


V - Intervention – The “great arsenal of democracy”



Walter Russell Mead’s characterization of American foreign policy as a “kaleidoscope” is an appropriate description, especially as far as the first century and a half of its history are concerned. In the same book, Mead offers another metaphorical description of American foreign policy:

American foreign policy is complex at its core. At any given moment it is more likely to be the product of a wide and diffuse coalition rather than of a single unitary vision. American foreign policy is at least as complicated to fathom as the elephant was for the proverbial blind men; the tusks are sharp, the tail is skittish, the ears flap, the trunk picks pockets, the feet tread heedlessly on smaller creatures, the breath smells of peanuts, and the creature as a whole is bulky and hard to move – but moves rapidly and violently if endangered, and

sometimes merely if it is alarmed by a mouse with a beard, a cigar, and a Spanish accent. But also like an elephant, American foreign policy generally gets what it wants¹.

Comparing American foreign policy to an elephant allows Mead to insist on the complexity of American foreign policy, not only in the first decades of its history but also after World War II. The Second World War was indeed a turning point because American foreign policy makers did not want to replicate the mistakes of their predecessors and therefore made sure that the United States would remain involved in world affairs afterwards. As a result, the transformation of the United States into the “great arsenal of democracy,” as FDR had promised in December 1940, became permanent and intervention in the second half of the twentieth century was now an abiding feature of America’s foreign policy.

After World War II, the European powers were too weak to restore and maintain the balance of power on the continent. The United States decided not to return to isolationism and instead helped restore that balance of power because it now knew how costly that policy could be. It feared the Soviet Union might occupy the vacuum of power which prevailed in Europe. As for the Soviet Union, it was also seeking security and therefore was eager to prevent another disruption of the European balance of power. The two superpowers had a similar overall geopolitical objective but their specific interests did not coincide. Furthermore, their respective ideologies were too unlike, which precluded compromise.

As a result, the Soviet-American relationship rapidly deteriorated and the United States soon found itself in a state of permanent emergency.

1. The Ideological Divide

Already in 1835, in the concluding chapter of the first volume of *De la démocratie en Amérique*, Alexis de Tocqueville underscored the unavoidable emergence of Russia and the United States as major players on the international scene:

Il y a aujourd’hui sur la terre deux grands peuples qui, partis de points différents, semblent s’avancer vers le même but : ce sont les Russes et les Anglo-Américains. Tous deux ont grandi dans l’obscurité ; et tandis que les regards des hommes étaient occupés ailleurs, ils se sont placés tout à coup au premier rang des nations, et le monde a appris presque en même temps leur naissance et leur grandeur. [...] Leur point de départ est différent, leurs voies sont diverses ; néanmoins, chacun d’entre eux semble appelé par un dessein secret de la Providence à tenir un jour dans ses mains les destinées de la moitié du monde².

Tocqueville’s contention in 1835 that the world was about to be dominated by both nations did not imply that there would be a fight between them. However, in 1847, the French politician Louis Adolphe Thiers came to the conclusion that bipolarity was bound to lead to conflict at some stage:

La vieille Europe a fait son temps. Il n’y a plus que deux peuples : la Russie là-bas, c’est barbare encore, mais c’est grand et (Pologne à part) c’est respectable. La vieille Europe aura tôt ou tard à compter avec cette jeunesse, car la Russie est une jeunesse, comme dit le peuple ; l’autre jeunesse, c’est l’Amérique, une démocratie adolescente et enivrée, qui ne connaît aucun obstacle. L’avenir du monde est là, entre ces deux grands mondes. Ils se heurteront un jour, et l’on verra alors des luttes dont le passé ne peut donner aucune idée, du moins pour la masse et le choc physique, car le temps des grandes choses morales est passé³.

Yet, hostility between the two countries remained minimal until the end of the nineteenth century because the world was still large enough and they could expand without clashing.

¹ Walter Russell Mead, *op. cit.*, p. 95.

² Alexis de Tocqueville, *De la démocratie en Amérique*, Volume I, *op.cit.*, pp. 597–598.

³ Louis Adolphe Thiers in André Fontaine, *Histoire de la guerre froide*, Volume I, *De la révolution d’Octobre à la guerre de Corée, 1917-1950*, Paris, Le Seuil/Coll. Points Histoire, [Fayard, 1965], p. 15.

The prospect of a future conflict seriously emerged at the beginning of the twentieth century following the Bolshevik Revolution of 1917 and the replacement of Russia by the Soviet Union. In addition to the strategic opposition between both geographical entities there was now an ideological clash. The Bolsheviks were eager to abolish private property, fairly distribute the fruits of production, and establish a socialist order based on public ownership of the means of production. What's more, Lenin endorsed the Marxist theory of inevitable conflict with capitalism. In the United States this ideology was deemed dangerous to individual liberties and the private market economy. At the end of World War I, President Woodrow Wilson had put forward an ideological framework which was diametrically opposed to Lenin's ideology. The main tenets of Wilson's ideology were self-determination, that is to say the notion that people could choose their own form of government, open markets so as to ensure economic prosperity, and collective security to achieve safety.

Because he feared ideological competition and because of the traditional geostrategic threat, in the summer of 1918 Wilson decided not to recognize the new state and to intervene in the Russian Civil War by supporting the White Forces against the Bolshevik Red Army. This intervention took place following the signing of the separate peace treaty with Germany at Brest-Litovsk in March 1918. In so doing the Bolsheviks had given up the fight and undermined the position of the Allied forces. Wilson, feeling the alliance had been betrayed, sent 7,000 U.S. troops to Siberia and smaller numbers to Archangel. The American effort in the fight against the Soviets remained limited but, because the United States did participate in the intervention, it was automatically considered by the Soviets as one of the imperialist aggressors determined to overthrow the new socialist state. The participation of the United States in the western intervention against the Soviet Union has led some historians to surmise that the Cold War actually started in 1918. To be sure, it reinforced the ideological rift between the two countries.

It is only in 1933 that the Soviet Union was finally recognized by the Roosevelt administration and that diplomatic relations between the two countries resumed. In the nineteen thirties, animosity between the two countries subsided because now they both had a common enemy: fascism. Still, suspicion remained strong and, at the end of the decade, several events intensified the feeling of mistrust: the signing of a non-aggression pact with Germany in August 1939, the participation of the Soviet Union in the dismemberment of Poland in September, the Soviet invasion of Finland in November and the annexation of the Baltic States (Latvia, Estonia, and Lithuania) in June 1940. These decisions backed up the claim that there was a close connection between the nature of the Soviet State and its foreign policy: to the totalitarian regime corresponded a totalitarian foreign policy.

The next year, following the invasion of the Soviet Union by German troops ("Operation Barbarossa") in June, there was a return to a less suspicious relationship. The United States promised that it would bring the Soviets its help. This more or less cordial relationship was made possible because the real danger to American national security did not come from Moscow but from Germany and Japan. After World War II, this working relationship was no longer practicable because both countries had diverging geopolitical interests and the new strategic situation in Europe refueled the old ideological divide between the two countries.

2. Containment

The Second World War was barely over when the Soviets began creating a sphere of influence in Eastern Europe in order to protect the Soviet Union from any possible attacks, or, as Vyacheslav Molotov, the Soviet foreign minister, put it: "We had to consolidate what had been conquered. The [Eastern] part of Germany had to be transformed into our Socialist Germany; and Czechoslovakia, Poland, Hungary, Yugoslavia – they all had been in an

amorphous state, and we had to introduce order ... there⁴.” This buffer zone implied the existence of friendly countries on the Soviet Union’s borders, that is to say communist-controlled governments. The American administration understood the security concerns of the Soviet Union but they also felt that the Soviets were implementing an expansionist agenda at the expense of the peoples of Eastern Europe. Progressively, American foreign policy makers began talking of containing Soviet ambitions. As a result, after World War II, the United States extended its security perimeter to include not only the Western Hemisphere but also key areas in Europe and Asia.

The first effort of the Soviets to establish their sphere of influence in Eastern Europe was in March 1945 when they imposed a Communist regime on Rumania. The Soviets deemed this action all the more justifiable as Rumania had been a willing ally of the Germans. Because of its geographical position the Soviets meant to act in a similar way in Poland and maneuvered to set up a puppet government there. In April 1945, the Soviet authorities in Poland arrested a number of non-communist leading politicians and sent them to jail. This decision was disapproved by Harry Truman, who had become President of the United States following Roosevelt’s death on April 12. The Second World War had started following the German invasion of Poland and Truman could not accept the replacement of Nazi domination over Poland by that of the Soviets. On April 23, Truman met Molotov and bluntly told him that the USSR was breaking the Yalta agreements as far as Poland was concerned. The meeting ended on a very bitter note: “I have never been talked to like that in my life,” Molotov said. I [Truman] told, “Carry out your agreements and you won’t get talked to like that⁵.” By the end of 1945 the Soviets had managed to control most of Eastern Europe and Truman suspected that Stalin’s intention was expansion rather than security. Although Truman and his advisers still expected to alleviate tensions between the two countries, they were less and less inclined to accommodate the Soviets.

After Stalin’s speech at the Bolchoï on February 9, 1946, the State Department asked the American diplomats in Moscow to shed some light on Soviet foreign policy. The answer came on February 22 and was formulated by **George Frost Kennan (3)**, the deputy chief of the U.S. mission in Moscow, in what was later called the “Long Telegram.” In this telegram Kennan claimed that for the Soviets the world was split into a capitalist camp, on the one hand, and a socialist one, on the other, and that hostility between these two camps was inevitable because the Soviet Union was “committed fanatically to the belief that with US there can be no *modus vivendi*.” However, he argued that the West had the physical and moral resources to resist Communism without recourse to any general military conflict. Kennan’s telegram was widely acclaimed because it provided an intellectual justification to the reorientation of American foreign policy. The gist of Kennan’s argumentation was published, under the pseudonym “X”, in the July 1947 issue of the journal *Foreign Affairs*. Kennan wrote:

Balanced against this are the facts that Russia, as opposed to the Western world in general, is still by far the weaker party, that Soviet policy is highly flexible, and that Soviet society may well contain deficiencies which will eventually weaken its own total potential. This would of itself warrant the United States entering with reasonable confidence upon a policy of firm containment, designed to confront the Russians with unalterable counter-force at every point where they show signs of encroaching upon the interests of a peaceful and stable world⁶.

⁴ Vyacheslav Molotov in Vladislav Zubok & Constantine Pleshakov, *Inside the Kremlin’s Cold War – From Stalin to Khrushchev*, Cambridge, Mass., Harvard University Press, 1996, p. 98.

⁵ Quoted in Harry S. Truman, *Memoirs*, Volume I, *Year of Decisions*, New York, Doubleday, 1955, p. 82.

⁶ George Frost Kennan, “The Sources of Soviet Conduct”, *Foreign Affairs*, July 1947, in Edward H. Judge & John W. Langdon (ed.), *The Cold War – A History through Documents*, Upper Saddle River, N.J., Prentice Hall, 1999, p. 36.

On March 5, 1946, Winston Churchill delivered a speech at Fulton, Missouri, in which he painted a gloomy picture of the situation in Europe when he said that “from Stettin in the Baltic to Trieste in the Adriatic, an iron curtain has descended across the Continent⁷.” Truman, by personally introducing Churchill to the Fulton audience had given his tacit agreement to the former British Prime Minister’s analysis. Yet, a new American foreign policy was still in the making. In July 1946, Secretary of Commerce **Henry Wallace (1)** sent President Truman a letter in which he pleaded for cooperation rather than confrontation with the Soviet Union:

We most earnestly want peace with Russia - but we want to be met half way. We want cooperation. And I believe that we can get cooperation once Russia understands that our primary objective is neither saving the British Empire nor purchasing oil in the Near East with the lives of American soldiers. We cannot allow national oil rivalries to force us into war⁸.

However, when in September 1946 Wallace made his opinion public, he was dismissed from his post.

The turning point in America’s foreign policy came because of an external event. In February 1947, Great Britain told the American administration that it no longer had the resources to maintain political stability in Greece and Turkey. The British government was on the verge of bankruptcy and therefore had no other option but to pull out of Greece and suspend their assistance to Turkey. Truman feared that, as a result of the British withdrawal, Greece and Turkey would become communist: “Greece needed aid, and needed it quickly and in substantial amounts. The alternative was the loss of Greece and the extension of the iron curtain across the Mediterranean⁹.” The British pull-out in Greece, Soviet repression in Eastern Europe and the growing influence of Communists in France and Italy made Truman fear the worst. The economic crisis in Western Europe, Soviet maneuvers in Manchuria and Iran as well as the intensification of the Civil War in China also significantly contributed to the tension in Washington and led Truman to make a historical announcement.

On March 12, 1947, **Harry Truman (2)** delivered a speech before a joint session of Congress. In this speech, which was afterwards referred to as the Truman Doctrine, he called for \$400 million in aid for Greece and Turkey, and for the right to send American troops to administer the reconstruction and help train local forces. The Truman Doctrine is now remembered because it spelled out one of the fundamental principles of America’s foreign policy, which was the need to assist other nations so as to contain totalitarianism:

One of the primary objectives of the foreign policy of the United States is the creation of conditions in which we and other nations will be able to work out a way of life free from coercion. [...] I believe that it must be the policy of the United States to support free peoples who are resisting attempted subjugation by armed minorities or by outside pressures. I believe that we must assist free peoples to work out their own destinies in their own way¹⁰.

Because he drew a clear distinction between the world of freedom and that of oppression and terror, Truman put an end to all prospects of cooperation with the Soviets and therefore committed the United States to a more confrontational policy. In the Soviet Union the speech was interpreted as a direct challenge and the Soviet newspaper *Pravda* called for a

⁷ Winston Churchill, “The ‘Iron Curtain’ speech”, March 5, 1946, in *ibid.*, p. 15.

⁸ Henry Wallace, “The Way to Peace”, September 12, 1946. Available at <http://newdeal.feri.org/wallace/haw28.htm>.

⁹ Harry S. Truman, *Memoirs*, Volume II, *Years of Trial and Hope, 1946-1952*, New York, Doubleday, 1956, p. 100.

¹⁰ “The Truman Doctrine”, March 12, 1947, in Thomas G. Paterson & Denis Merrill (ed.), *Major Problems in American Foreign Relations*, Volume II, *op. cit.*, p. 259.

reinforcement of security, notably by building up an atomic bomb. The time for negotiation, cooperation, and compromise was over.

The Truman Doctrine marked a decisive reorientation for the foreign policy of the United States. To start with, for the first time in its history, the United States disrupted its tradition of non-involvement in European affairs during peacetime. In other words, the United States was about to shed its traditional isolationism and become an interventionist country. Second, it also meant that the United States was now prepared to accept the responsibilities of the world leadership it had decided to assume. Third, the Truman Doctrine officially launched the containment policy even though it was still to be fully developed. By helping Greece and Turkey the United States made it clear that it was now prepared to participate in the geostrategic rivalry which opposed it to the Soviet Union. The clash between the two nations was no longer confined to ideology but also moved to the geographical arena. Still, because the Truman Doctrine was primarily an economic measure, the opposition between the two superpowers was soon characterized as a “Cold War.”

The war in Europe had devastated the economies of all the countries and by the end of 1946 Europe was on the verge of economic ruin. Truman and his advisers realized that only a tremendous program of economic aid could restore Europe’s economy. On June 5, 1947, Secretary of State George Marshall delivered a speech at Harvard University in which he called for such a plan. The Truman administration also feared that the Soviet Union would exploit Europe’s postwar economic vulnerability to set up friendly regimes in Western Europe too. They believed that the building of strong European economies would deter Western Europeans from turning to Communism and hence the Soviet Union. The Soviets felt that they had no choice but to try and counter American ambitions. In Eastern Europe, the Soviets tightened their grip and demanded unconditional support of the Soviet Union. Such was the case in Czechoslovakia where, in February 1948, the Communists took advantage of a parliamentary crisis to seize power. In the United States, the coup in Czechoslovakia, the most democratic Eastern European state, was widely denounced and permitted a rapid endorsement of the Marshall Plan in April. However successful it was, economic containment was soon deemed insufficient and replaced by a more militarized form of containment.

3. War by Proxy

The Czech coup of 1948 and the Berlin blockade of 1948–49 intensified the fear of the red menace, and as a consequence the Truman administration took a tougher stand. The first significant indication of this change came with the formation of the *North Atlantic Organization* (NATO)¹¹ in April 1949. The American decision to join NATO was a major one because it was the first time in its history that the United States committed itself to a military alliance in peacetime, each member of the organization pledging to intervene if one of them was attacked. Still, it was but the first step towards a much more militarized form of containment. A series of events in the second half of 1949 and in 1950 led the American government to formulate an even tougher response to the communist menace. However, the Soviet-American confrontation was not direct and the Cold War became a war by proxy.

In September 1949, the American authorities informed the American people that the Soviets had successfully exploded their first atomic bomb in August. The news came as a shock to both the American administration and the American people because the detonation of a Soviet bomb removed the sense of security the United States had because of its geographical position. The second major event of the second half of 1949 was the establishment of the People’s Republic of China in October. After two decades of Civil War, Mao Ze-dong had

¹¹ Belgium, Canada, Denmark, France, Great Britain, Iceland, Luxemburg, the Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, and the United States were the first members of the organization.

taken power. From 1945 to 1949 the United States had intervened substantially in the conflict, providing the Nationalist regime of Chiang Kai-shek about \$3 billion in economic and military aid. And yet, despite this aid, it had failed to block the communist revolution in China.

In January 1950 a Sino-Soviet Treaty of friendship and alliance was signed. This treaty was interpreted in the West as a clear indication that there was a monolithic communist bloc which now dominated most of Eurasia and intended to carry on its expansion. In any case, pressure was mounting on Truman to act against the spread of communism, all the more so as he was accused of having “lost” China by Republican foes such as Richard Nixon and **Joseph McCarthy (4)**. The following month, the senator from Wisconsin captured the attention of the media and the public with a speech at Wheeling, West Virginia, in which he denounced Communists:

I have in my hand 57 cases of individuals who would appear to be either card carrying members or certainly loyal to the Communist Party, but who nevertheless are still helping to shape our foreign policy.

One thing to remember in discussing the Communists in our Government is that we are not dealing with spies who get thirty pieces of silver to steal the blueprints of a new weapon. We are dealing with a far more sinister type of activity because it permits the enemy to guide and shape our policy¹².

In January 1950, Truman had approved the development of a hydrogen bomb. The same month, he ordered the State and Defense Departments to make a thoroughgoing review of American foreign and defense policies. The committee which was in charge of this assessment was headed by Paul H. Nitze, George Kennan’s successor as chairman of the State Department Policy Planning Staff. Kennan had resigned at the end of 1949 because he was dissatisfied with the more and more bellicose language of the Truman administration. His resignation meant that containment would no longer be confined to its economic dimension.

The Paul Nitze committee delivered its report in April 1950 and it took the form of **National Security Council Directive-68 (5)**. This document presented a very pessimistic view of Soviet expansion and therefore called for a reinforcement of the containment policy through a rapid military build-up. George Kennan had sought to block Soviet expansion by a variety of political, economic, psychological, and military measures. Paul Nitze, on the other hand, primarily advocated military measures because it was claimed that the Soviet Union was devoting 13.6% of its gross national product to defense expenditures when the United States was only spending half that amount. The great fear was of falling behind:

In summary, we must, by means of a rapid and sustained build-up of the political, economic, and military strength of the free world, and by means of an affirmative program intended to wrest the initiative from the Soviet Union, confront it with convincing evidence of the determination and ability of the free world to frustrate the Kremlin design of a world dominated by its will¹³.

Still, because it meant tripling the defense budget and because it also signified that the United States would become a world policeman, *NSC-68* was not readily approved. Truman knew that he would have great difficulty winning support in the Congress for such a costly political commitment. However, an unexpected event in Asia led to the approval of *NSC-68*.

On June 25, 1950, North Korean troops crossed the 38th parallel and invaded South Korea. Korea had been a divided nation since the end of World War II when a demarcation line was created at the 38th parallel. Despite efforts to negotiate the establishment of a united Korea, the country remained divided because each side was determined to unify the country on their respective terms. Separate governments had been established in 1948 and

¹² Joseph McCarthy, February 20, 1950, in Edward H. Judge & John W. Langdon (ed.), *op. cit.*, p. 63.

¹³ *NSC-68*, April 1950, in *ibid.*, p. 69.

reunification was no longer on the agenda. The rivalry between South Korea and North Korea was not merely an internal one. Because each Korea was supported by a superpower, the division reflected the division of the world into two blocs. And the war that broke out in June 1950 was not only a civil war between two regimes determined to eliminate the other. It was also an international war between the two superpowers.

