how to act with reasonable efficiency and decency in social and political matters, if it keeps order and pays its obligations, it need fear no interference from the United States. Chronic wrongdoing, or an impotence which results in a general loosening of the ties of civilized society, may in America, as elsewhere, ultimately require intervention by some civilized nation, and in the Western Hemisphere the adherence of the United States to the Monroe Doctrine may force the United States, however reluctantly, in flagrant cases of such wrongdoing or impotence, to the exercise of an international police power. If every country washed by the Caribbean Sea would show the progress in stable and just civilization which with the aid of the Platt Amendment Cuba has shown since our troops left the island, and which so many of the republics in both Americas are constantly and brilliantly showing, all question of interference by this Nation with their affairs would be at an end. Our interests and those of our southern neighbors are in reality identical. They have great natural riches, and if within their borders the reign of law and justice obtains, prosperity is sure to come to them. While they thus obey the primary laws of civilized society they may rest assured that they will be treated by us in a spirit of cordial and helpful sympathy. We would interfere with them only in the last resort, and then only if it became evident that their inability or unwillingness to do justice at home and abroad had violated the rights of the United States or had invited foreign aggression to the detriment of the entire body of American nations. It is a mere truism to say that every nation, whether in America or anywhere else, which desires to maintain its freedom, its independence, must ultimately realize that the right of such independence can not be separated from the responsibility of making good use of it.

In asserting the Monroe Doctrine, in taking such steps as we have taken in regard to Cuba, Venezuela, and Panama, and in endeavoring to circumscribe the theater of war in the Far East, and to secure the open door in China, we have acted in our own interest as well as in the interest of humanity at large. There are, however, cases in which, while our own interests are not greatly involved, strong appeal is made to our sympathies. Ordinarily it is very much wiser and more useful for us to concern ourselves with striving for our own moral and material betterment here at home than to concern ourselves with trying to better the condition of things in other nations. We have plenty of sins of our own to war against, and under ordinary circumstances we can do more for the general uplifting of humanity by striving with heart and soul to put a stop to civic corruption, to brutal lawlessness and violent race prejudices here at home than by passing resolutions and wrongdoing elsewhere. Nevertheless there are occasional crimes committed on so vast a scale and of such peculiar horror as to make us doubt whether it is not our manifest duty to endeavor at least to show our disapproval of the deed and our sympathy with those who have suffered by it. The cases must be extreme in which such a course is justifiable. There must be no effort made to remove the mote from our brother's eye if we refuse to remove the beam from our own. But in extreme cases action may be justifiable and proper. What form the action shall take must depend upon the circumstances of the case; that is, upon the degree of the atrocity and upon our power to remedy it. The cases in which we could interfere by force of arms as we interfered to put a stop to intolerable conditions in Cuba are necessarily very few. Yet it is not to be expected

that a people like ours, which in spite of certain very obvious shortcomings, nevertheless as a whole shows by its consistent practice its belief in the principles of civil and religious liberty and of orderly freedom, a people among whom even the worst crime, like the crime of lynching, is never more than sporadic, so that individuals and not classes are molested in their fundamental rights - it is inevitable that such a nation should desire eagerly to give expression to its horror on an occasion like that of the massacre of the Jews in Kishenef, or when it witnesses such systematic and long-extended cruelty and oppression as the cruelty and oppression of which the Armenians have been the victims, and which have won for them the indignant pity of the civilized world.

17 - Woodrow Wilson "War Message to Congress" - April 2, 1917

The present German submarine warfare against commerce is a warfare against mankind.

It is war against all nations.

American ships have been sunk, American lives taken, in ways which it has stirred us very deeply to learn of, but the ships and people of other neutral and friendly nations have been sunk and overwhelmed in the waters in the same way. There has been no discrimination. The challenge is to all mankind.

Each nation must decide for itself how it will meet it. The choice we make for ourselves must be made with a moderation of counsel and temperateness of judgment befitting our character and our motives as a nation. We must put excited feeling away. Our motive will not be revenge or the victorious assertion of the physical might of the nation, but only the vindication of right, of human right, of which we are only a single champion.