Historians have demonstrated that the invasion of South Korea took place only after the North Korean government had been given a green light by Stalin himself. Stalin made this decision because “[he] worried that, should the United States rearm Japan in the future, South Korea could become a dangerous beachhead for enemy forces. Therefore, it had to be captured before Japan could get back on its feet¹⁴.” Stalin gave the North Koreans the go-ahead because he believed that the Americans would not react but they did. The United States intervened in Korea because it felt that inaction in the face of communist aggression could only encourage future aggressive acts. The American intervention in Korea was made under the aegis of the United Nations; this was possible because the Soviets were boycotting the Security Council in an effort to obtain a seat for China. Faced with the arrival of U.S. troops in Korea, Stalin, who would not risk a direct confrontation, talked the Chinese into launching a counteroffensive. In November 1950, 200,000 Chinese “volunteers” crossed the Yalu River into North Korea, and soon the United Nations troops were compelled to retreat down the Korean peninsula.

With the Korean War, economic containment was definitively replaced by military containment as the war “appeared to validate several of *NSC-68*’s most important conclusions¹⁵.” The dispatch of American troops to Korea meant that the military build-up which was recommended by *NSC-68* was actually being implemented even before it had been formally approved by Congress. Defense expenditures went from 13.1 billion dollars in 1950, to 22.5 billion dollars in 1951 and to 44 billion dollars in 1952. Those figures respectively amounted to 4.6%, 6.9%, and 12.7% of the gross national product. By the end of the war the Army had 3,600,000 troops when at the outset it only had 1,400,000. Following the Korean War, the total strength of the American Army was 2,500,000. For the first time in its history, the United States kept a large standing army even in peacetime and its military establishment kept growing. The industrial geography of the United States was being transformed because of the Cold War. The new manufacturing base moved from the traditional industrial heartland of the North-East and the Great Lakes to the South and the West. Bell helicopters were built in Houston, Lockheed had a plant in Georgia, and the aircraft industry expanded in California and the North-West. In the name of national security, a large Interstate highway network was built. In case of nuclear attack, cities could be evacuated rapidly. The American economy was militarized by the Cold War and some complained about the increasingly martial outlook of the United States.

4. Nuclear Weapons and Intelligence

Like Truman, Dwight Eisenhower, who had been elected President in November 1952, felt that the Soviets could not be trusted. During the presidential campaign, he had promised to “roll back” communism in Eastern Europe and East Asia and free those who were enslaved by this ideology. He had also pledged to keep taxes low and therefore to avoid an increase in military expenditures. He was afraid that such an increase would divert valuable resources from domestic priorities. **Dwight Eisenhower (7)** also wanted to avoid the kind of military build-up which had been urged by *NSC-68* because he was afraid that it could undermine

¹⁴ Vladislav Zubok & Constantine Pleshakov, *op. cit.*, p. 62.

¹⁵ John Lewis Gaddis, *Strategies of Containment – A Critical Appraisal of Postwar American National Security Policy*, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1982, p. 109.

democratic values, turning the United States into a garrison state and favoring the development of what he called, in his Farewell Address in January 1961, the “military-industrial complex”:

This conjunction of an immense military establishment and a large arms industry is new in the American experience. The total influence – economic, political, even spiritual – is felt in every city, every Statehouse, every office of the Federal government. We recognize the imperative need for this development. Yet we must not fail to comprehend its grave implications. Our toil, resources and livelihood are all involved; so is the very structure of our society.

In the councils of government, we must guard against the acquisition of unwarranted influence, whether sought or unsought, by the military-industrial complex. The potential for the disastrous rise of misplaced power exists and will persist¹⁶.

In order to keep in check the growth of the military-industrial complex but nevertheless to carry on the fight against communism, Eisenhower decided to rely on nuclear power and intelligence.

The Eisenhower administration favored nuclear weapons over conventional military forces because it would be less costly and would deliver, as Secretary of Defense Charles Erwin Wilson said, “a bigger bang for the buck.” In January 1954, Secretary of State **John Foster Dulles (6)** announced the new American foreign policy, the so-called “New Look,” which provided for the use of “massive retaliatory power” against potential aggressors. Relying on nuclear weapons was possible because of America’s technological advance. In March 1954, the United States demonstrated its nuclear superiority when it detonated a bomb with the explosive power of fifteen million tons of TNT in the Marshall Islands in the Pacific Ocean. The United States also had more advanced delivery systems and could strike the Soviet Union from military bases in Britain, Turkey, Italy, Germany, and Japan. By 1955, it also had the B52, the first bomber with intercontinental range. Eisenhower believed that, if need be, the United States could threaten to launch massive retaliations. And yet, this strategy of atomic blackmail was far from being entirely dependable.

On October 4, 1957, the Soviets launched the world’s first orbiting satellite, *Sputnik*. To send their satellite into orbit around the earth they used an R-7 rocket, whose range and power were sufficient to launch a nuclear warhead that could hit the American continent in less than an hour. It came as a shock to most Americans because it meant, at least theoretically, that the Soviets now had the capacity to place a nuclear warhead on top of a long-range missile and strike targets as far away as the United States. The fear provoked by *Sputnik* was summed up in the following manner by G. Mennen Williams, the governor of Michigan: “Oh little *Sputnik*, flying high / With made-in-Moscow beep, / You tell the world’s it’s a Commie sky / and Uncle Sam’s asleep¹⁷.” The capacity of the Soviet Union to launch a nuclear strike seriously undermined the doctrine of “massive retaliation” and the strategy of atomic blackmail. However, thanks to the reconnaissance missions carried out by the U-2 planes of the American intelligence services, Eisenhower knew that the atomic capability of the United States remained far stronger than that of the Soviet Union.

Eisenhower valued intelligence because during World War II he had seen how useful it could be. What’s more, intelligence was consistent with his budgetary objective. It was inexpensive when compared with the use of conventional forces. The creation of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) in 1947 had marked a radical departure from American tradition because it was the first permanent central intelligence agency ever created during peacetime. The growth of this agency in the first years of the Cold War was astounding. The main

¹⁶ Dwight Eisenhower, “Farewell Address”, January 1961, in R. Heffner & A. Heffner (ed.), *op. cit.*, pp. 437-438.

¹⁷ G. Mennen Williams in David Reynolds, *op. cit.*, p. 404.

objective assigned to the CIA by the *National Security Act* was the collection and analysis of information. And yet, by 1948, its original mission had been significantly extended and it was encouraged to carry out covert operations which may be classified into three main categories: propaganda, economic and political action, and paramilitary action. The size and scope of the CIA's activities really increased during the Eisenhower administration and the president seriously encouraged the Agency, which was headed by none other than John Foster Dulles's brother, Allen, to carry out paramilitary operations.

In August 1953, the CIA organized a coup against Mohammad Mossadeq, the Iranian Prime Minister, because he had nationalized the oil industry in 1951 and was therefore accused of having a communist inclination. The successful overthrow of Mossadeq reinforced Eisenhower's confidence in covert action and the following year he ordered a new coup. The next target was the Guatemalan Prime Minister, Jacobo Arbenz Guzman, who was accused of being a communist because he intended to seize holdings of an American firm, the United Fruit Company. This operation went according to plan, the Arbenz government was overthrown and an America-supported regime took power.

If these covert operations were in keeping with Eisenhower's concern for a well-balanced budget, they nonetheless had a damaging political cost. How could the United States claim to be eager to protect the right of the peoples to self-determination when it was doing its best to undermine political regimes which were not necessarily illegitimate? Intelligence was also detrimental to the Soviet-American diplomatic relationship. On May 1, 1960, a U-2 plane was shot down over the Soviet Union and Khrushchev immediately accused the United States of spying on the Soviet Union. The "U-2 Incident" led to the failure of the Soviet-American summit in Paris a few days later. But worse was yet to come.

In January 1961, in his inaugural address, John Fitzgerald Kennedy promised to help America's "sister republics" but he also issued a warning:

To our sister republics south of the border, we offer a special pledge – to convert our good words into good deeds – in a new alliance for progress – to assist free men and free governments in casting off the chains of poverty. But this peaceful revolution of hope cannot become the prey of hostile powers. Let all our neighbors know that we shall join with them to oppose aggression or subversion anywhere in the Americas. And let every other power know that this hemisphere intends to remain master of its own house¹⁸.

Like his predecessor, Kennedy was worried by the recent political developments in Cuba where, in 1959, Fidel Castro had successfully led the Cuban revolution. When he took office, Kennedy soon discovered that the Eisenhower administration had meant to try and get rid of Fidel Castro. Eisenhower had asked the CIA to contrive a paramilitary operation to overthrow the Cuban leader but what was originally meant to be a plan of guerilla infiltration had become a direct conventional amphibious landing. Kennedy gave the go-ahead for the operation on April 17, 1961, but, because he feared diplomatic embarrassment, he canceled all air operations, including the air cover which was supposed to protect the Cuban exiles once they had landed at the Bay of Pigs. This decision was fatal to the operation and it quickly became a disaster. On April 19, those who had survived surrendered.

The Bay of Pigs fiasco was humiliating for the United States and the Kennedy administration was eager to take its revenge. Therefore, Kennedy ordered the CIA to devise a new plan so as to destabilize the Cuban regime through economic coercion, propaganda, and political action. The plan, *Operation Mongoose*, even called for the assassination of Fidel Castro. Kennedy's determination to get rid of Fidel Castro led Cuba to reinforce its links with the Soviet Union. The Cuban regime felt besieged and feared another U.S. intervention and therefore asked the Soviet Union for protection.

¹⁸ John Fitzgerald Kennedy, "Inaugural Address", January 1961, in R. Heffner & A. Heffner (ed.), *op. cit.*, p. 446.

The Soviets responded positively, first dispatching military personnel to the island. By the summer of 1962, there were some 42,000 Soviet troops on the island. Then, they began building a secret missile site, but it was discovered in October thanks to photographs taken by a U-2 plane. The Americans were alarmed because the photographs showed that the Soviets intended to place defensive as well as offensive missiles on the island and that the Soviets would therefore be able to launch a direct nuclear strike against the American territory. This discovery marked the beginning of the “missile crisis¹⁹”. On October 22, Kennedy announced on television that the Soviets were building up a missile site in Cuba and that he had decided to blockade all Cuban ports to prevent the entry of additional Soviet military equipment. In the following days, according to Anatoly Gribkov, a member of the Soviet army unit responsible for installing the missiles in Cuba, “the world was on the brink of a nuclear holocaust²⁰.” On October 27, a Soviet anti-aircraft unit shot down a U-2 plane and killed its pilot. A major disaster was averted and the crisis eventually came to an end on November 20 after Kennedy ordered the lifting of the U.S. blockade around Cuba, following the completion of the Soviet withdrawal.

The Bay of Pigs fiasco and the missile crisis amply demonstrated that the nuclear option and the intelligence dimension could have unpredictable consequences. A year later, **John Kennedy (8)** concluded:

We must conduct our affairs in such a way that it becomes in the Communists’ interest to agree on a genuine peace. And above all, while defending our own vital interests, nuclear powers must avert those confrontations which bring an adversary to a choice of either a humiliating retreat or a nuclear war. To adopt that kind of course in the nuclear age would be evidence only of the bankruptcy of our policy - or of a collective death-wish for the world²¹.

In spite of the peaceful outcome of the missile crisis, reconciliation was not on the agenda yet. As a matter of fact, the missile crisis probably reinforced American self-confidence and encouraged the United States to deepen its commitment in Vietnam.

5. The Vietnamese Quagmire

The failure of the Kennedy administration to topple Castro did not modify the main objective of their foreign policy: the fight against communism. A victory for communism represented a loss for the United States. Therefore, the Cuban example could not be allowed to be reproduced elsewhere. To meet this objective, President Kennedy replaced Eisenhower’s strategy of “massive retaliation” by the so-called “flexible response.” He believed that “massive retaliation” was not appropriate because, in case of an actual confrontation, there were no other options available but “mutually assured destruction (MAD)” or retreat and hence humiliation. The Kennedy administration considered that America’s foreign policy could not be based only on nuclear response. It was necessary to have a variety of means to meet the different challenges. This meant, in addition to nuclear weapons, diplomacy, covert action, paramilitary operations as well as conventional warfare. The situation in Vietnam gave the United States government the opportunity to experiment with “flexible response.” The United States felt it had to get involved in Vietnam because it believed that the distribution of power was being challenged by the communists. It would soon prove a very costly commitment.

¹⁹ See “The Cuban Missile Crisis” in John Lewis Gaddis, *We Now Know – Rethinking Cold War History*, Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1997, pp. 260–280.

²⁰ Anatoly Gribkov in Thomas G. Paterson & Dennis Merrill (ed.), *Major Problems in American Foreign Relations*, Volume II, *op. cit.*, p. 472.

²¹ John Fitzgerald Kennedy, “Commencement Address at American University”, June 10, 1963, in R. Heffner & A. Heffner (ed.), *op. cit.*, p. 453.

In 1954, following the French defeat at Dien Bien Phu, Vietnam had been divided into two parts along the 17th parallel. This division was meant to be provisional and the reunification of Vietnam was supposed to take place following general elections in 1956. The South Vietnamese authorities refused to participate in these elections and it rapidly appeared that they would not accept reunification. They were supported by the American authorities because U.S. intelligence estimated that the North Vietnamese leader Ho Chi Minh would win 80% of the votes. As a result, North Vietnam decided to help South Vietnamese guerilla forces to wage war against the South Vietnamese government. In December 1960, the fight intensified with the creation of the so-called *National Liberation Front* (NLF) or Viet-Cong, whose avowed aim was the overthrow of the South Vietnamese government. Kennedy, who was afraid of being labeled “soft on communism” and meant to demonstrate America’s will and power, could not accept this challenge and in early 1961 he decided to help the South Vietnamese government by sending the first American military advisers. By December 1963, there were more than 16,000 American military advisers in Vietnam.

Kennedy did expand American involvement in Vietnam even though he refrained from sending regular troops. Military advisers were not meant to fight in Vietnam but they did help the South Vietnamese forces in their fight against the NLF. They provided the South Vietnamese with napalm and Agent Orange, a powerful, toxic defoliant. By December 1963, about 100 American military advisers had been killed in Vietnam, a clear indication of the Americanization of the war. Still, the United States did not become fully involved in Vietnam before Lyndon Baines Johnson became president.

On August 2, 1964, a military incident occurred in the Gulf of Tonkin when two American ships were attacked by the North Vietnamese. These ships were patrolling in the Tonkin Gulf to gather intelligence and spot communist infiltration of men and supplies in South Vietnam by sea. Johnson immediately decided to retaliate and he called on Congress to authorize him as commander-in-chief to use all necessary measures to prevent further aggression in the area. Like Kennedy, Johnson felt that the situation in Vietnam was nothing else but the continuation of the global fight against communism, as he declared on television following the Gulf of Tonkin incident: “The challenge that we face in South-East Asia today is the same challenge that we have faced with courage and that we have met with strength in Greece and Turkey, in Berlin and Korea, in Lebanon and in Cuba²².” Congress accepted Johnson’s analysis and passed the *Gulf of Tonkin Resolution* a few days later. The House of Representatives voted 416-0 and the Senate 88-2 to allow Johnson to retaliate. Democratic Senators Ernest Gruening and Wayne Morse were the only two members of Congress who opposed the resolution. This decision marked the beginning of the Vietnam War even though there was no actual declaration of war.

Initially, Johnson decided not to wage a major war in Vietnam because he did not want to provoke China and the Soviet Union. Like Kennedy, he feared that a massive attack might lead to nuclear confrontation. Therefore, his strategy was to carry out calculated actions so as to deter aggression. However, this “flexible response” rapidly proved inefficient. Because the North Vietnamese would not surrender, the Johnson administration felt compelled to keep intensifying its effort. In April 1965, at the John Hopkins University, he sought to explain and justify American engagement in Vietnam:

Let no one think that retreat from Vietnam would bring an end to the conflict. The battle would be renewed in one country and then another. The central lesson of our time is that the appetite of aggression is never satisfied. To withdraw from one battlefield means only to

²² Lyndon Baines Johnson, August 1964, in Martin Walker, *The Cold War – A History*, New York, Henry Holt and Company, 1993, p. 196.

prepare for the next. We must stay in Southeast Asia – as we did in Europe – in the words of the Bible: “Hitherto shalt thou come, but no further²³.”

America’s growing involvement in Vietnam resulted, first of all, in a more and more intense bombing campaign. In 1965, the American air force dropped about 63,000 tons of bombs on Vietnam. In 1967, the total amount was 226,000 tons. In the same manner, the number of American ground troops sent to Vietnam kept increasing²⁴: in 1965, there were 184,300 soldiers, in 1966, 385,300, in 1967, 485,600 and in 1968, 536,100. In fact, the “flexible response” strategy inevitably led to escalation and eventually to a massive military commitment. It was denounced by a growing number of people, notably Senator William Fulbright, the chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations, who, in 1966, published *The Arrogance of Power*, a damning indictment of the war. The American military strategy in Vietnam was seriously flawed because it left the initiative to the North Vietnamese, who had prepared for this war of attrition.

On January 30, 1968, the first day of the Tet, a festive holiday in Vietnam that marked the beginning of the lunar year, the *National Liberation Front* launched a massive attack. The Americans and the South Vietnamese were caught off guard, not only because of its timing but also because of its surprising scope. The Viet-Cong managed to penetrate the American embassy in Saigon. It took about three weeks to subdue the enemy and regain the territory seized by the North Vietnamese. Some 40,000 North Vietnamese and NLF members were killed compared to 2,300 South Vietnamese and 1,100 Americans. Despite the heavy North Vietnamese losses, the Tet Offensive was a psychological blow to the South Vietnamese and the American forces. The North Vietnamese had proved that they were still very strong and could launch a major attack when they wanted to. What’s more, as opposed to the Americans, they were prepared to pay a high price. Already, in 1965, Le Duan, the first secretary of the Vietnamese communist party, had declared: “The North will not count the cost²⁵.” The Tet Offensive seriously undermined the American morale. Opinion polls showed that public confidence in the President’s handling of the war had dropped to 35%. On March 31, 1968, **Lyndon Johnson (9)** announced that he would not seek re-election.

The reaction of the American public opinion following the Tet offensive indicated that the domestic consensus on America’s foreign policy had been shattered, something that Johnson understood quite well:

It is true that a house divided against itself by the spirit of faction, of party, of region, of religion, of race, is a house that cannot stand.

There is division in the American house now. There is divisiveness among us all tonight.[...] So, I would ask all Americans, whatever their personal interests or concern, to guard against divisiveness and all its ugly consequences²⁶.

The American government had lost support not only for the continuation of the war itself but also for the overall containment policy, of which Vietnam was merely an application. The Vietnam War, undertaken in the name of containment, undermined containment itself. Because the Vietnam War turned out to be unwinnable, containment proved unworkable. The United States was not all-powerful and it could not therefore contain communism wherever it

²³ Lyndon Baines Johnson, April 7, 1965, John Hopkins University, in Edward H. Judge & John W. Langdon (ed.), *op. cit.*, p. 140.

²⁴ Figures provided in Jacques Portes, *Les Américains et la Guerre du Vietnam*, Bruxelles, Editions Complexe, 1993, p. 111.

²⁵ Le Duan, July 1965, in Mark Atwood Lawrence, *The Vietnam War – A Concise International History*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010, p. 91.

²⁶ Lyndon Baines Johnson, “Address to the Nation”, March 31, 1968. Available at <http://millercenter.org/president/speeches/detail/3388>

emerged. The Vietnam War marked the collapse of containment and called for a reassessment of America's foreign policy.

6. The Limits of Détente

Because of the psychological defeat of the Tet Offensive, Richard Nixon knew that he had no choice but to reexamine the American engagement in Vietnam as well as the containment policy. In January 1969, in his inaugural address, Nixon pledged to seek a new relationship with the Soviet Union. Nixon's main purpose was to achieve a relaxation of tensions with the Soviets. This reassessment of the containment policy was soon labeled "détente." This French word means "calm, relaxation, easing" but it is not devoid of ambiguity for its literal meaning refers to the release of a bowstring or the trigger of a gun. In the same manner, "razriadka," the Russian equivalent of "détente" means both relaxation and unloading. Therefore, one should be careful not to equate "détente" with "entente." There was, after 1968, a major reevaluation of America's foreign policy but tensions between both superpowers were not completely eradicated. Despite its commitment to détente, the Nixon administration was not prepared to abandon once and for all the containment of Soviet ambitions. The period following the Tet Offensive was therefore a rather contrasted period which eventually gave way to a period of renewed tension.

Richard Nixon, who took office in January 1969, primarily relied on his National Security Adviser, Henry Kissinger, to define and carry out his foreign policy options. Both Kissinger and Nixon were convinced that America's traditional foreign policy was no longer viable and needed to be reappraised. After the Tet Offensive, the nation was in a neo-isolationist mood and would not be easily mobilized to stop communist aggression throughout the world. This is why **Richard Nixon (10)** announced the Vietnamization of the war:

We have adopted a plan which we have worked out in cooperation with the South Vietnamese for the complete withdrawal of all U.S. combat ground forces, and their replacement by South Vietnamese forces on an orderly scheduled timetable. This withdrawal will be made from strength and not from weakness. As South Vietnamese forces become stronger, the rate of American withdrawal can become greater²⁷.

Nixon and Kissinger also knew that the world was no longer bipolar but multipolar and that therefore the rivalry with the Soviet Union could no longer be the only focus of America's foreign policy.

From the outset of his presidency, Nixon sought to ease tensions between both superpowers. In order to do so, he decided to engage negotiations with the Soviets. Détente was therefore characterized by a serious return to diplomacy. However, to everybody's surprise, the first significant diplomatic breakthrough did not involve the Soviet Union but China, a country the United States had been at odds with since 1950. In July 1971, without prior warning, the White House announced that Kissinger had met the Chinese Premier Zhou Enlai and that President Nixon had accepted an invitation to go to China. The following year, in February, Nixon did go to China. The Americans had exploited the Sino-Soviet rift to their advantage, using China "as a possible lever against the Soviet Union"²⁸. By getting closer to China, the United States seemed to indicate to the Soviet Union that it was prepared to align itself with Beijing, at the expense of Moscow. By seeking détente with China, the Nixon administration was trying to entice the Soviet Union to improve its relations with the United States. This maneuver probably gave an incentive to the diplomatic process between the

²⁷ Richard Nixon, "Address to the Nation on the War on Vietnam", November 3, 1969. Available at <http://millercenter.org/president/speeches/detail/3873>

²⁸ Warren I. Cohen, *America in the Age of Soviet Power, 1945-1991, The Cambridge History of American Foreign Relations* – Volume IV, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1993, p. 187.

United States and the Soviet Union. In May 1972, Nixon and Leonid Brezhnev met in Moscow and signed a treaty on the limitation of nuclear weapons, the SALT I Treaty.

From 1974 to 1976, in his capacity as the Secretary of State in the Ford administration, Kissinger went on with his attempt to build up a more constructive relationship with the Soviet Union. However, American foreign policy seemed to lack clarity because, despite détente, the United States remained committed to the containment of communism and was prepared to take active measures to promote this objective. In spite of a gradual withdrawal of its troops, the United States was still fighting in Vietnam at the end of 1972 and the peace treaty was only signed in January 1973. When, in 1970, the Marxist Salvador Allende was elected president in Chile, the Americans did their best to undermine his government. Détente did not mean an end to Soviet-American competition in the Third World. The United States still intended to contain the extension of communism in that area, where the Soviets remained very active.

The respective commitments of both superpowers in the Third World prove that détente meant a reduction rather than a termination of tensions. Somehow, this policy resulted in the continuation of the Cold War in other places. Détente was a rather ambiguous policy and **Jimmy Carter (11)** wanted a genuine détente which would not be characterized by equivocation:

Now, I believe in détente with the Soviet Union. To me it means progress toward peace. But the effects of détente should not be limited to our own two countries alone. We hope to persuade the Soviet Union that one country cannot impose its system of society upon another, either through direct military intervention or through the use of a client state's military force, as was the case with Cuban intervention in Angola.

Cooperation also implies obligation. We hope that the Soviet Union will join with us and other nations in playing a larger role in aiding the developing world, for common aid efforts will help us build a bridge of mutual confidence in one another²⁹.

Carter's foreign policy was supposed to be based on "positive incentives" towards the Soviet Union. For example, Carter put an end to America's support to repressive right-wing dictatorships around the world and he expected this turnabout to prompt the Soviet Union to move towards a more conciliatory relationship with the United States. But because he coupled this positive incentive with the necessity to respect human rights throughout the world, he antagonized the Soviets. They felt that the American president, by stressing the issue of human rights, was meddling in their internal affairs. Because of that, the Soviets were not inclined to respond positively to Carter's concessions.

And indeed, in the first three years of Carter's presidency, the Soviets reinforced their influence in Angola, Mozambique, and Ethiopia. They tried to consolidate their position in the Middle East and obtained naval facilities on the coast of South Yemen. They still supported the so-called "wars of liberation" and obviously welcomed the Communist or pro-Marxist regimes which took power in Afghanistan in April 1978, on the island of Grenada in March 1979 and in Nicaragua in July 1979. In December 1979, as the Communist regime of Afghanistan was experiencing serious difficulties, the Soviet Union decided to come to its help by sending thousands of soldiers there. The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan validated the idea that the Soviets were unrepentant expansionists. It destroyed what remained of the East-West détente and led the Carter administration to give up its hope of building up a more amicable relationship with the Soviet Union, and it moved towards a toughening of its foreign

²⁹ Jimmy Carter, "Commencement Speech at Notre Dame University", May 22, 1977. Available at <http://millercenter.org/president/speeches/detail/3399>

policy. Carter, who had offered “a morally responsible and farsighted vision” now “fell back on an appeal to the combative, nationalistic instincts of the American people³⁰.”

Considering that the Soviets, with their invasion of Afghanistan, had seriously undermined the global balance of power, Carter announced in early January 1980 an array of sanctions against the Soviet Union. He asked the Senate to suspend consideration of the SALT II Treaty, ordered an embargo on exports of grain from the United States to the Soviet Union and cancelled American participation in the summer Olympic Games of 1980 in Moscow. Jimmy Carter feared the Soviets might use Afghanistan as a stepping stone to control the entire region and consequently a large part of the world’s oil supplies. On January 23, 1980, in his State of the Union address, he declared that “an attempt by any outside force to gain control of the Persian Gulf will be regarded as an assault on the vital interests of the United States of America, and such an assault will be repelled by any means necessary, including military force³¹.” Carter’s emphasis on military force meant a total reversal of the policy he had initiated in 1976 and marked the demise of détente.

7. Wind of Change

Despite his about-face in his Soviet foreign policy and his diplomatic success with the March 1979 peace treaty between Egypt and Israel, Jimmy Carter was unable to muster up enough confidence among the American public to win the presidential election in 1980. His inability to put an end to the hostage crisis in Iran seriously undermined his new foreign policy stance towards the Soviet Union. During the presidential campaign, the Republican contender, Ronald Reagan, did not hesitate to exploit Carter’s difficulties and promised that he would put America back on its feet. Reagan, the “Great Communicator,” believed that the Soviet Union was trying to expand its global position and that it was vital to respond and reassert American power. Such an effort meant a return to a more confrontational foreign policy.

Ronald Reagan (12) decided that it was necessary to negotiate with the Soviets from a position of strength and he therefore initiated a rearmament policy. To him, the Soviet Union remained the arch-rival and he did not hesitate to characterize it as an “evil empire”:

So, in your discussions of the nuclear freeze proposals, I urge you to beware the temptation of pride - the temptation of blithely declaring yourselves above it all and label both sides equally at fault, to ignore the facts of history and the aggressive impulses of an evil empire, to simply call the arms race a giant misunderstanding and thereby remove yourself from the struggle between right and wrong and good and evil³².

Defense spending, which amounted to \$181 billion in 1976, rose to \$282 billion in 1982. The Reagan administration modernized American forces and introduced new weapons such as the MX missile and the B1 bomber. In addition to this, in March 1983, Reagan announced the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI), soon dubbed “Star Wars” by critics. SDI was meant to provide the United States with a protective shield against missiles. He also stepped up aid to anticommunist groups around the world, in Nicaragua or in Afghanistan for example. He also proved that he was ready to use American troops to prevent a country from becoming communist when he launched an attack on the island of Grenada in 1983. Still, in the wake of the Vietnam War, neither the American people nor the Congress was prepared to commit ground forces to overthrow the Sandinista regime in Nicaragua. They were not ready to accept

³⁰ Gaddis Smith, *Morality, Reason, and Power – American Diplomacy in the Carter Years*, New York, Hill and Wang, 1986, p. 247.

³¹ Jimmy Carter, “State of the Union Address”, January 23, 1980, in Edward H. Judge & John W. Langdon (ed.), *op. cit.*, p. 204.

³² Ronald Reagan, “Remarks at the Annual Convention of the National Association of Evangelicals”, March 8, 1983. Available at <http://millercenter.org/president/speeches/detail/3409>

the costs of a confrontation with communist forces after the Vietnam War, which had cost more than \$ 150 billion and the lives of 58,249 American soldiers.

Reagan understood this and also knew that it was necessary to resume the dialogue with the Soviets. This effort was facilitated because a wind of change had started blowing in the Soviet Union. Change in the Soviet Union was initiated by Mikhail Gorbachev, who was appointed general secretary of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union in March 1985. Very soon after he took over, he formally announced that he intended to reform the Soviet internal political system as well as its foreign policy. He de-emphasized the reliance of the Soviet Union on the military and decided to reduce its costly commitments abroad, starting with the engagement in Afghanistan, which had become the Vietnam War of the Soviets. Even if the CIA had not provided the Afghans with Stinger missiles, which helped them shoot down Soviet helicopters, the Soviets would have had the utmost difficulty winning the war. Gorbachev, who did not believe in Lenin's notion that conflict with capitalism was inevitable, displayed a sincere readiness for dialogue with the United States.

Gorbachev and Reagan held their first summit in November 1985 in Geneva. There were no concrete results but this first meeting gave both leaders the opportunity to establish a personal relationship. They met again in 1986 in Reykjavik and in 1987 in Washington where they signed the Intermediate Nuclear Treaty (INF), which led to the scrapping of SS20s and Pershing cruise missiles in Europe. Two years later, the Soviet troops left Afghanistan. Both decisions meant that détente had finally triumphed. The Cold War was not over yet but by the end of 1988 it was about to end.

On December 7, 1988, in a speech he delivered at the United Nations headquarters, **Mikhail Gorbachev (13)** announced that he would reduce Soviet forces by 500,000 and that he would eliminate units which were stationed in Germany, Czechoslovakia, and Hungary. On that occasion he declared:

Force or the threat of force neither can nor should be instruments of foreign policy. [...] The principle of the freedom of choice is mandatory. Refusal to recognize this principle will have serious consequences for the world peace. To deny a nation the freedom of choice, regardless of the pretext or the verbal guise in which it is cloaked, is to upset the unstable balance that has been achieved. [...] Freedom of choice is a universal principle. It knows no exception³³.

With these words, Gorbachev challenged the Soviet prerogative to intervene in Eastern Europe which had prevailed since the end of World War II. This meant, at least theoretically, that the citizens of Eastern European countries had the right to choose their own political future, irrespective of Soviet interests.

Reagan's successor, George Herbert Walker Bush, welcomed Gorbachev's commitments but he remained cautious because similar promises had been made in the past. He considered that the United States could not relinquish its containment policy before some conditions were met: (1) the number of Soviet troops which were stationed in Eastern Europe had to be significantly reduced; (2) a democratization process had to be engaged within the Soviet Union; (3) the right to self-determination had to be granted to the Eastern European countries. Following Gorbachev's speech at the United Nations, some Eastern Europeans immediately began initiating political reforms. In January 1989, the Hungarian parliament passed a piece of legislation authorizing freedom of assembly and association. A month later the Hungarian Communist Party accepted a multi-party system. The Soviet Union did not react to those decisions, proving that Gorbachev's commitment at the United Nations had been genuine. There followed a cycle of political reform in Eastern Europe which led, in

³³ Mikhail Gorbachev in Martin Walker, *The Cold War – A History*, *op. cit.*, p. 309.

November 1989, to the fall of the Berlin Wall. The Soviets did not react and left the East German people to determine their own future.

The following month, Gorbachev and Bush met in Malta. The time for confrontation seemed over, and the two leaders could now contemplate some form of political and economic cooperation. However, in the Soviet Union, hard-liners would not give up that easily, and in August 1991 they staged a coup. It failed and soon the Russian Parliament passed a decree to ban the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. The decision marked the fall of the USSR and therefore the end of the Cold War. On May 6, 1992, at Fulton, the very place where Churchill had delivered his Iron Curtain speech in 1946, Gorbachev acknowledged the end of the Cold War:

In the major centers of world politics the choice it would seem has today been made in favor of peace, co-operation, interaction and common security. And in pushing forward to a new civilization we should under no circumstances again make the intellectual and consequently political error of interpreting victory in the Cold War narrowly as a victory for oneself, one's own way of life, for one's own values and merits. This was a victory over a scheme for the development of humanity which was becoming slowly congealed and leading us to destruction. It was a shattering of the vicious circle into which we had driven ourselves. This was altogether a victory for common sense, reason, democracy and common human values³⁴.

If Reagan played a part in putting an end to the “vicious circle” of the Cold War, Gorbachev's role should not be minimized because the more he reformed the Soviet system the more he destabilized it, eventually leading to its collapse.

8. A New World Order

As regards American foreign policy, the end of the Cold War meant that containment was now obsolete and that the United States was faced with a conceptual vacuum. At first, American analysts were not worried by this situation and, like everybody else, rejoiced at the end of the Cold War and made optimistic comments. Charles Krauthammer³⁵ argued that the replacement of the unpredictable bipolar system of the Cold War with a unipolar world dominated by the mighty United States was good news because collective security would be assured. In a similar manner, Francis Fukuyama³⁶ judged that the end of the Cold War marked the triumph of liberal democracy, which could now serve as a model for the rest of the world. The collapse of the Soviet Union had proved that there was no working ideological alternative to liberal democracy. Thomas Friedman³⁷, who welcomed the victory of free-market capitalism, predicted that it would soon dominate the world with the globalization process. Still, the optimistic prospect of a new world order dominated by the United States, liberal democracy and globalization did not seduce everybody.

Samuel Huntington, a professor of political science at Harvard, did not believe that the triumph of the United States was bound to lead to a virtuous circle of prosperity, democracy, and peace. He responded to Francis Fukuyama, and offered a more realistic, if not pessimistic, outlook:

The end of the Cold War does not mean the end of political, ideological, diplomatic, economic, technological, or even military rivalry among nations. It does not mean the end of

³⁴ Mikhail Gorbachev in Bradley Lightbody, *The Cold War*, London, Routledge, 1999, pp. 124–125.

³⁵ Charles Krauthammer, “The Unipolar Moment”, *Foreign Affairs*, Winter 1991, pp. 23–33.

³⁶ Francis Fukuyama, “The End of History?”, *The National Interest*, Summer 1989, in Gideon Rose, *America and the World – Debating the New Shape of International Politics*, New York, W.W. Norton & Company, A Council on Foreign Relations Book, 2002, pp. 1–28.

³⁷ See Thomas Friedman, *The Lexus and the Olive Tree*, New York, Farrar, Straus & Giroux, 1999.

the struggle for power and influence. It very probably does mean increased instability, unpredictability, and violence in international affairs³⁸.

A couple of years later, elaborating on this idea, Huntington formulated his “clash of civilizations” theory. After reminding his readers that the eighteenth century had been dominated by conflicts among princes, the nineteenth century by conflicts between nations, the twentieth century by the conflict of ideologies, he argued that the twenty-first century would see a clash opposing Western civilization to the other civilizations of the world³⁹. The first political developments in the post-Cold War world seemed to validate Huntington’s thesis.

On December 16, 1989, while the world was busy watching the ongoing developments in Eastern Europe, an American officer was shot by the police in Panama City. To George Bush, this incident was the straw that broke the camel’s back. The relations between the United States and Panama had kept deteriorating and the American administration would no longer put up with the Panamanian leader, Manuel Noriega. Four days later, the American military launched a major operation, dubbed *Operation Just Cause*, to topple Noriega. On January 3, 1990, Noriega surrendered. This operation was in keeping with the Monroe Doctrine and Theodore Roosevelt’s big stick diplomacy, which had transformed Central America and South America into the backyard of the United States. The Americans had already intervened in Panama in 1865, 1903, 1912, and 1925. Still, *Operation Just Cause* also marked the passage of American foreign policy from bipolarity to unipolarity. The rest of the world was not consulted and this was an indication of America’s unilateral propensity in the post-Cold War world. The operation also broke “the mindset of the American people about the use of force in the post-Vietnam era⁴⁰”, and it served as a training ground for the American forces, which were soon to be tested again.

In August 1990, Iraqi forces invaded Kuwait. Tension had been brewing between Iraq and Kuwait for a few months but the invasion came as a surprise for most observers. In the previous years, notably during the Iran-Iraq War from 1980 to 1988, Iraq had served as a bulwark against Islamic forces in the region and the United States had supported the Iraqi dictator Saddam Hussein. However, the invasion of Kuwait was a case of blatant aggression which President Bush was not prepared to condone. In a televised address he said: “A line has been drawn in the sand”, which, “despite the passive construction, presented a vivid figurative marker of limits in the Arabian desert⁴¹.” On September 11, 1990, he delivered a speech in Congress and he made it very clear that America and the world would not tolerate aggression. On January 12, 1991, the American Congress approved *Operation Desert Storm*, a military intervention to free Kuwait which had been initially accepted by the United Nations. In his address to the nation on January 16, **George Bush (14)** predicted that from the crisis in the Persian Gulf “a new world order” could emerge:

This is an historic moment. We have in this past year made great progress in ending the long era of conflict and cold war. We have before us the opportunity to forge for ourselves and for future generations a new world order - a world where the rule of law, not the law of the jungle, governs the conduct of nations. When we are successful - and we will be - we have a real chance at this new world order, an order in which a credible United Nations can use its

³⁸ Samuel P. Huntington, “No Exit: The Errors of Endism”, *The National Interest*, Fall 1989, in Gideon Rose, *America and the World*, *op.cit.*, pp. 34–35.

³⁹ Samuel P. Huntington, “The Clash of Civilizations?”, *Foreign Affairs*, Summer 1993, in *ibid.*, pp. 43–44.

⁴⁰ Secretary of State James Baker in James Mann, *The Rise of the Vulcans – The History of Bush’s War Cabinet*, New York, Viking Penguin, 2004, p. 180.

⁴¹ George H. W. Bush in William Safire, *op. cit.*, pp. 200-201.

peacekeeping role to fulfill the promise and vision of the U.N.'s founders⁴².

In this new world order, the United States would assume world leadership and preserve the global balance of power with the approval of its allies. This vision, which marked the end of the bipolar world, was approved by Gorbachev. He had met Bush on September 9, 1990, and had signed a common Russian-American declaration demanding the departure of Iraqi troops from Kuwait.

The American Congress had approved *Operation Desert Storm*, but that did not mean that the American people were prepared to accept all the implications of Bush's new world order. In the post-Cold War world, the American people were primarily preoccupied by their economic well-being rather than new American commitments abroad. The Democratic presidential contender, Bill Clinton, understood very well the economic concerns of American voters and summed them up with his key campaign slogan: "It's the economy, stupid!" George Bush, who expected to reap the fruits of the victorious outcome of the Gulf War, was eventually defeated by Clinton. However, before leaving the presidency, in December 1992, under the aegis of the United Nations, Bush made a final commitment abroad when he decided to send troops to Somalia which was undergoing a disastrous humanitarian crisis.

As he had promised, Clinton devoted most of his energies to economic issues. Still, he had no intention of running away from his foreign policy responsibilities. During the campaign, he had declared that his top priorities would be to renovate the military apparatus, to reinforce the economic dimension in international affairs and to promote democracy abroad. Once in the White House, he asked his National Security Adviser, Anthony Lake, to devise a new foreign policy paradigm to replace the doctrine of containment. In 1993, Lake came up with "a strategy of enlargement – enlargement of the world's free community of market democracies." The main objectives of this strategy were: (1) to consolidate the world community of liberal democracies, (2) to promote the emergence of new liberal democracies, (3) to counter the States which were hostile to democracy and the free market economy, and (4) to pursue a humanitarian agenda. This was precisely what American forces were trying to do in Somalia with *Operation Restore Hope*⁴³.

In October 1993, eighteen American soldiers were killed in Mogadishu and this led to the withdrawal of U.S. troops from Somalia in March 1994. The Americans would now think twice before making new commitments abroad. And indeed, the United States stood by while genocide was taking place in Rwanda in the spring of 1994. In the same manner, it took months before the Clinton administration decided to react to the violence in the former Yugoslavia, which had been characterized by Secretary of State Warren Christopher as "a problem from hell"⁴⁴. It was not easy for Clinton to react to what was going on in the former Yugoslavia because he was faced with Republican opponents who were voicing neo-isolationist opinions. Still, in a speech he delivered on October 6, 1995, **Bill Clinton (15)** rejected the isolationist option:

Some really believe that after the cold war the United States can play a secondary role in the world, just as some thought we could after World War II, and some made sure we did after World War I.