When I addressed the Congress on the twenty-sixth of February last I thought that it would suffice to assert our neutral rights with arms, our right to use the seas against unlawful interference, our right to keep our people safe against unlawful violence. But armed neutrality, it now appears, is impracticable. Because submarines are in effect outlaws when used as the German submarines have been used against merchant shipping, it is impossible to defend ships against their attacks as the law of nations has assumed that merchantmen would defend themselves against privateers or cruisers, visible craft giving chase upon the open sea. It is common prudence in such circumstances, grim necessity indeed, to endeavor to destroy them before they have shown their own intention. They must be dealt with upon sight, if dealt with at all.

The German Government denies the right of neutrals to use arms at all within the areas of the sea which it has proscribed, even in the defense of rights which no modern publicist has ever before questioned their right to defend. The intimation is conveyed that the armed guards which we have placed on our merchant ships will be treated as beyond the pale of law and subject to be dealt with as pirates would be. Armed neutrality is ineffectual enough at best; in such circumstances and in the face of such pretensions it is worse than ineffectual; it is likely only to produce what it was meant to prevent; it is practically certain to draw us into the war without either the rights or the effectiveness of belligerents. There is one choice we cannot make, we are incapable of making: we will not choose the path of submission and suffer the most sacred rights of our nation and our people to be ignored or violated. The wrongs against which we now array ourselves are no common wrongs: they cut to the very roots of human life.

With a profound sense of the solemn and even tragical character of the step I am taking and of the grave responsibilities which it involves, but in unhesitating obedience to what I deem my constitutional duty, I advise that the Congress declare the recent course of the Imperial German Government to be in fact nothing less than war against the government and people of the United States; that it formally accept the status of belligerent which has thus been thrust upon it; and that it take immediate steps not only to put the country in a more thorough state of defense but also to exert all its power and employ all its resources to bring the Government of the German Empire to terms and end the war.

18 - Woodrow Wilson, Joint Session of Congress - January 8, 1918

We entered this war because violations of right had occurred which touched us to the quick and made the life of our own people impossible unless they were corrected and the world secure once for all against their recurrence. What we demand in this war, therefore, is nothing peculiar to ourselves. It is that the world be made fit and safe to live in; and particularly that it be made safe for every peace-loving nation which, like our own, wishes to live its own life, determine its own institutions, be assured of justice and fair dealing by the other peoples of the world as against force and selfish aggression. All the peoples of the world are in effect partners in this interest, and for our own part we see very clearly that unless justice be done to others it will not be done to us. The program of the world's peace, therefore, is our program; and that program, the only possible program, as we see it, is this:

I. Open covenants of peace, openly arrived at, after which there shall be no private international understandings of any kind but diplomacy shall proceed always frankly and in the public view.

II. Absolute freedom of navigation upon the seas, outside territorial waters, alike in peace and in war, except as the seas may be closed in whole or in part by international action for the enforcement of international covenants.

III. The removal, so far as possible, of all economic barriers and the establishment of an equality of trade conditions among all the nations consenting to the peace and associating themselves for its maintenance.

IV. Adequate guarantees given and taken that national armaments will be reduced to the lowest point consistent with domestic safety.

V. A free, open-minded, and absolutely impartial adjustment of all colonial claims, based upon a strict observance of the principle that in determining all such questions of sovereignty the interests of the populations concerned must have equal weight with the equitable claims of the government whose title is to be determined.

VI. The evacuation of all Russian territory and such a settlement of all questions affecting Russia as will secure the best and freest cooperation of the other nations of the world in obtaining for her an unhampered and unembarrassed opportunity for the independent determination of her own political development and national policy and assure her of a sincere welcome into the society of free nations under institutions of her own choosing; and, more than a welcome, assistance also of every kind that she may need and may herself desire. The treatment accorded Russia by her sister nations in the months to come will be the acid test of their good will, of their comprehension of her needs as distinguished from their own interests, and of their intelligent and unselfish sympathy.

VII. Belgium, the whole world will agree, must be evacuated and restored, without any attempt to limit the sovereignty which she enjoys in common with all other free nations. No other single act will serve as this will serve to restore confidence among the nations in the laws which they have themselves set and determined for the government of their relations with one another. Without this healing act the whole structure and validity of international law is forever impaired.

VIII. All French territory should be freed and the invaded portions restored, and the wrong done to France by Prussia in 1871 in the matter of Alsace-Lorraine, which has unsettled the peace of the world for nearly fifty years, should be righted, in order that

peace may once more be made secure in the interest of all.