⁴² George H. W. Bush, "Address to the Nation on the Invasion of Iraq", January 16, 1991. Available at <http://millercenter.org/president/speeches/detail/3428>

⁴³ See David Halberstam, *War in a Time of Peace – Bush, Clinton, and the Generals*, New York, Scribner, 2001, pp. 248–266. See also Andrew Bacevich, *American Empire – The Realities and Consequences of U.S. Diplomacy*, Cambridge, Mass., Harvard University Press, 2002, pp. 141-166

⁴⁴ Warren Christopher, CBS News, March 28, 1993, in Samantha Power, "*A Problem from Hell*" – *American and the Age of Genocide*, New York, Perennial, 2002, p. xii.

But if you look at the results from Bosnia to Haiti, from the Middle East to Northern Ireland, it proves once again that American leadership is indispensable and that without it our values, our interests, and peace itself would be at risk⁴⁵.

During the presidential campaign in 1995, the Republican candidate Bob Dole wrote that “American lives should not be risked – and lost – in places like Somalia, Haiti, and Rwanda” and he claimed that the American people would “not tolerate American casualties for irresponsible internationalism⁴⁶.”

In spite of Dole’s criticism, Clinton was reelected and he did manage to carry on his efforts in the former Yugoslavia, notably with *Operation Deliberate Force* in 1995 to protect Bosnia and the military operations to defend Kosovo in 1999. In the course of his second term, Clinton also launched major diplomatic initiatives in the Middle East and in Northern Ireland although the Republicans were accusing him of doing so to dodge the charges leveled against him in the Monica Lewinsky affair. Actually, this affair did not leave him much time to deal with foreign policy issues and, during the 2000 presidential elections, it was easy for the Republicans to blame the Democrats for having neglected foreign policy at the expense of America’s security.

9. The Global War on Terror

As regards foreign policy, the Republican candidate, George W. Bush, had little experience and relied on a team of foreign policy advisers whose collective nickname was the Vulcans after the Roman god of fire, the forge and metalwork. They came up with this name “to convey a sense of power, toughness, resilience and durability⁴⁷.” This team included realists and idealists. The former believed that what mattered most for the United States was to preserve its security and to maintain the global balance of power. They were cautious and were not prepared to have the United States entangled abroad in the way the Clinton administration had been in peacekeeping operations in Africa and the Balkans. The latter were the so-called neo-conservatives, people who claimed Wilson’s heritage and were eager to spread freedom and democracy throughout the world as a means of preserving U.S. security and ideals. They also advocated the primacy of American values in foreign affairs⁴⁸.

Condoleezza Rice, a professor of political science at Stanford University, became George W. Bush’s key foreign policy adviser and in that capacity, she wrote the Republican candidate’s foreign policy program, which was published by *Foreign Affairs*:

American foreign policy in a Republican administration should refocus the United States on the national interest and the pursuit of key priorities. These tasks are:

- * to ensure that America’s military can deter war, project power, and fight in defense of its interests if deterrence fails;
 - * to promote economic growth and political openness by extending free trade and a stable international monetary system to all committed to these principles, including in the western hemisphere, which has too often been neglected as a vital area of U.S. national interest;
 - * to renew strong and intimate relationships with allies who share American values and can thus share the burden of promoting peace, prosperity, and freedom;
 - * to focus U.S. energies on comprehensive relationships with the big powers, particularly Russia and China, that can and will mold the character of the international political system;
- and

⁴⁵ William J. Clinton, “Remarks at Freedom House”, October 6, 1995. Available at <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=50612&st=&st1=#axzz1hMEC9o2p>

⁴⁶ Bob Dole, “Shaping America’s Global Future”, *Foreign Policy*, N°98, Spring 1995.

⁴⁷ James Mann, *op. cit.*, p. x.

⁴⁸ See Robert Kagan & William Kristol (ed.), *Present Dangers – Crisis and Opportunity in American Foreign and Defense Policy*, San Francisco, Encounter Books, 2000.

* to deal decisively with the threat of rogue regimes and hostile powers, which is increasingly taking the forms of the potential for terrorism and the development of weapons of mass destruction (WMD)⁴⁹.

In the first months of Bush's presidency, what dominated the foreign policy agenda were the relationships with the major powers, particularly Russia and China.

To the utter dismay of the Russians, Bush decided to terminate the 1972 antiballistic missile treaty and to reactivate Reagan's National Missile Defense program, leading to a renewal of tensions between the two countries, some commentators even speaking of "a new rhetorical Cold War"⁵⁰. In April 2001, the collision of an American EP-3 surveillance plane with a Chinese intelligence fighter jet seriously affected the Sino-American relations. The Bush administration, in a stark display of unilateralism, also decided to withdraw from the International Criminal Court and the Kyoto accords on global warming.

The atmosphere of renewed tension between the United States and Russia was short-lived and was replaced, following the terrorist attacks on September 11, by a new spirit of cooperation. Vladimir Putin and George W. Bush met in the United States in November 2001 and they both displayed a common will to increase cooperation. At a joint White House press conference, Putin declared: "We intend to dismantle conclusively the vestiges of the Cold War, and develop an entirely new partnership for the long term"⁵¹. As for Bush, he said: "This is a new day in the long history of Russian-American relations. We're transforming our relationship from one of hostility and suspicion to one based on cooperation and trust"⁵². The threats of terrorism justified much closer U.S.–Russian cooperation in a wide range of areas. The Cold War between the two countries was now definitively over, not only because they were no longer at odds with each other but because of the emergence of a common enemy: Islamist extremism. It had attacked American interests on several occasions, but it also directly threatened Russia's security in Central Asia.

Before the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, terrorism had not been a priority for **George W. Bush**. But 9/11 was a transformative event for him as the speech he delivered to Congress on September 20 proved:

Great harm has been done to us. We have suffered great loss and in our grief and anger we have found our mission and our moment. Freedom and fear are at war. The advance of human freedom, the great achievement of our time and the great hope of every time depends on us. Our nation, this generation, will lift the dark threat of violence from our people and our future. We will rally the world to this cause by our efforts. We will not tire, we will not falter, and we will not fail⁵³.

Bush was now a war president and he defined the conflict against terrorism as a fight between good and evil. The Bush administration would lead a "Global War on Terror," a doctrine which filled the conceptual vacuum of America's foreign policy left by the end of the Cold War. It was a moment of historical vindication for the neo-conservatives who had warned since the early 1990s that the end of the Cold War would not necessarily translate into geopolitical stability⁵⁴.

⁴⁹ Condoleezza Rice, "Promoting the National Interest", *Foreign Affairs*, January/February 2000.

⁵⁰ Graham T. Allison & Sergei Karaganov, "U.S.–Russian Dialogue Is Needed to Head Off a New Cold War", *The International Herald Tribune*, April 3, 2001.

⁵¹ Vladimir Putin in Brian Knowlton, "Bush's Arms-Cut Plan", *The International Herald Tribune*, November 14, 2001.

⁵² George W. Bush in *ibid.*

⁵³ George W. Bush, "Address to a Joint Session of Congress", September 20, 2001. Available at <http://www.presidentialrhetoric.com/speeches/09.20.01.html>

⁵⁴ See Alain Frachon & Daniel Vernet, *L'Amérique des néo-conservateurs – L'illusion messianique*, Paris, Perrin/Tempus, [2004] 2010, p. 163.

The Bush administration first decided to launch an attack against the Taliban in Afghanistan so as to dismantle the Al Qaeda network, the radical Islamic fundamentalist terrorist organization which had found shelter there. On October 7, 2001, *Operation Enduring Freedom* began in Afghanistan. On the home front, on the following day, the Office of Homeland Security was created, and on October 25, Congress passed the *U.S.A. Patriot Act*, an acronym standing for “Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism.” In 2004, the adoption of the *Intelligence Reform and Prevention Act* led to the creation of the National Counterterrorism Center and the Office of the Director of National Intelligence. Before this large bureaucratic reorganization was implemented, the Bush administration issued, in September 2002, a key document which was meant to define the foreign policy of the United States: “The National Security Strategy of the United States of America.” It rapidly became known as the Bush Doctrine.

The Bush Doctrine was a combination of realism and idealism, “competing impulses” which, according to **Robert Gates (17)**, have often characterized American foreign policy. This duality could be observed already in George W. Bush’s preamble to the National Security Strategy document. He argued first that the objective of the United States was to “seek to create a balance of power” and to defend the nation. He also wrote that the United States had to promote social and political freedom, democracy and economic openness, goals which were similar to those of Woodrow Wilson and FDR. However, unlike Wilson but like Andrew Jackson, Bush was prepared to use force unilaterally and to act preventively to promote his objectives. As a result, America’s foreign policy during the George W. Bush presidency lacked clarity and its Wilsonian dimension was overshadowed by its Jacksonian inclination. The political scientist Pierre Hassner underlined the contradictory aspect of Bush’s foreign policy: “On pourrait parler d’une sorte de “wilsonisme botté” au sens où l’on a qualifié l’ère napoléonienne de “révolution bottée”. C’est un mélange d’isolationnisme, d’idéisme, d’unilatéralisme et d’internationalisme messianique⁵⁵.” One of the key elements in the Bush Doctrine was the possibility for the United States to use force in a preemptive manner, something that was experimented in Iraq.

In a speech in January 2002, Bush spoke of an “axis of evil” which threatened the peace of the world and in which he included North Korea, Iran and Iraq. As regards Iraq, the Bush administration was convinced that it held stockpiles of biological, chemical, and nuclear weapons. Therefore, in October 2002, he secured the passage of a resolution by Congress authorizing the use of military force against Iraq. However, on February 6, 2003, Secretary of State Colin Powell’s presentation at the United Nations⁵⁶ failed to convince the Security Council that Iraq possessed weapons of mass destruction, and it therefore refused to vote a similar resolution. On February 14, French Secretary of State Dominique de Villepin delivered a speech against war in Iraq before the United Nations and he was warmly applauded. In spite of this rebuttal, the Bush administration decided to attack Iraq. A major anti-war rally, which gathered hundreds of thousands of American citizens in the streets of major cities on February 15, 2003, did not deter Bush either and the first bombs fell on Baghdad on March 19, 2003. That very day, at the United Nations, Dominique de Villepin made a final plea for peace:

Make no mistake about it: the choice is indeed between two visions of the world.

⁵⁵ Pierre Hassner, *Le Monde*, 30 septembre 2002.

⁵⁶ Colin Powell, “Presentation to the U.N. Security Council: A Threat to International Peace and Security”, February 6, 2003, in Micah L. Sifry & Christopher Cerf (ed.), *The Iraq War Reader – History, Documents, Opinions*, New York, Touchstone, 2003, pp. 465-481.

To those who choose the use of force and think they can resolve the world's complexity through swift and preventive action, we offer in contrast determined action over time⁵⁷.

By going to war in Iraq, the Bush administration defied the United Nations Charter, which prohibits any international use of force except in self-defense or pursuant to a decision of the Security Council.

On May 1, aboard the aircraft carrier *USS Lincoln*, George W. Bush, who was wearing a pilot uniform for the occasion and was standing in front of a banner proclaiming "Mission Accomplished," triumphantly announced an end to major combat activity in Iraq. Bush's triumph was short-lived as the situation in Iraq kept deteriorating with an average of 30 "terrorist" attacks a day by October 2003. The number of American soldiers killed in Iraq reached 500 in January 2004 and 1,000 in September 2004. By the time Bush left the White House in January 2009, no fewer than 4,100 American soldiers had been killed in Iraq and 30,000 had been wounded. The Iraqi dictator Saddam Hussein had indeed been removed from power but America's intervention, which cost somewhere around \$800 billion⁵⁸, had triggered off a wave of sectarian fighting leaving tens of thousands of Iraqi casualties and a country on the verge of civil war as rival insurgent groups were vying with each other to fill the power vacuum. On the home front, as **Roger Cohen (18)** wrote, "while America's young men and women fought, other Americans enriched themselves⁵⁹."

When Barack Obama took over, only a handful of pundits still defended George W. Bush's foreign policy decisions and even the neo-conservatives were critical. Robert Kagan, for example, wrote that "the problem with the "war on terror" paradigm is not that the war has failed in its main and vitally important purpose. It is that the paradigm was and is an insufficient one on which to base the entirety of U.S. foreign policy⁶⁰." This analysis was shared by Obama, who, in October 2002, had publicly voiced his opposition to what he characterized as "a rash war." Once elected, he intended to put an end to America's engagement in Iraq and to break with the Global War on Terror. Symbolically, the phrases "war on terror" and "terrorist attacks" were replaced by the euphemisms "overseas contingency operations" and "man-caused disasters⁶¹." In addition to these semantic changes, **Barack Obama (19)** pledged to modify America's foreign policy, favoring a multilateral approach to the unilateral position of the Bush administration. With respect to the Muslim world, in an effort to rebuild relationships, he declared:

To the Muslim world, we seek a new way forward, based on mutual interest and mutual respect. To those leaders around the globe who seek to sow conflict, or blame their society's ills on the West – know that your people will judge you on what you can build, not what you destroy. To those who cling to power through corruption and deceit and the silencing of dissent, know that you are on the wrong side of history; but that we will extend a hand if you are willing to unclench your fist⁶².

⁵⁷ Dominique de Villepin, "Address before the United Nations Security Council", March 19, 2003. In John Ehrenberg, J. Patrice McSherry, José Ramón Sánchez & Caroleen Marji Sayej, *The Iraq Papers*, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2010, p. 151. The original document can be found in Dominique de Villepin, *Un autre monde*, Paris, L'Herne, 2003, pp. 99-105.

⁵⁸ David E. Sanger, *The Inheritance – The World Obama Confronts and the Challenges to American Power*, London, Bantam Press, 2009, p. ix.

⁵⁹ Roger Cohen, "In the Seventh Year, as the Dust Cleared", *International Herald Tribune*, September 11, 2008.

⁶⁰ Robert Kagan, "The September 12 Paradigm", *Foreign Affairs*, september/october 2008.

⁶¹ Peter Baker, "Bush's Language is Out, Even As His Policies Live On", *International Herald Tribune*, April 3, 2009.

⁶² Barack Obama, "Inaugural Address", January 20, 2009.

Available at <http://www.presidentialrhetoric.com/speeches/01.20.09.html>

On June 4, 2009, at Cairo University, he confirmed his message, declaring that “this cycle of suspicion and discord [between the United States and the Muslims] must end.” Vice President **Joseph Biden (20)** promised that America would no longer torture and that it would “close the detention facility at Guantánamo Bay⁶³.” However laudable the rhetoric of Obama and Biden was, moving away from Bush’s foreign policy commitments proved difficult⁶⁴.

First of all, Obama had to cope with his Republican adversaries, notably former Vice President Dick Cheney, who were doing their best to preserve the main tenets of the Bush Doctrine and were accusing the Democrats of selling off America’s national security. Second, the situation in Iraq and Afghanistan remained quite tense and this is why Obama felt the United States could not afford to lower its guard, something he made plain in the speech he delivered on December 10, 2009, at Oslo City Hall, as he was awarded the Nobel Peace Prize:

As someone who stands here as a direct consequence of Dr. King’s life’s work, I am living testimony to the moral force of non-violence. I know there is nothing weak - nothing passive - nothing naïve - in the creed and lives of Gandhi and King.

But as a head of state sworn to protect and defend my nation, I cannot be guided by their examples alone. I face the world as it is, and cannot stand idle in the face of threats to the American people. For make no mistake: evil does exist in the world⁶⁵.

On September 11, 2011, ten years after the infamous terrorist attacks, the inauguration of the National September 11 Memorial served as vivid reminder of the terrorist threat. The memorial, consisting of a pair of abyss-like square pools built where the Twin Towers of the World Trade Center stood, was inaugurated by Barack Obama and former President George W. Bush.

During the Obama administration, the Global War on Terror remained part of America’s foreign policy agenda and this explains why it was sometimes called the “Long War” against terrorism. On May 22, 2010, at West Point, Obama introduced the new National Security Strategy of the United States and said that the war was not about to end soon:

Our campaign to disrupt, dismantle, and to defeat al Qaeda is part of an international effort that is necessary and just. But this is a different kind of war. There will be no simple moment of surrender to mark the journey’s end -- no armistice, no banner headline. Though we have had more success in eliminating al Qaeda leaders in recent months than in recent years, they will continue to recruit, and plot, and exploit our open society⁶⁶.

Unlike the previous document, the new national security strategy rejected the unilateral use of U.S. power and the right to wage preemptive war. It also emphasized diplomatic engagement and international alliances but it certainly did not rule out the use of force.

In the same manner, torture and rendition were no longer authorized but Guantánamo was not closed down. Oversight of spying programs was strengthened but the use of secrecy remained systematic and target killings using unmanned aerial vehicles, usually called drones, became a matter of routine. Obama, therefore, ensured a certain continuity with the previous administration⁶⁷ and Andrew Bacevich could argue that he did not seriously challenge the

⁶³ Joseph Biden, “Remarks at the 45th Munich Security Conference”, February 7, 2009. Available at <http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/remarks-vice-president-biden-45th-munich-conference-security-policy>

⁶⁴ See Annick Cizel, « Le ‘nouveau commencement’ de la politique étrangère américaine : entre changement et continuités », in Anne Deysine (ed.), *op. cit.*, pp. 153–187.

⁶⁵ Barack Obama, “Nobel Peace Prize Speech”, December 10, 2009. Available at <http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/remarks-president-acceptance-nobel-peace-prize>

⁶⁶ Barack Obama, “Remarks by the President at United States Military Academy at West Point Commencement”, May 22, 2010. Available at <http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/remarks-president-united-states-military-academy-west-point-commencement>

⁶⁷ See Timothy J. Lynch & Robert S. Singh, *After Bush - The Case for Continuity in American Foreign Policy*, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2008.

foreign policy consensus which “has centered on what we might call the Sacred Trinity of global power projection, global military presence and global activism – the concrete expression of what politicians commonly refer to as ‘American global leadership’⁶⁸.” To be fair, one needs to acknowledge that it was bound to be difficult to cope with the legacy Obama was left by his predecessor.

This legacy included America’s commitments in Iraq and Afghanistan. In December 2011, Obama was able to announce that the last U.S. troops were leaving Iraq and that their withdrawal from Afghanistan had begun. Still, Bush’s inheritance also meant an obese “military-industrial complex.” In the course of his two mandates, Bush doubled the U.S. defense budget, which went from approximately \$350 billion in 2001 to \$700 billion or so in 2009. On average, from 1946 to 2005, the annual U.S. defense budget amounted to \$360 billion⁶⁹. In spite of a few cuts, Obama’s annual defense budget remained close to \$700 billion and, sixty-five years after the end of World War II, the United States was still, literally speaking, the “great arsenal of democracy.” America’s commitment to the defense of democracy was once again illustrated when in March 2011, during the Arab Spring, it joined a multi-state coalition “to protect the Libyan people from immediate danger⁷⁰.” The action of the Obama administration in Libya was characterized as “leading from behind” but it was, nevertheless, crucial.

Again, in November 2011, before her visit to Asia, Secretary of State Hillary Clinton declared that democracy promotion was part of her foreign policy agenda in the region:

Our work will proceed along six key lines of action: strengthening bilateral security alliances; deepening our working relationships with emerging powers, including with China; engaging with regional multilateral institutions; expanding trade and investment; forging a broad-based military presence; and advancing democracy and human rights⁷¹.

The Asia-Pacific region, rather than Europe, Latin America, Africa or the Middle East, was now the key target of the foreign policy of the United and it was prepared to pay the price to ensure global leadership in the area. On January 5, 2012, at the Pentagon, Barack Obama said that America was “turning the page on a decade of war” and he announced reductions in the defense budget. However, he added: “As I made clear in Australia, we will be strengthening our presence in the Asia Pacific, and budget reductions will not come at the expense of that critical region⁷².”

During the 2008 presidential campaign, Barack Obama was photographed clutching a copy of Fareed Zakaria’s *The Post-American World*, a book in which the Indian-American analyst described the United States as a waning power: “The current economic upheaval will only hasten the move to a post-American world. If the Iraq War and George W. Bush’s foreign policy had the effect of delegitimizing America’s military-political power in the eyes of the world, the financial crisis has had the effect of delegitimizing America’s economic power⁷³.” Obama shared Zakaria’s analysis about “a post-American world” but his initiative as regards the Asia-Pacific area demonstrated that he was certainly not prepared to abandon

⁶⁸ Andrew J. Bacevich, “Sins of Omission”, *International Herald Tribune*, April 28, 2009.

⁶⁹ Figures provided in Pap Ndiaye, « Le complexe militaro-industriel », in Denis Lacorne (ed.), *Les États-Unis*, *op. cit.*, p. 427.

⁷⁰ Barack Obama, “Remarks by the President in Address to the Nation on Libya”, March 28, 2011. Available at <http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2011/03/28/remarks-president-address-nation-libya>

⁷¹ Hillary Clinton, “America’s Pacific Century”, *Foreign Policy*, November 2011.

⁷² Barack Obama, “Remarks by the President on the Defense Strategic Review”, January 5, 2012. Available at <http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2012/01/05/remarks-president-defense-strategic-review>

⁷³ Fareed Zakaria, *The Post-American World*, New York, W. W. Norton, 2008, p. xxi. See also Philip Golub, *Une autre histoire de la puissance américaine*, Paris, Seuil, 2011. Page 238, he writes: “Le système international américano-centré est en train de céder la place à un monde décentré.”

American leadership. In January 2009, Hillary Clinton had made a similar pledge when, during her Senate confirmation hearing for the position of Secretary of State, she declared:

I believe that American leadership has been wanting, but is still wanted. We must use what has been called smart power, the full range of tools at our disposal -- diplomatic, economic, military, political, legal, and cultural -- picking the right tool or combination of tools for each situation. With smart power, diplomacy will be the vanguard of our foreign policy⁷⁴.

As opposed to the Bush administration, the Obama team strove to implement a smart power foreign policy, combining hard power and soft power strategies.

⁷⁴ Hillary Clinton, "Senate confirmation hearing", January 13, 2009. Available at <http://www.cfr.org/us-election-2008/transcript-hillary-clintons-confirmation-hearing/p18225>

INTERVENTION

1. Henry Wallace, “The Way to peace,” September 12, 1946.
2. Harry S. Truman, “Address Before a Joint Session of Congress,” March 12, 1947.
3. George Frost Kennan, “The Sources of Soviet Conduct,” *Foreign Affairs*, July 1947.
4. Joseph McCarthy, Wheeling, West Virginia, February 9, 1950.
5. National Security Directive – 68, April 14, 1950.
6. John Foster Dulles, “Speech to the Council on Foreign Relations,” January 12, 1954.
7. Dwight Eisenhower, “Farewell Address to the Nation,” January 17, 1961.
8. John F. Kennedy, “American University Commencement Address,” June 10, 1963.
9. Lyndon B. Johnson, “Address to the Nation,” March 31, 1968.
10. Richard Nixon, “Address to the Nation on the War in Vietnam,” November 3, 1969.
11. Jimmy Carter, “Commencement Speech Given at Notre Dame University,” May 22, 1977.
12. Ronald Reagan, “Remarks at the Annual Convention of the National Association of Evangelicals,” March 8, 1983.
13. Mikhail Gorbachev, “Speech to the United Nations,” December 7, 1988.
14. George H. W. Bush, “Address to the Nation on the Invasion of Iraq,” January 16, 1991.
15. William J. Clinton, “Remarks at Freedom House,” October 6, 1995.
16. George W. Bush, “Address to a Joint Session of Congress,” September 20, 2001.
17. Robert M. Gates, “World Forum on the Future of Democracy,” September 17, 2007.
18. Roger Cohen, “In the Seventh Year, as the Dust Cleared,” September 11, 2008.
19. Barack Obama, “Inaugural Address,” January 20, 2009.
20. Joseph Biden, “Remarks at the 45th Munich Security Conference,” February 7, 2009.

1 - Henry Wallace, "The Way to Peace" - September 12, 1946

To prevent war and insure our survival in a stable world, it is essential that we look abroad through our own American eyes and not through the eyes of either the British Foreign Office or a pro-British or anti-Russian press.

In this connection, I want one thing clearly understood. I am neither anti-British nor pro-British — neither anti-Russian nor pro-Russian. And just two days ago, when President Truman read these words, he said that they represented the policy of his administration.

I plead for an America vigorously dedicated to peace - just as I plead for opportunities for the next generation throughout the world to enjoy the abundance which now, more than ever before, is the birthright of man.

To achieve lasting peace, we must study in detail just how the Russian character was formed - by invasions of Tartars, Mongols, Germans, Poles, Swedes, and French; by the czarist rule based on ignorance, fear and force; by the intervention of the British, French and Americans in Russian affairs from 1919 to 1921; by the geography of the huge Russian land mass situated strategically between Europe and Asia; and by the vitality derived from the rich Russian soil and the strenuous Russian climate. Add to all this the tremendous emotional power which Marxism and Leninism gives to the Russian leaders — and then we can realize that we are reckoning with a force which cannot be handled successfully by a "Get tough with Russia" policy. "Getting tough" never bought anything real and lasting — whether for schoolyard bullies or businessmen or world powers. The tougher we get, the tougher the Russians will get.

Throughout the world there are numerous reactionary elements which had hoped for Axis victory — and now profess great friendship for the United States. Yet, these enemies of yesterday and false friends of today continually try to provoke war between the United States and Russia. They have no real love of the United States. They only long for the day when the United States and Russia will destroy each other.

We must not let our Russian policy be guided or influenced by those inside or outside the United States who want war with Russia. This does not mean appeasement.

We most earnestly want peace with Russia - but we want to be met half way. We want cooperation. And I believe that we can get cooperation once Russia understands that our primary objective is neither saving the British Empire nor purchasing oil in the Near East with the lives of American soldiers. We cannot allow national oil rivalries to force us into war. All of the nations producing oil, whether inside or outside of their own boundaries, must fulfill the provisions of the United Nations Charter and encourage the development of world petroleum reserves so as to make the maximum amount of oil available to all nations of the world on an equitable peaceful basis - and not on the basis of fighting the next war.

For her part, Russia can retain our respect by cooperating with the United Nations in a spirit of open-minded and flexible give-and-take.

The real peace treaty we now need is between the United States and Russia. On our part, we should recognize that we have no more business in the political affairs of Eastern Europe than Russia has in the political affairs of Latin America, Western Europe and the United States. We may not like what Russia does in Eastern Europe. Her type of land reform, industrial expropriation, and suppression of basic liberties offends the great majority of the people of the United States. But whether we like it or not the Russians will try to socialize their sphere of influence just as we try to democratize our sphere of influence. This applies also to Germany and Japan. We are striving to democratize Japan and our area of control in Germany, while Russia strives to socialize eastern Germany.

As for Germany, we all must recognize that an equitable settlement, based on a unified German nation, is absolutely essential to any lasting European settlement. This means that Russia must be assured that never again can German industry be converted into military might to be used against her - and Britain, Western Europe and the United States must be certain that Russia's Germany policy will not become a tool of Russian design against Western Europe.

The Russians have no more business in stirring up native communists to political activity in Western Europe, Latin America and the United States than we have in interfering in the politics of Eastern Europe and Russia. We know what Russia is up to in Eastern Europe, for example, and Russia knows what we are up to. We cannot permit the door to be closed against our trade in Eastern Europe any more than we can in China. But at the same time we have to recognize that the Balkans are closer to Russia than to us - and that Russia cannot permit either England or the United States to dominate the politics of that area.

2 - Harry S. Truman, "Address Before a Joint Session of Congress" - March 12, 1947

One of the primary objectives of the foreign policy of the United States is the creation of conditions in which we and other nations will be able to work out a way of life free from coercion. This was a fundamental issue in the war with Germany and Japan. Our victory was won over countries which sought to impose their will, and their way of life, upon other nations.

To ensure the peaceful development of nations, free from coercion, the United States has taken a leading part in establishing the United Nations. The United Nations is designed to make possible lasting freedom and independence for all its members. We shall not realize our objectives, however, unless we are willing to help free peoples to maintain their free institutions and their national integrity against aggressive movements that seek to impose upon them totalitarian regimes. This is no more than a frank recognition that totalitarian regimes imposed on free peoples, by direct or indirect aggression, undermine the foundations of international peace and hence the security of the United States.

The peoples of a number of countries of the world have recently had totalitarian regimes forced upon them against their will. The Government of the United States has made frequent protests against coercion and intimidation, in violation of the Yalta agreement, in Poland, Rumania, and Bulgaria. I must also state that in a number of other countries there have been similar developments.

At the present moment in world history nearly every nation must choose between alternative ways of life. The choice is too often not a free one.

One way of life is based upon the will of the majority, and is distinguished by free institutions, representative government, free elections, guarantees of individual liberty, freedom of speech and religion, and freedom from political oppression.

The second way of life is based upon the will of a minority forcibly imposed upon the majority. It relies upon terror and oppression, a controlled press and radio; fixed elections, and the suppression of personal freedoms.

I believe that it must be the policy of the United States to support free peoples who are resisting attempted subjugation by armed minorities or by outside pressures.

I believe that we must assist free peoples to work out their own destinies in their own way.

I believe that our help should be primarily through economic and financial aid which is essential to economic stability and orderly political processes.

The world is not static, and the status quo is not sacred. But we cannot allow changes in the status quo in violation of the Charter of the United Nations by such methods as coercion, or by such subterfuges as political infiltration. In helping free and independent nations to maintain their freedom, the United States will be giving effect to the principles of the Charter of the United Nations.

It is necessary only to glance at a map to realize that the survival and integrity of the Greek nation are of grave importance in a much wider situation. If Greece should fall under the control of an armed minority, the effect upon its neighbor, Turkey, would be immediate and serious. Confusion and disorder might well spread throughout the entire Middle East.

Moreover, the disappearance of Greece as an independent state would have a profound effect upon those countries in Europe whose peoples are struggling against great difficulties to maintain their freedoms and their independence while they repair the damages of war.

It would be an unspeakable tragedy if these countries, which have struggled so long against overwhelming odds, should lose that victory for which they sacrificed so much. Collapse of free institutions and loss of independence would be disastrous not only for them but for the world. Discouragement and possibly failure would quickly be the lot of neighboring peoples striving to maintain their freedom and independence.

Should we fail to aid Greece and Turkey in this fateful hour, the effect will be far reaching to the West as well as to the East.

We must take immediate and resolute action.

I therefore ask the Congress to provide authority for assistance to Greece and Turkey in the amount of \$400,000,000 for the period ending June 30, 1948. In requesting these funds, I have taken into consideration the maximum amount of relief assistance which would be furnished to Greece out of the \$350,000,000 which I recently requested that the Congress authorize for the prevention of starvation and suffering in countries devastated by the war.

In addition to funds, I ask the Congress to authorize the detail of American civilian and military personnel to Greece and Turkey, at the request of those countries, to assist in the tasks of reconstruction, and for the purpose of supervising the use of such financial and material assistance as may be furnished. I recommend that authority also be provided for the instruction and training of selected Greek and Turkish personnel.

Finally, I ask that the Congress provide authority which will permit the speediest and most effective use, in terms of needed commodities, supplies, and equipment, of such funds as may be authorized.

3 - George Frost Kennan, "The Sources of Soviet Conduct," *Foreign Affairs* - July 1947

In these circumstances it is clear that the main element of any United States policy toward the Soviet Union must be that of long-term, patient but firm and vigilant containment of Russian expansive tendencies. It is important to note, however, that such a policy has nothing to do with outward histrionics: with threats or blustering or superfluous gestures of outward "toughness." While the Kremlin is basically flexible in its reaction to political realities, it is by no means unamenable to considerations of prestige. Like almost any other government, it can be placed by tactless and threatening gestures in a position where it cannot afford to yield even though this might be dictated by its sense of realism. The Russian leaders are keen judges of human psychology, and as such they are highly conscious that loss of temper and of self-control is never a source of strength in political affairs. They are quick to exploit such evidences of weakness. For these reasons it is a *sine qua non* of successful dealing with Russia that the foreign government in question should remain at all times cool and collected and that its demands on Russian policy should be put forward in such a manner as to leave the way open for a compliance not too detrimental to Russian prestige.

In the light of the above, it will be clearly seen that the Soviet pressure against the free institutions of the western world is something that can be contained by the adroit and vigilant application of counter-force at a series of constantly shifting geographical and political points, corresponding to the shifts and maneuvers of Soviet policy, but which cannot be charmed or talked out of existence. The Russians look forward to a duel of infinite duration, and they see that already they have scored great successes. It must be borne in mind that there was a time when the Communist Party represented far more of a minority in the sphere of Russian national life than Soviet power today represents in the world community.

But if the ideology convinces the rulers of Russia that truth is on their side and that they can therefore afford to wait, those of us on whom that ideology has no claim are free to examine objectively the validity of that premise. The Soviet thesis not only implies complete lack of control by the west over its own economic destiny, it likewise assumes Russian unity, discipline and patience over an infinite period. Let us bring this apocalyptic vision down to earth, and suppose that the western world finds the strength and resourcefulness to contain Soviet power over a period of ten to fifteen years. What does that spell for Russia itself?

The Soviet leaders, taking advantage of the contributions of modern techniques to the arts of despotism, have solved the question of obedience within the confines of their power. Few challenge their authority; and even those who do are unable to make that challenge valid as against the organs of suppression of the state.

The Kremlin has also proved able to accomplish its purpose of building up Russia, regardless of the interests of the inhabitants, and industrial foundation of heavy metallurgy, which is, to be sure, not yet complete but which is nevertheless continuing to grow and is approaching those of the other major industrial countries. All of this, however, both the maintenance of internal political security and the building of heavy industry, has been carried out at a terrible cost in human life and in human hopes and energies. It has necessitated the use of forced labor on a scale unprecedented in modern times under conditions of peace. It has involved the neglect or abuse of other phases of Soviet economic life, particularly agriculture, consumers' goods production, housing and transportation.

To all that, the war has added its tremendous toll of destruction, death and human exhaustion. In consequence of this, we have in Russia today a population which is physically and spiritually tired. The mass of the people are disillusioned, skeptical and no longer as

accessible as they once were to the magical attraction which Soviet power still radiates to its followers abroad. The avidity with which people seized upon the slight respite accorded to the Church for tactical reasons during the war was eloquent testimony to the fact that their capacity for faith and devotion found little expression in the purposes of the regime.

In these circumstances, there are limits to the physical and nervous strength of people themselves. These limits are absolute ones, and are binding even for the cruelest dictatorship, because beyond them people cannot be driven. The forced labor camps and the other agencies of constraint provide temporary means of compelling people to work longer hours than their own volition or mere economic pressure would dictate; but if people survive them at all they become old before their time and must be considered as human casualties to the demands of dictatorship. In either case their best powers are no longer available to society and can no longer be enlisted in the service of the state.

4 - Joseph McCarthy, Wheeling, West Virginia - February 9, 1950

I have in my hand 57 cases of individuals who would appear to be either card carrying members or certainly loyal to the Communist Party, but who nevertheless are still helping to shape our foreign policy.

One thing to remember in discussing the Communists in our Government is that we are not dealing with spies who get thirty pieces of silver to steal the blueprints of a new weapon. We are dealing with a far more sinister type of activity because it permits the enemy to guide and shape our policy.

This brings us down to the case of one Alger Hiss who is important not as an individual any more, but rather because he is so representative of a group in the State Department. It is unnecessary to go over the sordid events showing how he sold out the Nation which had given him so much. Those are rather fresh in all of our minds.

However, it should be remembered that the fact in regard to his connection with this international Communist spy ring were made known to the then Under Secretary of State Berle three days after Hitler and Stalin signed the Russo-German alliance pact.

Under Secretary Berle promptly contacted Dean Acheson and received word in return that Acheson (and I quote) "could vouch for Hiss absolutely" – at which time the matter was dropped.

Again in 1943, the FBI had occasion to investigate the facts surrounding Hiss' contacts with the Russian spy ring. But even after that FBI report was submitted, nothing was done.

Then late in 1948 – on August 5 – when the Un-American Activities Committee called Alger Hiss to give an accounting, President Truman issued a Presidential directive ordering all Government agencies to refuse to turn over any information whatsoever in regard to the Communist activities of any Government employee to a congressional committee.

If time permitted, it might be well to go into detail about the fact that Hiss was Roosevelt's chief adviser at Yalta when Roosevelt was admittedly in ill health and tired physically and mentally and when, according to the Secretary of State, Hiss and Gromyko drafted the report on the conference.

Of the results of this conference, Arthur Bliss Lane of the State Department had this to say: "As I glanced over the document, I could not believe my eyes. To me, almost every line spoke of a surrender to Stalin."

As you hear this story of high treason, I know that you are saying to yourself, "Well, why doesn't the Congress do something about it?" Actually, ladies and gentlemen, one of the most important reasons for the graft, the corruption, the dishonesty, the disloyalty, the treason in High Government positions – one of the most important reasons why this continues is a lack of moral uprising on the part of the 140,000,000 American people.

As you know, very recently the Secretary of State proclaimed his loyalty to a man guilty of what has always been considered the most abominable of all crimes – of being a traitor to the people who gave him a position of great trust. The Secretary of State in attempting to justify his continued devotion to the man who sold out the Christian world to the atheistic world, referred to Christ's Sermon on the Mount as a justification and reason therefore, and the reaction of the American people to this would have made the heart of Abraham Lincoln happy.

When this pompous diplomat in striped pants, with a phony British accent, proclaimed to the American people that Christ on the Mount endorsed communism, high treason, and

betrayal of a sacred trust, the blasphemy was so great that it awakened the dormant indignation of the American people.

He has lighted the spark which is resulting in a moral uprising and will end only when the whole sorry mess of twisted, warped thinkers are swept from the national scene so that we may have a new birth of honesty and decency in government.

5 - National Security Directive – 68 - April 14, 1950

Our position as the center of power in the free world places a heavy responsibility upon the United States for leadership. We must organize and enlist the energies and resources of the free world in a positive program for peace which will frustrate the Kremlin design for world domination by creating a situation in the free world to which the Kremlin will be compelled to adjust. Without such a cooperative effort, led by the United States, we will have to make gradual withdrawals under pressure until we discover one day that we have sacrificed positions of vital interest.

It is imperative that this trend be reversed by a much more rapid and concerted build-up of the actual strength of both the United States and the other nations of the free world. The analysis shows that this will be costly and will involve significant domestic financial and economic adjustments.

The execution of such a build-up, however, requires that the United States have an affirmative program beyond the solely defensive one of countering the threat posed by the Soviet Union. This program must light the path to peace and order among nations in a system based on freedom and justice, as contemplated in the Charter of the United Nations. Further, it must envisage the political and economic measures with which and the military shield behind which the free world can work to frustrate the Kremlin design by the strategy of the cold war; for every consideration of devotion to our fundamental values and to our national security demands that we achieve our objectives by the strategy of the cold war, building up our military strength in order that it may not have to be used. The only sure victory lies in the frustration of the Kremlin design by the steady development of the moral and material strength of the free world and its projection into the Soviet world in such a way as to bring about an internal change in the Soviet system. Such a positive program - harmonious with our fundamental national purpose and our objectives - is necessary if we are to regain and retain the initiative and to win and hold the necessary popular support and cooperation in the United States and the rest of the free world.

This program should include a plan for negotiation with the Soviet Union, developed and agreed with our allies and which is consonant with our objectives. The United States and its allies, particularly the United Kingdom and France, should always be ready to negotiate with the Soviet Union on terms consistent with our objectives. The present world situation, however, is one which militates against successful negotiations with the Kremlin - for the terms of agreements on important pending issues would reflect present realities and would therefore be unacceptable, if not disastrous, to the United States and the rest of the free world. After a decision and a start on building up the strength of the free world has been made, it might then be desirable for the United States to take an initiative in seeking negotiations in the hope that it might facilitate the process of accommodation by the Kremlin to the new situation. Failing that, the unwillingness of the Kremlin to accept equitable terms or its bad faith in observing them would assist in consolidating popular opinion in the free world in support of the measures necessary to sustain the build-up.

In summary, we must, by means of a rapid and sustained build-up of the political, economic, and military strength of the free world, and by means of an affirmative program intended to wrest the initiative from the Soviet Union, confront it with convincing evidence of the determination and ability of the free world to frustrate the Kremlin design of a world dominated by its will. Such evidence is the only means short of war which eventually may force the Kremlin to abandon its present course of action and to negotiate acceptable agreements on issues of major importance.

The whole success of the proposed program hangs ultimately on recognition by this Government, the American people, and all free peoples, that the cold war is in fact a real war in which the survival of the free world is at stake. Essential prerequisites to success are consultations with Congressional leaders designed to make the program the object of non-partisan legislative support, and a presentation to the public of a full explanation of the facts and implications of the present international situation. The prosecution of the program will require of us all the ingenuity, sacrifice, and unity demanded by the vital importance of the issue and the tenacity to persevere until our national objectives have been attained.

6 - John Foster Dulles, "Speech to the Council on Foreign Relations" - January 12, 1954

The Soviet Communists are planning for what they call "an entire historical era," and we should do the same. They seek through many types of maneuvers gradually to divide and weaken the free nations by overextending them in efforts which, as Lenin put it, are "beyond their strength, so that they come to practical bankruptcy." Then, said Lenin, "our victory is assured." Then, said Stalin, will be "the moment for the decisive blow."

In the face of this strategy, measures cannot be judged adequate merely because they ward off an immediate danger. It is essential to do this, but it is also essential to do so without exhausting ourselves.

And when the Eisenhower administration applied this test, we felt that some transformations were needed.

It is not sound military strategy permanently to commit U.S. land forces to Asia to a degree that leaves us no strategic reserves.

It is not sound economics to support permanently other countries; nor is it good foreign policy, for in the long run, that creates as much ill will as good will.