IX. A readjustment of the frontiers of Italy should be effected along clearly recognizable lines of nationality.

X. The peoples of Austria-Hungary, whose place among the nations we wish to see safeguarded and assured, should be accorded the freest opportunity to autonomous development.

XI. Rumania, Serbia, and Montenegro should be evacuated; occupied territories restored; Serbia accorded free and secure access to the sea; and the relations of the several Balkan states to one another determined by friendly counsel along historically established lines of allegiance and nationality; and international guarantees of the political and economic independence and territorial integrity of the several Balkan states should be entered into.

XII. The Turkish portion of the present Ottoman Empire should be assured a secure sovereignty, but the other nationalities which are now under Turkish rule should be assured an undoubted security of life and an absolutely unmolested opportunity of autonomous development, and the Dardanelles should be permanently opened as a free passage to the ships and commerce of all nations under international guarantees.

XIII. An independent Polish state should be erected which should include the territories inhabited by indisputably Polish populations, which should be assured a free and secure access to the sea, and whose political and economic independence and territorial integrity should be guaranteed by international covenant.

XIV. A general association of nations must be formed under specific covenants for the purpose of affording mutual guarantees of political independence and territorial integrity to great and small states alike.

19 - William E. Borah, U. S. Congress, Senate - November 19, 1919

If the league includes the affairs of the world, does it not include the affairs of all the world? Is there any limitation of the jurisdiction of the council or of the assembly upon the question of peace and war? Does it not have now, under the reservations, the same as it had before, the power to deal with all matters of peace or war throughout the entire world? How shall you keep from meddling in the affairs of Europe or keep Europe from meddling in the affairs of America?

Mr. President, there is another reason and even a more commanding reason why I shall record my vote against this treaty. It imperils what I conceive to be the underlying, the very first principle of this Republic. It is a conflict with the right of our people to govern themselves free from all restraint, legal or moral, of foreign powers. It challenges every tenet of my political faith. If this faith were one of my own contriving, if I stood here to assert principles of government of my own evolving, I might well be charged with intolerable presumption, for we all recognize the ability of those who urge a different course. But I offer in justification of my course nothing of my own save the deep and abiding reverence I have for those whose policies I humbly but most ardently support. I claim no merit save fidelity to American principles and devotion to American ideals as they were wrought out from time to time by those who built the Republic and as they have been extended and maintained throughout these years. In opposing the treaty I do nothing more than decline to renounce and tear out of my life the sacred traditions which throughout fifty years have been translated into my whole intellectual and moral being. I will not, I cannot, give up my belief that America must, not alone for the happiness of her own people, but for the moral guidance and greater contentment of the world, be permitted to live her own life. Next to the tie which binds a man to his God is the tie which binds a man to his country, and all schemes, all plans, however ambitious and fascinating they seem in their proposal, but which would embarrass or entangle and impede or shackle her sovereign will, which would compromise her freedom of action, I unhesitatingly put behind me.

Sir, since the debate opened months ago those of us who have stood against this proposition have been taunted many times with being little Americans. Leave us the word American, keep that in your presumptuous impeachment, and no taunt can disturb us, no gibe discompose our purposes. Call us little Americans if you will, but leave us the consolation and the pride which the term American, however modified, still imparts. Take away that term and though you should coin in telling phrase your highest eulogy we would hurl it back as a common slander. We have been ridiculed because, forsooth, of our limited vision. Possibly that charge may be true. Who is there here that can read the future? Time, and time alone, unerring and remorseless, will give us each our proper place in the affections of our countrymen and in the esteem and commendation of those who are to come after us. We neither fear nor court her favor. But if our vision has been circumscribed it has at all times within its compass been clear and steady. We have sought nothing save the tranquility of our own people and the honor, and independence of our own Republic. No foreign flattery, no possible world of glory and power have disturbed our poise or come between us and our devotion to the traditions which have made us a people or the policies which have made us a nation, unselfish and commanding. If we have erred we erred out of too much love for those things which from childhood you and we together have been taught to revere – yes, to defend at the cost of limb and life. If we have erred it is because we have placed too high an estimate upon the wisdom of Washington and Jefferson, too exalted an opinion upon the patriotism of the sainted Lincoln. And blame us not therefore if we have, in our limited vision, seemed sometimes bitter and at all times uncompromising, for the things for which we have spoken,

feebly spoken, the things which we have endeavored to defend, have been the things for which your fathers and our fathers were willing to die.