Also, it is not sound to become permanently committed to military expenditures so vast that they lead to what Lenin called "practical bankruptcy."

Take first the matter of national security. We need allies and we need collective security. And our purpose is to have them, but to have them on a basis which is more effective and on a basis which is less costly. How do we do this? The way to do this is to place more reliance on community deterrent power, and less dependence on local defensive power. We want for ourselves and for others a maximum deterrent at a bearable cost.

Local defense will always be important. But there is no local defense which alone will contain the mighty land power of the Communist world. Local defenses must be reinforced by the further deterrent of massive retaliatory power.

A potential aggressor must know that he cannot always prescribe battle conditions that suit him. Otherwise, for example, a potential aggressor who is glutted with manpower might be tempted to attack in confidence that resistance would be confined to manpower. He might be tempted to attack in places where his superiority was decisive.

The way to deter aggression is for the free community to be willing and able to respond vigorously at places and with means of its own choosing.

Now, so long as our basic policy concepts were unclear, our military leaders could not be selective in building our military power. If the enemy could pick his time and his place and his method of warfare - and if our policy was to remain the traditional one of meeting aggression by direct and local opposition - then we had to be ready to fight in the Arctic and in the tropics; in Asia, the Near East, and in Europe; by sea, by land, and by air; by old weapons and by new weapons.

The total cost of our security efforts, at home and abroad, was over \$50,000,000,000 per annum, and involved, for 1953, a projected budgetary deficit of \$9,000,000,000; and for 1954 a projected deficit of \$11,000,000,000. This was on top of taxes comparable to wartime taxes and the dollar was depreciating in its effective value. And our allies were similarly weighed down. This could not be continued for long without grave budgetary, economic, and social consequences.

But before military planning could be changed the President and his advisers, as represented by the National Security Council, had to make some basic policy decisions. This

has been done. And the basic decision was as I indicated to depend primarily upon a great capacity to retaliate instantly by means and at places of our choosing. And now the Department of Defense and the Joint Chiefs of Staff can shape our military establishment to fit what is our policy, instead of having to try to be ready to meet the enemy's many choices. And that permits of a selection of military means instead of a multiplication of means. And as a result it is now possible to get, and to share, more basic security at less cost.

7 - Dwight Eisenhower, "Farewell Address to the Nation" - January 17, 1961

We now stand ten years past the midpoint of a century that has witnessed four major wars among great nations. Three of these involved our own country. Despite these holocausts America is today the strongest, the most influential and most productive nation in the world. Understandably proud of this pre-eminence, we yet realize that America's leadership and prestige depend, not merely upon our unmatched material progress, riches and military strength, but on how we use our power in the interests of world peace and human betterment.

Throughout America's adventure in free government, our basic purposes have been to keep the peace; to foster progress in human achievement, and to enhance liberty, dignity and integrity among peoples and among nations.

To strive for less would be unworthy of a free and religious people.

Any failure traceable to arrogance or our lack of comprehension or readiness to sacrifice would inflict upon us a grievous hurt, both at home and abroad.

Progress toward these noble goals is persistently threatened by the conflict now engulfing the world. It commands our whole attention, absorbs our very beings. We face a hostile ideology global in scope, atheistic in character, ruthless in purpose, and insidious in method. Unhappily the danger it poses promises to be of indefinite duration. To meet it successfully, there is called for, not so much the emotional and transitory sacrifices of crisis, but rather those which enable us to carry forward steadily, surely, and without complaint the burdens of a prolonged and complex struggle – with liberty the stake. Only thus shall we remain, despite every provocation, on our charted course toward permanent peace and human betterment.

Crises there will continue to be. In meeting them, whether foreign or domestic, great or small, there is a recurring temptation to feel that some spectacular and costly action could become the miraculous solution to all current difficulties. A huge increase in the newer elements of our defenses; development of unrealistic programs to cure every ill in agriculture; a dramatic expansion in basic and applied research – these and many other possibilities, each possibly promising in itself, may be suggested as the only way to the road we wish to travel.

But each proposal must be weighed in light of a broader consideration; the need to maintain balance in and among national programs – balance between the private and the public economy, balance between the cost and hoped for advantages – balance between the clearly necessary and the comfortably desirable; balance between our essential requirements as a nation and the duties imposed by the nation upon the individual; balance between the actions of the moment and the national welfare of the future. Good judgment seeks balance and progress; lack of it eventually finds imbalance and frustration.

The record of many decades stands as proof that our people and their Government have, in the main, understood these truths and have responded to them well in the face of threat and stress.

But threats, new in kind or degree, constantly arise.

Of these, I mention two only.

A vital element in keeping the peace is our military establishment. Our arms must be mighty, ready for instant action, so that no potential aggressor may be tempted to risk his own destruction.

Our military organization today bears little relation to that known by any of my

predecessors in peacetime, or indeed by the fighting men of World War II or Korea.

Until the latest of our world conflicts, the United States had no armaments industry. American makers of plowshares could, with time and as required, make swords as well. But now we can no longer risk emergency improvisation of national defense; we have been compelled to create a permanent armaments industry of vast proportions. Added to this, three and a half million men and women are directly engaged in the defense establishment. We annually spend on military security more than the net income of all United States corporations.

This conjunction of an immense military establishment and a large arms industry is new in the American experience. The total influence – economic, political, even spiritual – is felt in every city, every Statehouse, every office of the Federal government. We recognize the imperative need for this development. Yet we must not fail to comprehend its grave implications. Our toil, resources and livelihood are all involved; so is the very structure of our society.

In the councils of government, we must guard against the acquisition of unwarranted influence, whether sought or unsought, by the military-industrial complex. The potential for the disastrous rise of misplaced power exists and will persist.

We must never let the weight of this combination endanger our liberties or democratic processes. We should take nothing for granted. Only an alert and knowledgeable citizenry can compel the proper meshing of the huge industrial and military machinery of defense with our peaceful methods and goals, so that security and liberty may prosper together.

8 - John F. Kennedy, "American University Commencement Address" - June 10, 1963

No government or social system is so evil that its people must be considered as lacking in virtue. As Americans, we find communism profoundly repugnant as a negation of personal freedom and dignity. But we can still hail the Russian people for their many achievements in science and space, in economic and industrial growth, in culture, in acts of courage.

Among the many traits the peoples of our two countries have in common, none is stronger than our mutual abhorrence of war. Almost unique among the major world powers, we have never been at war with each other. And no nation in the history of battle ever suffered more than the Soviet Union in the Second World War. At least 20 million lost their lives. Countless millions of homes and families were burned or sacked. A third of the nation's territory, including two thirds of its industrial base, was turned into a wasteland - a loss equivalent to the destruction of this country east of Chicago.

Today, should total war ever break out again - no matter how - our two countries will be the primary target. It is an ironic but accurate fact that the two strongest powers are the two in the most danger of devastation. All we have built, all we have worked for, would be destroyed in the first 24 hours. And even in the cold war, which brings burdens and dangers to so many countries, including this Nation's closest allies, our two countries bear the heaviest burdens. For we are both devoting massive sums of money to weapons that could be better devoted to combat ignorance, poverty, and disease. We are both caught up in a vicious and dangerous cycle, with suspicion on one side breeding suspicion on the other, and new weapons begetting counter-weapons. In short, both the United States and its allies, and the Soviet Union and its allies, have a mutually deep interest in a just and genuine peace and in halting the arms race. Agreements to this end are in the interests of the Soviet Union as well as ours. And even the most hostile nations can be relied upon to accept and keep those treaty obligations, and only those treaty obligations, which are in their own interest.

So let us not be blind to our differences, but let us also direct attention to our common interests and the means by which those differences can be resolved. And if we cannot end now our differences, at least we can help make the world safe for diversity. For in the final analysis, our most basic common link is that we all inhabit this small planet. We all breathe the same air. We all cherish our children's futures. And we are all mortal.

Third, let us reexamine our attitude towards the cold war, remembering we're not engaged in a debate, seeking to pile up debating points. We are not here distributing blame or pointing the finger of judgment. We must deal with the world as it is, and not as it might have been had the history of the last 18 years been different. We must, therefore, persevere in the search for peace in the hope that constructive changes within the Communist bloc might bring within reach solutions which now seem beyond us. We must conduct our affairs in such a way that it becomes in the Communists' interest to agree on a genuine peace. And above all, while defending our own vital interests, nuclear powers must avert those confrontations which bring an adversary to a choice of either a humiliating retreat or a nuclear war. To adopt that kind of course in the nuclear age would be evidence only of the bankruptcy of our policy - or of a collective death-wish for the world.

To secure these ends, America's weapons are nonprovocative, carefully controlled, designed to deter, and capable of selective use. Our military forces are committed to peace and disciplined in self-restraint. Our diplomats are instructed to avoid unnecessary irritants and purely rhetorical hostility. For we can seek a relaxation of tensions without relaxing our guard. And, for our part, we do not need to use threats to prove we are resolute. We do not

need to jam foreign broadcasts out of fear our faith will be eroded. We are unwilling to impose our system on any unwilling people, but we are willing and able to engage in peaceful competition with any people on earth.

Meanwhile, we seek to strengthen the United Nations, to help solve its financial problems, to make it a more effective instrument for peace, to develop it into a genuine world security system - a system capable of resolving disputes on the basis of law, of insuring the security of the large and the small, and of creating conditions under which arms can finally be abolished. At the same time we seek to keep peace inside the non-Communist world, where many nations, all of them our friends, are divided over issues which weaken Western unity, which invite Communist intervention, or which threaten to erupt into war. Our efforts in West New Guinea, in the Congo, in the Middle East, and the Indian subcontinent, have been persistent and patient despite criticism from both sides.

9 - Lyndon B. Johnson, "Address to the Nation" - March 31, 1968

I believe that a peaceful Asia is far nearer to reality because of what America has done in Vietnam. I believe that the men who endure the dangers of battle - fighting there for us tonight - are helping the entire world avoid far greater conflicts, far wider wars, far more destruction, than this one.

The peace that will bring them home someday will come. Tonight I have offered the first in what I hope will be a series of mutual moves toward peace.

I pray that it will not be rejected by the leaders of North Vietnam. I pray that they will accept it as a means by which the sacrifices of their own people may be ended. And I ask your help and your support, my fellow citizens, for this effort to reach across the battlefield toward an early peace.

Finally, my fellow Americans, let me say this:

Of those to whom much is given, much is asked. I cannot say and no man could say that no more will be asked of us.

Yet, I believe that now, no less than when the decade began, this generation of Americans is willing to "pay any price, bear any burden, meet any hardship, support any friend, oppose any foe to assure the survival and the success of liberty."

Since those words were spoken by John F. Kennedy, the people of America have kept that compact with mankind's noblest cause.

And we shall continue to keep it.

Yet, I believe that we must always be mindful of this one thing, whatever the trials and the tests ahead. The ultimate strength of our country and our cause will lie not in powerful weapons or infinite resources or boundless wealth, but will lie in the unity of our people.

This I believe very deeply.

Throughout my entire public career I have followed the personal philosophy that I am a free man, an American, a public servant, and a member of my party, in that order always and only.

For 37 years in the service of our Nation, first as a Congressman, as a Senator, and as Vice President, and now as your President, I have put the unity of the people first. I have put it ahead of any divisive partisanship.

And in these times as in times before, it is true that a house divided against itself by the spirit of faction, of party, of region, of religion, of race, is a house that cannot stand.

There is division in the American house now. There is divisiveness among us all tonight. And holding the trust that is mine, as President of all the people, I cannot disregard the peril to the progress of the American people and the hope and the prospect of peace for all peoples.

So, I would ask all Americans, whatever their personal interests or concern, to guard against divisiveness and all its ugly consequences.

Fifty-two months and 10 days ago, in a moment of tragedy and trauma, the duties of this office fell upon me. I asked then for your help and God's, that we might continue America on its course, binding up our wounds, healing our history, moving forward in new unity, to clear the American agenda and to keep the American commitment for all of our people.

United we have kept that commitment. United we have enlarged that commitment.

Through all time to come, I think America will be a stronger nation, a more just society, and a land of greater opportunity and fulfillment because of what we have all done together in these years of unparalleled achievement.

Our reward will come in the life of freedom, peace, and hope that our children will enjoy through ages ahead.

What we won when all of our people united just must not now be lost in suspicion, distrust, selfishness, and politics among any of our people.

Believing this as I do, I have concluded that I should not permit the Presidency to become involved in the partisan divisions that are developing in this political year.

With America's sons in the fields far away, with America's future under challenge right here at home, with our hopes and the world's hopes for peace in the balance every day, I do not believe that I should devote an hour or a day of my time to any personal partisan causes or to any duties other than the awesome duties of this office - the Presidency of your country.

Accordingly, I shall not seek, and I will not accept, the nomination of my party for another term as your President.

But let men everywhere know, however, that a strong, a confident, and a vigilant America stands ready tonight to seek an honorable peace - and stands ready tonight to defend an honored cause - whatever the price, whatever the burden, whatever the sacrifice that duty may require.

Thank you for listening.

Good night and God bless all of you.

10 - Richard Nixon, "Address to the Nation on the War in Vietnam" - November 3, 1969

At the time we launched our search for peace I recognized we might not succeed in bringing an end to the war through negotiation. I, therefore, put into effect another plan to bring peace - a plan which will bring the war to an end regardless of what happens on the negotiating front.

It is in line with a major shift in U.S. foreign policy which I described in my press conference at Guam on July 25. Let me briefly explain what has been described as the Nixon Doctrine - a policy which not only will help end the war in Vietnam, but which is an essential element of our program to prevent future Vietnams.

We Americans are a do-it-yourself people. We are an impatient people. Instead of teaching someone else to do a job, we like to do it ourselves. And this trait has been carried over into our foreign policy.

In Korea and again in Vietnam, the United States furnished most of the money, most of the arms, and most of the men to help the people of those countries defend their freedom against Communist aggression.

Before any American troops were committed to Vietnam, a leader of another Asian country expressed this opinion to me when I was traveling in Asia as a private citizen. He said: "When you are trying to assist another nation defend its freedom, U.S. policy should be to help them fight the war but not to fight the war for them."

Well, in accordance with this wise counsel, I laid down in Guam three principles as guidelines for future American policy toward Asia:

- First, the United States will keep all of its treaty commitments.
- Second, we shall provide a shield if a nuclear power threatens the freedom of a nation allied with us or of a nation whose survival we consider vital to our security.
- Third, in cases involving other types of aggression, we shall furnish military and economic assistance when requested in accordance with our treaty commitments. But we shall look to the nation directly threatened to assume the primary responsibility of providing the manpower for its defense.

After I announced this policy, I found that the leaders of the Philippines, Thailand, Vietnam, South Korea, and other nations which might be threatened by Communist aggression, welcomed this new direction in American foreign policy.

The defense of freedom is everybody's business - not just America's business. And it is particularly the responsibility of the people whose freedom is threatened. In the previous administration, we Americanized the war in Vietnam. In this administration, we are Vietnamizing the search for peace.

The policy of the previous administration not only resulted in our assuming the primary responsibility for fighting the war, but even more significantly did not adequately stress the goal of strengthening the South Vietnamese so that they could defend themselves when we left.

The Vietnamization plan was launched following Secretary Laird's visit to Vietnam in March. Under the plan, I ordered first a substantial increase in the training and equipment of South Vietnamese forces.

In July, on my visit to Vietnam, I changed General Abrams' orders so that they were consistent with the objectives of our new policies. Under the new orders, the primary mission of our troops is to enable the South Vietnamese forces to assume the full responsibility for the

security of South Vietnam.

Our air operations have been reduced by over 20 percent.

And now we have begun to see the results of this long overdue change in American policy in Vietnam:

- After 5 years of Americans going into Vietnam, we are finally bringing American men home. By December 15, over 60,000 men will have been withdrawn from South Vietnam including 20 percent of all of our combat forces.
- The South Vietnamese have continued to gain in strength. As a result they have been able to take over combat responsibilities from our American troops.

Two other significant developments have occurred since this administration took office.

- Enemy infiltration, infiltration which is essential if they are to launch a major attack, over the last 3 months is less than 20 percent of what it was over the same period last year.
- Most important - United States casualties have declined during the last 2 months to the lowest point in 3 years.

Let me now turn to our program for the future.

We have adopted a plan which we have worked out in cooperation with the South Vietnamese for the complete withdrawal of all U.S. combat ground forces, and their replacement by South Vietnamese forces on an orderly scheduled timetable. This withdrawal will be made from strength and not from weakness. As South Vietnamese forces become stronger, the rate of American withdrawal can become greater.

I have not and do not intend to announce the timetable for our program. And there are obvious reasons for this decision which I am sure you will understand. As I have indicated on several occasions, the rate of withdrawal will depend on developments on three fronts.

One of these is the progress which can be or might be made in the Paris talks. An announcement of a fixed timetable for our withdrawal would completely remove any incentive for the enemy to negotiate an agreement. They would simply wait until our forces had withdrawn and then move in.

The other two factors on which we will base our withdrawal decisions are the level of enemy activity and the progress of the training programs of the South Vietnamese forces.

11 - Jimmy Carter, "Commencement Speech Given at Notre Dame University" - May 22, 1977

For too many years, we've been willing to adopt the flawed and erroneous principles and tactics of our adversaries, sometimes abandoning our own values for theirs. We've fought fire with fire, never thinking that fire is better quenched with water. This approach failed, with Vietnam the best example of its intellectual and moral poverty. But through failure we have now found our way back to our own principles and values, and we have regained our lost confidence.

By the measure of history, our Nation's 200 years are very brief, and our rise to world eminence is briefer still. It dates from 1945, when Europe and the old international order lay in ruins. Before then, America was largely on the periphery of world affairs. But since then, we have inescapably been at the center of world affairs.

Our policy during this period was guided by two principles: a belief that Soviet expansion was almost inevitable but that it must be contained, and the corresponding belief in the importance of an almost exclusive alliance among non-Communist nations on both sides of the Atlantic. That system could not last forever unchanged. Historical trends have weakened its foundation. The unifying threat of conflict with the Soviet Union has become less intensive, even though the competition has become more extensive.

The Vietnamese war produced a profound moral crisis, sapping worldwide faith in our own policy and our system of life, a crisis of confidence made even more grave by the covert pessimism of some of our leaders.

In less than a generation, we've seen the world change dramatically. The daily lives and aspirations of most human beings have been transformed. Colonialism is nearly gone. A new sense of national identity now exists in almost 100 new countries that have been formed in the last generation. Knowledge has become more widespread. Aspirations are higher. As more people have been freed from traditional constraints, more have been determined to achieve, for the first time in their lives, social justice.

The world is still divided by ideological disputes, dominated by regional conflicts, and threatened by danger that we will not resolve the differences of race and wealth without violence or without drawing into combat the major military powers. We can no longer separate the traditional issues of war and peace from the new global questions of justice, equity, and human rights.

It is a new world, but America should not fear it. It is a new world, and we should help to shape it. It is a new world that calls for a new American foreign policy - a policy based on constant decency in its values and on optimism in our historical vision.

We can no longer have a policy solely for the industrial nations as the foundation of global stability, but we must respond to the new reality of a politically awakening world.

We can no longer expect that the other 150 nations will follow the dictates of the powerful, but we must continue - confidently - our efforts to inspire, to persuade, and to lead.

Our policy must reflect our belief that the world can hope for more than simple survival and our belief that dignity and freedom are fundamental spiritual requirements. Our policy must shape an international system that will last longer than secret deals.

We cannot make this kind of policy by manipulation. Our policy must be open; it must be candid; it must be one of constructive global involvement, resting on five cardinal principles.

I've tried to make these premises clear to the American people since last January. Let me review what we have been doing and discuss what we intend to do.

First, we have reaffirmed America's commitment to human rights as a fundamental tenet of our foreign policy. In ancestry, religion, color, place of origin, and cultural background, we Americans are as diverse a nation as the world has even seen. No common mystique of blood or soil unites us. What draws us together, perhaps more than anything else, is a belief in human freedom. We want the world to know that our Nation stands for more than financial prosperity.

This does not mean that we can conduct our foreign policy by rigid moral maxims. We live in a world that is imperfect and which will always be imperfect - a world that is complex and confused and which will always be complex and confused.

I understand fully the limits of moral suasion. We have no illusion that changes will come easily or soon. But I also believe that it is a mistake to undervalue the power of words and of the ideas that words embody. In our own history, that power has ranged from Thomas Paine's "Common Sense" to Martin Luther King, Jr.'s "I Have a Dream."

In the life of the human spirit, words are action, much more so than many of us may realize who live in countries where freedom of expression is taken for granted. The leaders of totalitarian nations understand this very well. The proof is that words are precisely the action for which dissidents in those countries are being persecuted.