20 - Franklin Delano Roosevelt, "Quarantine Speech" - October 5, 1937

There is a solidarity and interdependence about the modern world, both technically and morally, which makes it impossible for any nation completely to isolate itself from economic and political upheavals in the rest of the world, especially when such upheavals appear to be spreading and not declining. There can be no stability or peace either within nations or between nations except under laws and moral standards adhered to by all. International anarchy destroys every foundation for peace. It jeopardizes either the immediate or the future security of every nation, large or small. It is, therefore, a matter of vital interest and concern to the people of the United States that the sanctity of international treaties and the maintenance of international morality be restored.

The overwhelming majority of the peoples and nations of the world today want to live in peace. They seek the removal of barriers against trade. They want to exert themselves in industry, in agriculture and in business, that they may increase their wealth through the production of wealth-producing goods rather than striving to produce military planes and bombs and machine guns and cannon for the destruction of human lives and useful property.

In those nations of the world which seem to be piling armament on armament for purposes of aggression, and those other nations which fear acts of aggression against them and their security, a very high proportion of their national income is being spent directly for armaments. It runs from thirty to as high as fifty percent. We are fortunate. The proportion that we in the United States spend is far less - eleven or twelve percent.

How happy we are that the circumstances of the moment permit us to put our money into bridges and boulevards, dams and reforestation, the conservation of our soil and many other kinds of useful works rather than into huge standing armies and vast supplies of implements of war.

I am compelled and you are compelled, nevertheless, to look ahead. The peace, the freedom and the security of ninety percent of the population of the world is being jeopardized by the remaining ten percent who are threatening a breakdown of all international order and law. Surely the ninety percent who want to live in peace under law and in accordance with moral standards that have received almost universal acceptance through the centuries, can and must find some way to make their will prevail.

The situation is definitely of universal concern. The questions involved relate not merely to violations of specific provisions of particular treaties; they are questions of war and of peace, of international law and especially of principles of humanity. It is true that they involve definite violations of agreements, and especially of the Covenant of the League of Nations, the Briand-Kellogg Pact and the Nine Power Treaty. But they also involve problems of world economy, world security and world humanity.

It is true that the moral consciousness of the world must recognize the importance of removing injustices and well-founded grievances; but at the same time it must be aroused to the cardinal necessity of honoring sanctity of treaties, of respecting the rights and liberties of others and of putting an end to acts of international aggression.

It seems to be unfortunately true that the epidemic of world lawlessness is spreading.

When an epidemic of physical disease starts to spread, the community approves and joins in a quarantine of the patients in order to protect the health of the community against the spread of the disease.

It is my determination to pursue a policy of peace. It is my determination to adopt every practicable measure to avoid involvement in war. It ought to be inconceivable that in

this modern era, and in the face of experience, any nation could be so foolish and ruthless as to run the risk of plunging the whole world into war by invading and violating, in contravention of solemn treaties, the territory of other nations that have done them no real harm and are too weak to protect themselves adequately. Yet the peace of the world and the welfare and security of every nation, including our own, is today being threatened by that very thing.

No nation which refuses to exercise forbearance and to respect the freedom and rights of others can long remain strong and retain the confidence and respect of other nations. No nation ever loses its dignity or its good standing by conciliating its differences, and by exercising great patience with, and consideration for, the rights of other nations.

War is a contagion, whether it be declared or undeclared. It can engulf states and peoples remote from the original scene of hostilities. We are determined to keep out of war, yet we cannot insure ourselves against the disastrous effects of war and the dangers of involvement. We are adopting such measures as will minimize our risk of involvement, but we cannot have complete protection in a world of disorder in which confidence and security have broken down.

If civilization is to survive the principles of the Prince of Peace must be restored. Trust between nations must be revived.

Most important of all, the will for peace on the part of peace-loving nations must express itself to the end that nations that may be tempted to violate their agreements and the rights of others will desist from such a course. There must be positive endeavors to preserve peace.

America hates war. America hopes for peace. Therefore, America actively engages in the search for peace.

Chronology – Expansion

- 1763 The Paris Treaty puts an end to the Seven Years' War. France yields Canada and its territories east of the Mississippi River (except New Orleans) to England, and cedes New Orleans and Louisiana to Spain. In America, France retains only the islands of Saint-Pierre and Miquelon. Spain yields Florida to England.
- 1778 The United States signs a Treaty of Alliance and a Treaty of Amity and Commerce with France.
- 1783 End of the War of Independence. A peace treaty is signed in Paris on September 3: it recognizes the United States as an independent nation and establishes its borders.
- 1793 George Washington declares that the United States will remain neutral in the Franco-British war.
- 1794 Jay's Treaty: it aims at solving all territorial and commercial disputes between the United States and Great Britain. The British promise to evacuate their fortified posts in the Northwest.
- 1795 Pinckney's Treaty: Thomas Pinckney, a special envoy of the United States, signs a treaty with Spain. It grants the United States free use of the Mississippi and the right to deposit goods in New Orleans.
Treaty of Greenville: A year after their defeat at the battle of Fallen Timbers, the Indians cede to the United States most of what later became the state of Ohio.
- 1796 France announces that it will seize any neutral ship heading for England. Beginning of an undeclared naval war with France.
In his Farewell Address, George Washington asks the American people to have "as little political connection as possible" with foreign nations.
- 1800 With the Treaty of Mortefontaine hostilities between France and the United States come to an end.
Napoleon concludes the Treaty of San Ildefonso with Spain providing for the return to France of Louisiana. The treaty is kept secret and Spain continues to administer the territory.
- 1801 Thomas Jefferson is elected: he promises "peace, commerce and honest friendship with all nations, entangling with none."
- 1802 Notwithstanding the guarantees of Pinckney's Treaty of 1795, the Spanish Intendant at New Orleans closes the Mississippi River to American commerce.
- 1803 France yields Louisiana to the United States for approximately \$15 million. The Louisiana Purchase doubles the territory of the United States
- 1810 President Madison issues a proclamation annexing West Florida.
- 1812 Congress adopts a declaration of war. The so-called Second War for Independence starts to protect free trade and sailors' rights.
- 1814 Peace treaty with England is signed at Ghent.
- 1819 The Adams-Onís Treaty provides for the cession of both the Floridas to the United States by Spain. The treaty also defines the boundary between the United States and Mexico. It is to run from the Sabine River in east Texas to the forty-second parallel, the present northern boundary of California. Spain gives up its claim to Oregon and, in return, the United States relinquishes all claims to Texas.
First American missionaries arrive in Hawaii.
- 1823 The Monroe Doctrine : Following Spain's decision, backed up by the powers of the Holy Alliance (Russia, Prussia and Austria) to reconquer its American colonies, President James Monroe issues a warning to European nations not to intervene in the New World and a promise by the United States not to meddle in their internal affairs.

- The principles of noncolonization, nonintervention and isolation are defined by Monroe's Secretary of State, John Quincy Adams.
- 1836 The Texans declare their independence, establish a republic and request admission into the American Union.
The Mexican president, General Santa Anna, leads an army into Texas to put down the revolt. They take over the Alamo mission at San Antonio and kill every member of the garrison.
General Sam Houston defeats the Mexicans at the battle of San Jacinto. The new republic seeks annexation to the United States but Andrew Jackson refuses it.
- 1844 Caleb Cushing signs the Treaty of Wangxia with the Chinese.
- 1845 Congress votes the annexation of Texas. Mexico breaks its diplomatic relations with the United States.
The catch-phrase "Manifest Destiny" is coined by John O'Sullivan, the editor of *The Democratic Review*. The phrase reflects the assumption that Providence has intended the United States to control the entire North American continent.
- 1846 Beginning of the Mexican War.
The Americans settlers in California stage the Bear Flag Revolt and proclaim their independence from Mexico.
The Oregon Treaty: England cedes the territory west of the Rockies and south of the 49th parallel.
- 1848 End of the Mexican War. The Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo is signed on February 2nd: Mexico accepts the annexation of Texas and cedes New Mexico and California to the United States in exchange for \$15 million. This land acquisition amounts to a 33% growth of the American territory.
- 1853 Gadsden Purchase: the United States acquires from Mexico one final strip of territory in the southwest in order to build a transcontinental railroad.
- 1854 Commodore Matthew C. Perry signs the Treaty of Kanagawa with Japan, providing for the opening of two ports to American trading vessels.
- 1858 Treaty of Tianjin by which the United States gains access to more Chinese ports.
- 1867 Purchase of Alaska from Russia for \$7 million.
Occupation and annexation of Midway Islands.
- 1860s Horace Greeley popularizes the famous phrase "Go West, Young Man."
- 1868 The Burlingame Treaty ensures Chinese in the United States and Americans in China the most-favored nation treatment.
- 1869 Treaty with Colombia giving the United States the right to build a canal through Panama.
- 1872 The Grant administration establishes a naval base in Samoa.
- 1885 John Fiske, the leading American popularizer of Darwinian ideas, publishes an article in *Harper's New Monthly Magazine* in which he extols the genius of the Anglo-Saxon race and reformulates the Manifest Destiny concept.
- 1887 Leasing of Pearl Harbor in Hawaii as a naval base.
- 1890 The Superintendent of the Census announces the disappearance of the frontier.
Captain Alfred Mahan publishes *The Influence of Sea Power upon History, 1660-1783*, in which he argues that a nation needs a powerful navy to wield power on the international scene.
- 1893 F.J. Turner publishes *The Significance of the Frontier in American History*, in which he puts forward his frontier thesis which argues that the receding frontier explains American democracy and the American national character.