12 - Ronald Reagan, "Remarks at the Annual Convention of the National Association of Evangelicals" - March 8, 1983

During my first press conference as president, in answer to a direct question, I pointed out that, as good Marxist-Leninists, the Soviet leaders have openly and publicly declared that the only morality they recognize is that which will further their cause, which is world revolution. I think I should point out I was only quoting Lenin, their guiding spirit, who said in 1920 that they repudiate all morality that proceeds from supernatural ideas – that's their name for religion - or ideas that are outside class conceptions. Morality is entirely subordinate to the interests of class war. And everything is moral that is necessary for the annihilation of the old, exploiting social order and for uniting the proletariat.

Well, I think the refusal of many influential people to accept this elementary fact of Soviet doctrine illustrates a historical reluctance to see totalitarian powers for what they are. We saw this phenomenon in the 1930s. We see it too often today.

This doesn't mean we should isolate ourselves and refuse to seek an understanding with them. I intend to do everything I can to persuade them of our peaceful intent, to remind them that it was the West that refused to use its nuclear monopoly in the forties and fifties for territorial gain and which now proposes 50 percent cut in strategic ballistic missiles and the elimination of an entire class of land-based, intermediate-range nuclear missiles.

At the same time, however, they must be made to understand we will never compromise our principles and standards. We will never give away our freedom. We will never abandon our belief in God. And we will never stop searching for a genuine peace. But we can assure none of these things America stands for through the so-called nuclear freeze solutions proposed by some.

The truth is that a freeze now would be a very dangerous fraud, for that is merely the illusion of peace. The reality is that we must find peace through strength.

I would agree to a freeze if only we could freeze the Soviets' global desires. A freeze at current levels of weapons would remove any incentive for the Soviets to negotiate seriously in Geneva and virtually end our chances to achieve the major arms reductions which we have proposed. Instead, they would achieve their objectives through the freeze.

A freeze would reward the Soviet Union for its enormous and unparalleled military buildup. It would prevent the essential and long overdue modernization of United States and allied defenses and would leave our aging forces increasingly vulnerable. And an honest freeze would require extensive prior negotiations on the systems and numbers to be limited and on the measures to ensure effective verification and compliance. And the kind of a freeze that has been suggested would be virtually impossible to verify. Such a major effort would divert us completely from our current negotiations on achieving substantial reductions.

A number of years ago, I heard a young father, a very prominent young man in the entertainment world, addressing a tremendous gathering in California. It was during the time of the cold war, and communism and our own way of life were very much on people's minds. And he was speaking to that subject. And suddenly, though, I heard him saying, "I love my little girls more than anything." And I said to myself, "Oh, no, don't. You can't - don't say that." But I had underestimated him. He went on: "I would rather see my little girls die now; still believing in God, than have them grow up under communism and one day die no longer believing in God."

There were thousands of young people in that audience. They came to their feet with shouts of joy. They had instantly recognized the profound truth in what he had said, with regard to the physical and the soul and what was truly important.

Yes, let us pray for the salvation of all of those who live in that totalitarian darkness. Pray they will discover the joy of knowing God. But until they do, let us be aware that while they preach the supremacy of the State, declare its omnipotence over individual man, and predict its eventual domination of all peoples on the earth, they are the focus of evil in the modern world.

It was C.S. Lewis who, in his unforgettable Screw Tape Letters, wrote: “The greatest evil is not done now in those sordid ‘dens of crime’ that Dickens loved to paint. It is not even done in concentration camps and labor camps. In those we see its final result. But it is conceived and ordered; moved, seconded, carried and minuted in clear, carpeted, warmed, and well-lighted offices, by quiet men with white collars and cut fingernails and smooth-shaven cheeks who do not need to raise their voice.”

Well, because these quiet men do not raise their voices, because they sometimes speak in soothing tones of brotherhood and peace, because, like other dictators before them, they're always making “their final territorial demand,” some would have us accept them at their word and accommodate ourselves to their aggressive impulses. But if history teaches anything, it teaches that simpleminded appeasement or wishful thinking about our adversaries is folly. It means the betrayal of our past, the squandering of our freedom.

So, I urge you to speak out against those who would place the United States in a position of military and moral inferiority. You know, I've always believed that old Screw Tape reserved his best efforts for those of you in the Church. So, in your discussions of the nuclear freeze proposals, I urge you to beware the temptation of pride - the temptation of blithely declaring yourselves above it all and label both sides equally at fault, to ignore the facts of history and the aggressive impulses of an evil empire, to simply call the arms race a giant misunderstanding and thereby remove yourself from the struggle between right and wrong and good and evil.

13 - Mikhail Gorbachev, "Speech to the United Nations" - December 7, 1988

Finally, being on U.S. soil, but also for other, understandable reasons, I cannot but turn to the subject of our relations with this great country. I had a chance to appreciate the full measure of its hospitality during my memorable visit to Washington exactly a year ago.

Relations between the Soviet Union and the United States of America span five and a half decades. The world has changed, and so have the nature, role, and place of these relations in world politics. For too long they were built under the banner of confrontation, and sometimes of hostility, either open or concealed. But in the last few years, throughout the world people were able to heave a sigh of relief, thanks to the changes for the better in the substance and atmosphere of the relations between Moscow and Washington.

No one intends to underestimate the serious nature of the disagreements, and the difficulties of the problems which have not been settled. However, we have already graduated from the primary school of instruction in mutual understanding and in searching for solutions in both our own and common interests. The U.S.S.R. and the United States created the biggest nuclear missile arsenals, but after objectively recognizing their responsibility, they were able to be the first to conclude an agreement on the reduction and physical destruction of a proportion of these weapons, which threatened both themselves and everyone else.

Both sides possess the biggest and the most refined military secrets. But it is they who have laid the basis for and are developing a system of mutual verification with regard to both the destruction and the limiting and banning of armaments production. It is they who are amassing experience for future bilateral and multilateral agreements. We value this.

We acknowledge and value the contribution of President Ronald Reagan and the members of his administration, above all Mr. George Shultz. All this is capital that has been invested in a joint undertaking of historic importance. It must not be wasted or left out of circulation. The future U.S. administration headed by newly elected President George Bush will find in us a partner, ready - without long pauses and backward movements - to continue the dialogue in a spirit of realism, openness, and goodwill, and with a striving for concrete results, over an agenda encompassing the key issues of Soviet-U.S. relations and international politics.

We are talking first and foremost about consistent progress toward concluding a treaty on a 50 percent reduction in strategic offensive weapons, while retaining the ABM Treaty; about elaborating a convention on the elimination of chemical weapons - here, it seems to us, we have the preconditions for making 1989 the decisive year; and about talks on reducing conventional weapons and armed forces in Europe. We are also talking about economic, ecological and humanitarian problems in the widest possible sense. [...]

We are not inclined to oversimplify the situation in the world. Yes, the tendency toward disarmament has received a strong impetus, and this process is gaining its own momentum, but it has not become irreversible. Yes, the striving to give up confrontation in favor of dialogue and cooperation has made itself strongly felt, but it has by no means secured its position forever in the practice of international relations. Yes, the movement toward a nuclear-free and nonviolent world is capable of fundamentally transforming the political and spiritual face of the planet, but only the very first steps have been taken. Moreover, in certain influential circles, they have been greeted with mistrust, and they are meeting resistance.

The inheritance of inertia of the past are continuing to operate. Profound contradictions and the roots of many conflicts have not disappeared. The fundamental fact

remains that the formation of the peaceful period will take place in conditions of the existence and rivalry of various socioeconomic and political systems. However, the meaning of our international efforts, and one of the key tenets of the new thinking, is precisely to impart to this rivalry the quality of sensible competition in conditions of respect for freedom of choice and a balance of interests. In this case it will even become useful and productive from the viewpoint of general world development; otherwise, if the main component remains the arms race, as it has been till now, rivalry will be fatal. Indeed, an ever greater number of people throughout the world, from the man in the street to leaders, are beginning to understand this.

Esteemed Mr. Chairman, esteemed delegates: I finish my first speech at the United Nations with the same feeling with which I began it: a feeling of responsibility to my own people and to the world community. We have met at the end of a year that has been so significant for the United Nations, and on the threshold of a year from which all of us expect so much. One would like to believe that our joint efforts to put an end to the era of wars, confrontation and regional conflicts, aggression against nature, the terror of hunger and poverty, as well as political terrorism, will be comparable with our hopes. This is our common goal, and it is only by acting together that we may attain it.

Thank you.

14 - George H. W. Bush, "Address to the Nation on the Invasion of Iraq" - January 16, 1991

I had hoped that when the United States Congress, in historic debate, took its resolute action, Saddam would realize he could not prevail and would move out of Kuwait in accord with the United Nation resolutions. He did not do that. Instead, he remained intransigent, certain that time was on his side.

Saddam was warned over and over again to comply with the will of the United Nations: Leave Kuwait, or be driven out. Saddam has arrogantly rejected all warnings. Instead, he tried to make this a dispute between Iraq and the United States of America.

Well, he failed. Tonight, 28 nations - countries from 5 continents, Europe and Asia, Africa, and the Arab League - have forces in the Gulf area standing shoulder to shoulder against Saddam Hussein. These countries had hoped the use of force could be avoided. Regrettably, we now believe that only force will make him leave.

Prior to ordering our forces into battle, I instructed our military commanders to take every necessary step to prevail as quickly as possible, and with the greatest degree of protection possible for American and allied service men and women. I've told the American people before that this will not be another Vietnam, and I repeat this here tonight. Our troops will have the best possible support in the entire world, and they will not be asked to fight with one hand tied behind their back. I'm hopeful that this fighting will not go on for long and that casualties will be held to an absolute minimum.

This is an historic moment. We have in this past year made great progress in ending the long era of conflict and cold war. We have before us the opportunity to forge for ourselves and for future generations a new world order - a world where the rule of law, not the law of the jungle, governs the conduct of nations. When we are successful - and we will be - we have a real chance at this new world order, an order in which a credible United Nations can use its peacekeeping role to fulfill the promise and vision of the U.N.'s founders.

We have no argument with the people of Iraq. Indeed, for the innocents caught in this conflict, I pray for their safety. Our goal is not the conquest of Iraq. It is the liberation of Kuwait. It is my hope that somehow the Iraqi people can, even now, convince their dictator that he must lay down his arms, leave Kuwait, and let Iraq itself rejoin the family of peace-loving nations.

Thomas Paine wrote many years ago: "These are the times that try men's souls" Those well-known words are so very true today. But even as planes of the multinational forces attack Iraq, I prefer to think of peace, not war. I am convinced not only that we will prevail but that out of the horror of combat will come the recognition that no nation can stand against a world united, no nation will be permitted to brutally assault its neighbor.

No President can easily commit our sons and daughters to war. They are the Nation's finest. Ours is an all-volunteer force, magnificently trained, highly motivated. The troops know why they're there. And listen to what they say, for they've said it better than any President or Prime Minister ever could.

Listen to Hollywood Huddleston, Marine lance corporal. He says, "Let's free these people, so we can go home and be free again." And he's right. The terrible crimes and tortures committed by Saddam's henchmen against the innocent people of Kuwait are an affront to mankind and a challenge to the freedom of all.

Listen to one of our great officers out there, Marine Lieutenant General Walter Boomer. He said: "There are things worth fighting for. A world in which brutality and

lawlessness are allowed to go unchecked isn't the kind of world we're going to want to live in."

Listen to Master Sergeant J.P. Kendall of the 82d Airborne: "We're here for more than just the price of a gallon of gas. What we're doing is going to chart the future of the world for the next 100 years. It's better to deal with this guy now than five years from now."

And finally, we should all sit up and listen to Jackie Jones, an Army lieutenant, when she says, "If we let him get away with this, who knows what's going to be next?"

I have called upon Hollywood and Walter and J.P. and Jackie and all their courageous comrades-in-arms to do what must be done. Tonight, America and the world are deeply grateful to them and to their families. And let me say to everyone listening or watching tonight: When the troops we've sent in finish their work, I am determined to bring them home as soon as possible.

Tonight, as our forces fight, they and their families are in our prayers. May God bless each and every one of them, and the coalition forces at our side in the Gulf, and may He continue to bless our nation, the United States of America.

15 - William J. Clinton, "Remarks at Freedom House" - October 6, 1995

American efforts in Bosnia, the Middle East, and Haiti and elsewhere have required investments of time and energy and resources. They've required persistent diplomacy and the measured use of the world's strongest military. They have required both determination and flexibility in our efforts to work as leaders and to work with other nations. And sometimes they've called on us to make decisions that were, of necessity, unpopular in the short run, knowing that the payoff would not come in days or weeks but months or years. Sometimes they have been difficult for many Americans to understand because they have to be made, as many decisions did right after World War II, without the benefit of some overarching framework, the kind of framework the bipolar cold war world provided for so many years.

To use the popular analogy of the present day, there seems to be no mainframe explanation for the PC world in which we're living. We have to drop the abstractions and dogma and pursue, based on trial and error and persistent experimentation, a policy that advances our values of freedom and democracy, peace, and security.

We must continue to bear the responsibility of the world's leadership. That is what you came here to do, and that's what I want to discuss today. It is more than a happy coincidence that the birth of bipartisan support for America's leadership in the world coincides with the founding of this organization by Eleanor Roosevelt and Wendell Willkie in 1941 when for the first time Americans, both Democrats and Republicans, liberals and conservatives and moderates, understood our special obligation to lead in the world.

The results of responsible U.S. leadership during the 1940s were truly stunning: victory in the war and the construction of a post-war world. Not with abstract dogma but again, over a 5-year period, basing experience on new realities, through trial and error with a relentless pursuit of our own values, we created NATO, the Marshall Plan, Bretton Woods, the institutions that kept the peace in Europe, avoided nuclear conflict, helped to spread democracy, brought us unparalleled prosperity, and ultimately ensured the triumph of freedom in the cold war.

In that struggle, Freedom House and organizations like it reminded Americans that our values and our interests are one and the same. Promoting democracies that participate in this new global marketplace is the right thing to do. For all their imperfections, they advance what all people want and often fight and die for: human dignity, security, and prosperity. We know these democracies are less likely to go to war, less likely to traffic in terrorism, more likely to stand against the forces of hatred and intolerance and organized destruction.

Throughout what we now call the American century, Republicans and Democrats disagreed on specific policies, often heatedly from time to time, but we have always agreed on the need for American leadership in the cause of democracy, freedom, security, and prosperity. Now that consensus is truly in danger, and interestingly enough, it is in danger in both parties. Voices from the left and the right are calling on us to step back from, instead of stepping up to, the challenges of the present day. They threaten to reverse the bipartisan support for our leadership that has been essential to our strength for 50 years. Some really believe that after the cold war the United States can play a secondary role in the world, just as some thought we could after World War II, and some made sure we did after World War I.

But if you look at the results from Bosnia to Haiti, from the Middle East to Northern Ireland, it proves once again that American leadership is indispensable and that without it our values, our interests, and peace itself would be at risk.

It has now become a truism to blame the current isolationism on the end of the cold war because there is no longer a mainframe threat in this PC world. But when I took office, I made it clear that we had a lot of work to do to get our own house in order.

I agree that America has challenges at home that have to be addressed. We have to revive our economy and create opportunity for all of our citizens. We have to put responsibility back in our social programs and strengthen our families and our communities. We have to reform our own Government to make it leaner and more effective. But we cannot do any of these things in isolation from the world which we have done so much to make and which we must continue to lead.

16 - George W. Bush, "Address to a Joint Session of Congress" - September 20, 2001

Americans are asking: "Why do they hate us?" They hate what they see right here in this chamber, a democratically elected government. Their leaders are self-appointed. They hate our freedoms, our freedom of religion, our freedom of speech, our freedom to vote and assemble and disagree with each other.

They want to overthrow existing governments in many Moslem countries such as Egypt, Saudi Arabia and Jordan. They want to drive Israel out of the Middle East. They want to drive Christians and Jews out of vast regions of Asia and Africa.

These terrorists kill not merely to end lives but to disrupt and end a way of life. With every atrocity they hope that America grows fearful, retreating from the world and forsaking our friends. They stand against us because we stand in their way.

We are not deceived by their pretenses to piety.

We have seen their kind before. They are the heirs of all the murderous ideologies of the twentieth century. By sacrificing human life to serve their radical visions, by abandoning every value except the will to power, they follow the path of fascism, Nazism, and totalitarianism. And they will follow that path all the way to where it ends in history's unmarked grave of discarded lies. Americans are asking: "How do we fight and win this war?"

We will direct every resource at our command, every means of diplomacy, every tool of intelligence, every instrument of law enforcement, every financial influence and every necessary weapon of war to the disruption and to the defeat of the global terror network.

Now, this war will not be like the war against Iraq a decade ago with the decisive liberation of territory and a swift conclusion. It will not look like the air war above Kosovo two years ago where no ground troops were used and not a single American was lost in combat.

Our response involves far more than instant retaliation and isolated strikes. Americans should not expect one battle but a lengthy campaign unlike any other we have ever seen. It may include dramatic strikes, visible on TV and covert operations secret even in success.

We will starve terrorists of funding, turn them one against another, drive them from place to place until there is no refuge or no rest.

And we will pursue nations that provide aid or safe havens to terrorism. Every nation in every region now has a decision to make: Either you are with us or you are with the terrorists.

From this day forward, any nation that continues to harbor or support terrorism will be regarded by the United States as a hostile regime. Our nation has been put on notice: we are not immune from attack. We will take offensive measures against terrorism to protect Americans. Today dozens of federal departments and agencies as well as state and local governments have responsibilities affecting homeland security.

These efforts must be coordinated at the highest level. So tonight I announce the creation of a Cabinet-level position reporting directly to me, the Office of Homeland Security and tonight I also announce the distinguished American to lead this effort, to strengthen American security, a military veteran, an effective governor, a true patriot, a trusted friend, Pennsylvania's Tom Ridge.

He will lead, oversee and coordinate a comprehensive national strategy to safeguard our country against terrorism and respond to any attack that may come. These measures are essential. The only way to defeat terrorism as a threat to our way of life is to stop it, eliminate it and destroy it where it grows.

Many will be involved in this effort from FBI agents to intelligence operatives to the reservists we have called to active duty. All deserve our thanks and all have our prayers. And tonight, a few miles from the damaged Pentagon, I have a message for our military: Be ready. I have called the armed forces to alert and there is a reason.

The hour is coming when America will act and you will make us proud.

This is not, however, just America's fight. And what is at stake is not just America's freedom. This is the world's fight, this is civilization's fight. This is the fight of all who believe in progress and pluralism, tolerance, and freedom.

We ask every nation to join us.

We will ask and we will need the help of police forces, intelligence service and banking systems all around the world. The United States is grateful that many nations and many international organizations have already responded with sympathy and with support - nations from Latin America to Asia, to Africa, to Europe, to the Islamic world.

Perhaps the NATO charter reflects best the attitude of the world: An attack on one is an attack on all. The civilized world is rallying to America's side.

They understand that if this goes unpunished, their own cities, their own citizens may be next. Terror unanswered cannot only bring down buildings, it can threaten the stability of legitimate governments. And you know what? We're not going to allow it.

17 - Secretary of Defense Robert M. Gates, World Forum on the Future of Democracy, Williamsburg - September 17, 2007

When I retired from government in 1993, it seemed that the success and spread of democracy was inexorable, a foregone conclusion – that with the collapse of the Soviet Union, the evolution of political systems had reached, in the words of one scholar at the time, the “end of history.” But the relative calm in the immediate aftermath of the Cold War served only to mask new threats to the security of democratic nations: ethnic conflicts, new genocides, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction – especially by rogue states and, above all, a new, more formidable, and more malignant form of terrorism embraced by Islamic extremists.

These new threats, and in particular, the conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan, and the wider challenge of dealing with radical jihadist movements since September 11th, once again have people talking about the competing impulses in U.S. foreign policy: realism versus idealism, freedom versus security, values versus interests.

This is not a new debate. Not long after winning our own independence, the U.S. was faced with how to respond to the French Revolution – an issue that consumed the politics of the country during the 1790s. The issue was whether to support the revolutionary government and its war against an alliance of European monarchies led by Great Britain. To many, like Thomas Jefferson, the French Revolution, with its stated ideals of liberty, equality, and fraternity, seemed a natural successor to our own. Jefferson wrote that “this ball of liberty, I believe most piously, is now so well in motion that it will roll round the globe.”

John Adams and the Federalists, however, were just as adamantly opposed. They were appalled by the revolution’s excesses and feared the spread of violent French radicalism to our shores. In fact, they accused the Jeffersonians of being “pimps of France,” who “represented cutthroats who walk in rags.” The Federalists mocked Jefferson for his rhetorical defense of freedom and equality across the Atlantic while he continued to own slaves. Adams and Alexander Hamilton were, in turn, accused of being crypto-monarchists.