- 1895 The Cuban insurrection begins: the Cleveland administration issues a neutrality proclamation.
- 1898 Congressional joint resolution recognizing Cuban independence and authorizing the President to use force to expel the Spaniards from the island.
Annexation of Hawaii.
Creation of the Anti-Imperialist League.
Treaty of Paris: it recognizes Cuban independence and provides for the cession to the United States of the Philippines, Puerto Rico, and the Pacific Island of Guam for \$20 million.
- 1899 Outbreak of Filipino insurrection against U.S. troops begins. The Filipino rebels, led by Emilio Aguinaldo, are dissatisfied that their country has not been granted independence
Formulation of an Open Door policy towards China by Secretary of State
- 1901 Congress adopts the *Platt amendment*: it transforms Cuba into a virtual American protectorate and grants the United States a naval base in Cuba, Guantánamo Bay.
Emilio Aguinaldo is arrested and the Filipino rebellion comes to an end.
- 1903 Hay-Bunau-Varilla Treaty: the building of the Panama canal is entrusted to the United States army engineers, who begin work in 1907.
- 1904 Roosevelt Corollary to the Monroe Doctrine is expressed in Annual message: the United States retains the right to intervene in the affairs of Latin American nations in order to ensure order and security.
- 1914 Following the outbreak of WWI in Europe, the United States declares that it will remain neutral.
- 1917 President Wilson asks Congress for a declaration of war.
Bolshevik Revolution. The United States breaks off its diplomatic ties with the Soviet Union.
- 1918 President Woodrow Wilson puts forward his fourteen-point program.
- 1919 The Senate refuses to ratify the Versailles Treaty and hence prevents the United States from participating in the newly created League of Nations.
- 1932 Following the Japanese invasion of Manchuria, the Stimson Doctrine merely condemns the aggression.
- 1933 The United States following the election of Franklin Delano Roosevelt, resumes its diplomatic ties with the Soviet Union.
- 1935 First *Neutrality Act*: it bans the shipment of arms to a country in a state of war.
- 1941 *Lend-Lease Act*: it allows the United States to sell, lease, or lend weapons to nations whose defense the President deems vital to the United States.
Atlantic Charter Conference: Churchill and Roosevelt define the main objectives of the British and American governments: rejection of territorial expansion, collective security, an international system of open trade, the right of people to self-determination.
December 7: The Japanese launch a surprise attack on Pearl Harbor, the American naval base in the Pacific.
December 8: Congress declares war.
- 1944 Bretton Woods Conference: it sets up an international monetary system consisting in a World Bank and an International Monetary Fund (IMF).
Dumbarton Oaks Conference: lays the foundation of an international organization dedicated to the preservation of peace.
- 1945 At the Yalta Conference, Roosevelt, Churchill, and Stalin negotiate postwar settlement for Europe.
The United Nations Organization is established at the San Francisco Conference.

May 8: Germany surrenders (V-E Day).

Potsdam Conference. The leaders of the United States, Great Britain, and the USSR issue an ultimatum to Japan, demanding its unconditional surrender.

August 6: Little Boy is dropped on Hiroshima.

August 9: Fat Man is dropped on Nagasaki.

August 14: Japan surrenders unconditionally (V-J Day).