It was left to President George Washington to resolve the matter. He had said that: “My best wishes are irresistibly excited whensoever, in any country, I see an oppressed nation unfurl the banners of freedom.” But the European wars and, in particular, our estrangement from the British, had begun to disrupt the lives of ordinary Americans by impeding trade and causing riots and refugees. Washington, understanding the fragility of America’s position at the time, adopted a neutrality policy toward France and would go on to make a peace treaty with Great Britain – sparking massive protests and accusations of selling out the spirit of 1776.

Consider the great historic irony: The United States had recently broken free of the British monarchy only with the help of an absolutist French king. Yet when France itself turned in the direction of popular rule and was confronted by Europe’s monarchies, the United States took a pass and made amends with our old British foe.

In short, from our earliest days, America’s leaders have struggled with “realistic” versus “idealistic” approaches to the international challenges facing us. The most successful leaders, starting with Washington, have steadfastly encouraged the spread of liberty, democracy, and human rights. At the same time, however, they have fashioned policies blending different approaches with different emphases in different places and different times.

Over the last century, we have allied with tyrants to defeat other tyrants. We have sustained diplomatic relations with governments even as we supported those attempting their overthrow.

We have at times made human rights the centerpiece of our national strategy even as we did business with some of the worst violators of human rights. We have worked with authoritarian governments to advance our own security interests even while urging them to reform.

We have used our military to eliminate governments seen as a threat to our national security, to undo aggression, to end ethnic slaughter, and to prevent chaos. In recent times, we have done this in Grenada, Panama, Kuwait, the Balkans, Haiti, Afghanistan, and Iraq. In the process, we have brought the possibility of democracy and freedom to tens of millions more who had been oppressed or were suffering.

To win and protect our own freedom, the United States has made common cause with countries that were far from free – from Louis XVI, to one of history’s true monsters, Joseph Stalin. Without the one there is no American independence. Without the other, no end to the Third Reich. It is neither hypocrisy nor cynicism to believe fervently in freedom while adopting different approaches to advancing freedom at different times along the way – including temporarily making common cause with despots to defeat greater or more urgent threats to our freedom or interests.

The consuming goal of most of my professional life was containing the threat of the Soviet Union and seeing a Europe made whole and free. For most of the Cold War, the ideal surely seemed distant, even unreachable. One prominent columnist wrote in *Time* magazine in 1982 that “It would be wishful thinking to predict that international Communism someday will either self-destruct or so exhaust itself.”

During that struggle, as for most of our history, inspiring presidential rhetoric about freedom, along with many firm stands for human rights and self-determination, had to coexist with often grubby compromises and marriages of convenience that were necessary to stave off the Evil Empire.

Thank you.

**18 - Roger Cohen, "In the Seventh Year, as the Dust Cleared,"
International Herald Tribune - September 11, 2008**

And in the seventh year after the fall, the dust and debris of the towers cleared. And it became plain at last what had been wrought.

For the wreckage begat greed and it came to pass that while America's young men and women fought, other Americans enriched themselves. Beguiling the innocent, they did backdate options and they did package toxic mortgage securities and they did reprice risk on the basis that it no more existed than famine in a fertile land.

Thereby did the masters of the universe prosper, with gold, with silver shekels, with land rich in cattle and fowl, with illegal manservants and maids, with jewels and silk, with Gulfstream V business jets; yet the whole land did not prosper with them. And it came to pass, when the housing bubble burst, that Main Street had to pay for the Wall Street party.

For Bush ruled over the whole nation and so sure was he of his righteousness that he did neglect husbandry.

And he took his nation into desert wars and mountain wars but, Lo, he thought not to impose taxation, not one heifer nor sheep nor ox did Bush demand of the rich. And it came to pass that the nation fell into debt as boundless as the wickedness of Sodom. For everyone was maxed out.

So heavy was the burden of war and of bailing out Fannie Mae and financing debt with China that not one silver shekel remained to build bridges, nor airports, nor high-speed trains, nor roads, nor even to take care of wounded vets; and the warriors returning unto their homes from distant combat thought blight had fallen on the land.

So it was in the seventh year after the fall of the towers. And still Bush did raise his hands to the Lord and proclaim: "I will be proved right in the end!"

And around the whole earth, which had stood with America, there arose a great trouble for it seemed to peoples abroad that a great nation, rich in flocks and herds and land and water, had been cast among thorns and Philistines; its promise betrayed, its light dimmed, its armies stretched, its budget broken, its principles compromised, its dollar diminished.

And it came to pass that this profligate nation, drinking oil with an insatiable thirst, could not cure itself of his addiction, and so its wealth was transferred to other nations that did not always wish it well. Wherefore the balance of power in the world was altered in grievous ways; and new centers of authority arose, and they were no more persuaded by democracy than was the Pharaoh.

For Bush ruled over the whole nation and so sure was he of his righteousness that he did neglect the costs of wanton consumption. And he believed that if the Lord created fossil fuel, fossil fuel must flow without end, as surely as the grape will yield wine.

Therefore, in the seventh year after the fall, with 1,126 of the slain still unidentified, their very beings rendered unto dust, their souls inhabiting the air of New York, it seemed that one nation had become two; and loss, far from unifying the people, had sundered the nation.

For the rich, granted tax breaks more generous than any blessing, grew richer, and incomes in the middle ceased to rise, and workers saw jobs leaving the land for that region called Asia. And some fought wars while others shopped; and some got foreclosed while others got clothes; and still Bush spake but few listened.

Behold, so it was in the seventh year and it seemed that America was doubly smitten, from without and within. And, Lo, a strange thing did come to pass. For as surely as the seasons do alternate, so the ruler and party that have brought woe to a nation must give way to

others who can lead their people to plenty. How can the weary, flogged ass bear honey and balm and almonds and myrrh?

Yet many Americans believed the weary beast could still give them bounty. They did hold that a people called the French was really to blame. They did accuse a thing called the United Nations. They did curse the ungodly folk of Gotham and Hollywood and the sinful city of Chicago; and, Lo, they proclaimed God was Republican, and carried a gun, and understood (white) teenage sex, and almost certainly hailed from Alaska.

For Bush ruled over the nation and so sure was he of his righteousness that he did foster division until it raged like a plague.

And in the seventh year after the fall, the dust and debris of the towers cleared. And it became plain at last what had been wrought – but now how the damage would be undone.

19 - Barack Obama, "Inaugural Address" – January 20, 2009

As for our common defense, we reject as false the choice between our safety and our ideals. Our Founding Fathers, faced with perils we can scarcely imagine, drafted a charter to assure the rule of law and the rights of man, a charter expanded by the blood of generations. Those ideals still light the world, and we will not give them up for expedience's sake. And so to all other peoples and governments who are watching today, from the grandest capitals to the small village where my father was born: know that America is a friend of each nation and every man, woman, and child who seeks a future of peace and dignity, and that we are ready to lead once more.

Recall that earlier generations faced down fascism and communism not just missiles and tanks, but with sturdy alliance and enduring convictions. They understood that our power alone cannot protect us, nor does it entitle us to do as we please. Instead, they knew that our power grows through its prudent use; our security emanates from the justness of our cause, the force of our example, the tempering qualities of humility and restraint.

We are the keepers of this legacy. Guided by these principles once more, we can meet those new threats that demand even greater effort – even greater cooperation and understanding between nations. We will begin to responsibly leave Iraq to its people, and forge a hard-earned peace in Afghanistan. With old friends and former foes, we will work tirelessly to lessen the nuclear threat, and roll back the spectre of a warming planet. We will not apologize for our way of life, nor will we waver in its defense, and for those who seek to advance their aims by inducing terror and slaughtering innocents, we say to you now that our spirit is stronger and cannot be broken; you cannot outlast us, and we will defeat you.

For we know that our patchwork heritage is a strength, not a weakness. We are a nation of Christians and Muslims, Jews and Hindus – and non-believers. We are shaped by every language and culture, drawn from every end of this Earth; and because we have tasted the bitter swill of civil war and segregation, and emerged from that dark chapter stronger and more united, we cannot help but believe that old hatreds shall someday pass; that the lines of tribe shall soon dissolve; that as far the world grows smaller, our common humanity shall reveal itself and that America must play its role in ushering in a new era of peace.

To the Muslim world, we seek a new way forward, based on mutual interest and mutual respect. To those leaders around the globe who seek to sow conflict, or blame their society's ills on the West – know that your people will judge you on what you can build, not what you destroy. To those who cling to power through corruption and deceit and the silencing of dissent, know that you are on the wrong side of history; but that we will extend a hand if you are willing to unclench your fist.

To the people of poor nations, we pledge to work alongside you to make your farms flourish and let clean waters flow; to nourish starved bodies and feed hungry minds. And to those nations like ours that enjoy relative plenty, we say we can no longer afford indifference to suffering outside our borders; nor can we consume the world's resources without regard to effect. For the world has changed, and we must change with it.

As we consider the road that unfolds before us, we remember with humble gratitude those brave Americans who, at this very hour, patrol far-off deserts and distant mountains. They have something to tell us today, just as the fallen heroes who lie in Arlington whisper through the ages. We honor them not only because they are guardians of our liberty, but because they embody the spirit of service; a willingness to find meaning in something greater than themselves. And yet, at this moment – a moment that will define a generation – it is precisely this spirit that must inhabit us all.

20 - Joseph Biden, "Remarks at the 45th Munich Security Conference" - February 7, 2009

Our Founders understood then, and the United States believes now, that the example of our power must be matched by the power of our example. And that is why our administration rejects a false choice between our safety and our ideals. America will vigorously defend our security and our values, and in doing so we believe we'll all be more secure.

As hard as we try, I know - I know - that we're likely to fall short of our ideals in the future, just as we have in the past. But I commit to you, this administration will strive every day - every day - to honor the values that animate American democracy and, I might add, that bind us to all of you in this room.

America will not torture. We will uphold the rights of those who we bring to justice. And we will close the detention facility at Guantánamo Bay.

But tough choices lie ahead. As we seek a lasting framework for our common struggle against extremism, we'll have to work cooperatively with nations around the world - and we'll need your help. We'll need your help. For example, we will ask others to take responsibility for some of those now in Guantánamo, as we determine to close it. Our security is shared. And so, too, I respectfully suggest, is our responsibility to defend it.

That's the basis upon which we want to build a new approach to the challenges of this century. America will do more, but America will - that's the good news. The bad news is America will ask for more from our partners, as well.

Here's what we'll do, and what we hope our partners will consider.

First, we'll work in a partnership whenever we can, and alone only when we must. The threats we face have no respect for borders. No single country, no matter how powerful, can best meet these threats alone. We believe international alliances and organizations do not diminish America's power - we believe they help advance our collective security, economic interests and our values.

So we'll engage. We'll listen. We'll consult. America needs the world, just as I believe the world needs America. But we say to our friends that the alliances, treaties and international organizations we build must be credible and they must be effective. That requires a common commitment not only to listen and live by the rules, but to enforce the rules when they are, in fact, clearly violated.

Such a bargain is the bargain we seek. Such a bargain can be at the heart of our collective efforts to convince Iran, for example, to forego the development of nuclear weapons. The Iranian people are a great people; the Persian civilization is a great civilization. But Iran has acted in ways that are not conducive to peace in the region or to the prosperity of its own people. Its illicit nuclear program is but one of those manifestations.

Our administration is reviewing our policy toward Iran, but this much is clear: We will be willing to talk. We'll be willing to talk to Iran and to offer a very clear choice: Continue down the current course and there will be continued pressure and isolation; abandon the illicit nuclear program and your support for terrorism, and there will be meaningful incentives.

Second, we'll strive to act preventively, not preemptively, to avoid whenever possible, or wherever possible the choice of last resort between the risks of war and the dangers of inaction. We'll draw upon all the elements of our power - military and diplomatic, intelligence and law enforcement, economic and cultural - to stop crises from occurring

before they are in front of us. In short, we're going to attempt to recapture the totality of America's strength, starting with diplomacy.

On his second full day in office, President Obama, went to our State Department, where he stressed the centrality of diplomacy in our national security. The commitment can be seen in his appointments, starting with the Secretary of State, Hillary Clinton. It can be seen in the President's decision to name two of America's most tenacious diplomats - Senator George Mitchell and Ambassador Richard Holbrooke - to contend with two of the world's most urgent and vexing and complex challenges: the need for a secure, just, and lasting peace between Israel and the Palestinians, and the imperative of stopping the mountains between Afghanistan and Pakistan from providing a haven for terrorists.

Thirdly, America will extend a hand to those who, as the President said, will unclench their fist. The United States of America does not believe, our administration does not believe, in a clash of civilizations; there is nothing inevitable about that. We do see a shared struggle against extremism - and we'll do everything in our collective power to help the forces of tolerance prevail.

Chronology – Intervention

- 1946 George Frost Kennan, an attaché in the U.S. embassy in Moscow, sends his famous and very influential Long Telegram' on Soviet foreign policy.
March 5: Winston Churchill delivers a speech at Fulton, Missouri, in which he warns that an "Iron Curtain" is descending on Europe, dividing the continent into two blocs. Henry Wallace, the Secretary of Commerce, delivers a public speech in New York in which he voices his disagreement about the American foreign policy towards the Soviet Union and pleads for more cooperation.
- 1947 Truman announces his doctrine, containment, in conjunction with a request for aid to Greece and Turkey, who are no longer aided by Great Britain.
Secretary of State George Marshall proposes a plan for the economic recovery of Western Europe.

The *National Security Act* reorganizes the armed services into a *Department of Defense*, establishes the *National Security Council* (NSC) and creates the *Central Intelligence Agency* (CIA).
- 1948 Communist coup d'état in Czechoslovakia.
Beginning of the Berlin Blockade: the Soviet Union imposes a blockade on the Western sector of Berlin.
- 1949 The Senate ratifies American participation in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), a historic commitment for the United States, which had refused to join military alliances in time of peace since 1778.
Collapse of the Nationalist regime of Chang Kai-shek and creation of the Communist People's Republic of China.
- 1950 In Wheeling, West Virginia, Senator Joseph McCarthy accuses the State Department of being penetrated by Communists.
National Security Council Decision N°68 (NSC-68) is adopted. It calls for vast increases in defense spending in order to build up nuclear capacity as well as conventional forces to a point where the combined strength will be superior to that of the Soviet Union.
75,000 North Korean troops cross the thirty-eighth parallel and invade South Korea. American troops commanded by General MacArthur land in South Korea.
- 1953 End of the Korean War.
A CIA covert operation succeeds in toppling Mohammad Mossadeq, the Iranian Prime Minister.
- 1954 John Foster Dulles announces the new American foreign policy, the "New Look," which provides for the use of "massive retaliatory power" against potential aggressors.
In Guatemala, the moderately socialist government of Jacobo Arbenz is overthrown with the help of the CIA.
President Dwight Eisenhower formulates his "domino theory": he argues that a communist takeover of Indochina would lead inevitably to communist domination throughout Asia.
- 1957 The Soviets launch the world's first orbiting satellite, Sputnik.
- 1960 A U-2 plane is shot down over the Soviet Union and the pilot, Francis Gary Powers, is captured.
- 1961 Dwight Eisenhower delivers his Farewell Address in which he warns the American people against the growth of the "military-industrial complex."
The Bay of Pigs covert operation, the aim of which was to overthrow Fidel Castro, fails.
- 1962 Thanks to photographs taken by American U-2 reconnaissance planes, J.F. Kennedy is able to announce that the Soviets are building up missile sites in Cuba.
The Soviets agree to withdraw their missiles from Cuba following Kennedy's promise not to invade Cuba and to withdraw American missiles from Turkey.

- 1964 Following brief fighting between American and North Vietnamese troops Congress votes the *Gulf of Tonkin Resolution*, giving the President power to repel any armed attacks against the armed forces of the United States and to prevent further aggression.
- 1968 Beginning of the Tet Offensive.
- 1972 President Richard Nixon visits China.
President Nixon visits the Soviet Union.
SALT I: First Strategic Arms Limitation Talks.
- 1973 Peace settlement between Vietnam and the United States.
- 1975 April: North Vietnamese troops invade South Vietnam.
- 1979 Camp David Accords: under the aegis of President Jimmy Carter, Egypt and Israel sign a peace treaty.
The American embassy in Teheran is occupied by Iranian Muslim fundamentalists and 66 Americans are taken hostage.
- 1980 Following the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan the previous year, Carter announces an array of sanctions.
- 1983 President Ronald Reagan calls the Soviet Union the ‘evil empire.’
Reagan launches his *Strategic Defense Initiative* (SDI).
U.S. forces invade the Caribbean island of Grenada and overthrow its Marxist government.
- 1987 Reagan, in Berlin, challenges Gorbachev to “tear down this wall.”
- 1988 Gorbachev at the United Nations declares that “freedom of choice is a universal principle.”
- 1989 Military intervention in Panama, *Operation Just Cause*, so as to overthrow Manuel Noriega.
Opening of the Berlin Wall by East Germany.
- 1991 Congress passes a resolution supporting the use of force to secure the withdrawal of Iraqi troops from Kuwait.
Operation Desert Storm begins.
- 1992 *Operation Restore Hope*: a U.S.-led multinational force enters Somalia to secure the arrival of humanitarian aid.
- 1993 A truck bomb explodes in the garage of the World Trade Center in New York City, killing 6 people.
Following the death of 18 Army Rangers in the Black Hawk Down battle in Mogadishu, U.S. troops leave Somalia.
- 1994 In a speech at the John Hopkins University, Anthony Lake, the National Security Adviser, uses the term ‘enlargement’ to describe America’s foreign policy for the post-Cold War world.
The United States fails to intervene in the Rwandan genocide.
- 1995 *Operation Deliberate Force*: a program of NATO air strikes is set up to coerce the Bosnian Serb leadership into acceding to American and European demands to negotiate an end to the civil war.
Negotiations at Dayton, Ohio, lead to the end of the war in Bosnia.
- 1996 Clinton characterizes the United States as the “world’s indispensable nation.”
- 1998 Simultaneous terrorist attacks against United States embassies in Nairobi and Dar es Salaam leave 258 people dead and more than 1,000 injured.
Operation Desert Fox: Clinton orders air strikes against Iraq because Saddam Hussein has denied United Nations weapons inspectors access to sites.
- 1999 NATO bombs Serbian military targets in Kosovo and Serbia to stop ethnic cleansing.

2000	The USS Cole is bombed in the harbor of Aden, Yemen, killing 17 American sailors.
2001	An EP-3 reconnaissance plane on an intelligence mission near China's coastline collides with a Chinese fighter jet. George W. Bush says he plans to reactivate Reagan's Missile Defense program. September 11: an al-Qaida attack against the World Trade Center in New York City and the Pentagon kills no fewer than 3,000 people. <i>Operation Enduring Freedom</i> begins in Afghanistan. The Office of Homeland Security is established. Congress passes the <i>U.S.A. Patriot Act</i> , an acronym standing for "Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism."
2002	The first prisoners from the war in Afghanistan arrive in Guantánamo Bay, the American naval base in Cuba. The National Security Strategy of the USA states that the United States will never allow its military supremacy to be challenged and contemplates preemptive action against hostile states and terrorist groups. This document, which spells out the "Global War on Terror," rapidly becomes known as the Bush Doctrine. Congress adopts a resolution authorizing the use of military force against Iraq.
2003	Secretary of State Colin Powell argues, before the United Nations Security Council, that Iraq possesses weapons of mass destruction and may therefore face "serious consequences." March 19: The first American bombs fall on Baghdad. Saddam Hussein is found hiding near Tikrit and taken into custody.
2004	George Bush outlines his "Greater Middle East initiative", an effort to promote political freedom, democracy, free trade, equality for women, access to education and greater openness in the Middle East. The press reveals that U.S. forces have used torture as an interrogation technique in Iraq at the Abu Ghraib prison. The number of American soldiers killed in Iraq reaches 1000.
2005	On television, George W. Bush says that no weapons of mass destruction have been found in Iraq.
2006	Saddam Hussein is executed.
2007	The surge: Bush announces that several thousand additional troops will be sent to Iraq.
2008	Bush acknowledges that there were no WMDs in Iraq.
2009	George W. Bush leaves the presidency: 4,100 American soldiers have been killed and there have been tens of thousands of Iraqi casualties In his inaugural address, Barack Obama pledges to seek "a new way forward, based on mutual interest and mutual respect" with the Muslim world. Obama pledges to close down Guantánamo Bay. June: at Cairo University, Obama declares that "this cycle of suspicion and discord [between the United States and the Muslims] must end." December: Obama is awarded the Nobel Peace Prize.
2010	Obama defines a new National Security Strategy, rejecting the unilateral use of U.S. power and the right to wage preemptive war. It also emphasizes diplomatic engagement and international alliances.
2011	March: the United States joins a multi-state coalition to protect the Libyan population. May 2: Bin Laden is killed in Pakistan by a Navy Seal team.
2012	The detention camp at Guantánamo Bay remains open.